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2A B S T R A C T
This thesis is essentially an analysis of British attitudes 
towards Indian nationalism between 1922 and 1935. It rests upon the 
argument that attitudes created paradigms of perception which condi­
tioned responses to events and situations and thus helped to shape 
the contours of British policy in India. Although resistant to 
change, attitudes could be and were altered and the consequent para­
digm shift facilitated political change.
Books, pamphlets, periodicals, newspapers, private papers of 
individuals, official records, and the records of some interest 
groups have been examined to re-create, as far as possible, the 
structure of beliefs and opinions that existed in Britain with re­
gard to Indian nationalism and its more concrete manifestations, and 
to discover the social, political, economic and intellectual roots of 
the beliefs and opinions.
The first chapter is an introductory discussion of attitudes 
considered as ideological correlates of imperialism. The second 
chapter deals with British views on the working of Dyarchy in India 
and Indian demands for further reforms. British reactions to the 
rise of militant nationalism and the controversy over the Simon Com­
mission are analysed in the third chapter. The fourth chapter is 
primarily an examination of the responses to the first civil disobe­
dience campaign and the Gandhi-Irwin Pact. The fifth and sixth chap­
ters analyse the debate on the White Paper, the activities of some 
pressure groups, the role played by the State in moulding public opi­
nion, and the discussions leading up to the 1935 Act. The seventh 
and final chapter draws together the threads and sets out the conclu­
sions derived from this study.
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51: Introduction
This study of British attitudes to Indian nationalism between 
1922 and 1935 essentially attempts to answer three basic questions: 
what were these attitudes; what was their economic, social, politi­
cal and intellectual context; and, finally, what was the relation­
ship between these attitudes and imperial policy?
Such an investigation seems justifiable on two grounds. First, 
it will enable the reconstruction, albeit in part, of the structure 
of beliefs and ideas about the Indian Empire that existed in British 
society during the period under study. This reconstruction, even if 
incomplete, can be a means of extending social history (1). Secondly, 
metropolitan attitudes towards a subject people and their nationalism 
constitute an important part of the ideological correlates of imperi­
alism. An examination of such attitudes will therefore provide an 
additional interpretative dimension to the study of the complex geo­
metry of imperialism.
Recent historians of the retreat of the Raj have advanced seve­
ral reasons. Some have argued that the end of the British Empire in 
India was virtually predetermined, the decline of the Empire having 
been programmed, as it were, into the logic of imperialism and its 
institutions (2). Others have seen the collapse of Empire as stem­
ming from a failure to maintain structures of collaboration, or an
6inability to solve problems created by international economic crises 
(3). Another view is that, far from seeking ways of ending British 
rule in India (and elsewhere), Britain was attempting to shore up 
the Raj through increasingly complex political moves, some of which 
were designed to undermine the strength of nationalism by the develop­
ment of provincial loci of power (4).
Concentrating as they do on economic and political factors, 
most of these explanations do not take note of what may be called 
the psychological or ideological component of imperialism. This is 
partly because attempts to establish a causal connection between ideas 
and imperialism necessarily founder on the imprecision inherent in the 
relationship. That there is a link between the structure of beliefs 
and imperialism is perhaps self-evident. Imperialism in general, and 
British imperialism in particular, was accompanied in its various 
phases by the expression of several ideas and opinions, some supportive 
of, and some hostile to, imperialism. What, however, is not so clear 
is the nature of this relationship.
Michael Howard has suggested that the structures of beliefs and 
ideas in a society 'determined action and perhaps made some actions 
more likely than others' (5). Corelli Barnett was more emphatic. He 
has argued that the collapse of British power and the decline of the 
Empire in the Nineteen Forties was caused by a moral revolution which 
transformed British character (6). D.K. Fieldhouse, discussing the 
concept of 'popular imperialism', has advanced the contrary but more 
plausible view that 'it would be far more accurate to say that impe­
rialism as a state of mind was a shadow cast by the events of impe­
rial expansion than that empire was the product of the imperial idea' 
(7).
The truth cannot perhaps be discerned by asking whether ideas
determined action or whether imperialism was the progenitor of the 
imperial idea. It may be that the relationship was more a 'confused 
mixture of cause and effect' (8). It will be more helpful, therefore, 
to assume that the relationship between ideas and imperialism was one 
of interdependence and interaction rather than one of unidirectional 
causation. If imperialism in practice generated a set of ideas, 
these ideas in turn set the boundaries of the intellectual matrix 
within which the various decision-makers were constrained to move.
The process was constant, dynamic and reciprocal. Imperial ideology 
may therefore be seen neither as a cause, nor as a consequence of im­
perialism, but as one of its significant correlates.
The dominant ideology in any society tends to legitimize, justi­
fy, and reproduce or perpetuate the structure of that society. In 
the case of imperialism too, the dominant ideology performed similar 
functions in two interrelated but different areas, for, of necessity, 
imperial ideology had two separate foci: the metropolitan society on 
the one hand, and the subject society on the other.
In the latter, it was imperial ideology which diminished the 
need for repression and coercive action to maintain or extend the 
Empire. The psychological incorporation of a subject people into 
the imperial system was accomplished in several ways.
The apparently passive acceptance of imperial dominance by the 
indigenes of a colony was secured by, for example, making them feel in­
ferior to the alien ruling elite (9). Or it was obtained through the 
dissemination of myths about the permanence of Empire (10). On occa­
sion, imperial hegemony was buttressed by the resurrection or even in­
vention of indigenous traditions (11). Imperial ideology served also 
to secure local collaborators who helped imperial penetration and later 
its perpetuation. Such collaborators often had material reasons for
tending to support the Empire, but this tendency was reinforced by ide­
ology. The introduction of the English language and a Western system
of education into India, for example, acted to psychologically inte-
/
grate the new 'Westernized' Indian elite into the imperial system.
While imperial ideology performed this important function of 
securing the acquiescence of the colonial people, it also helped to 
reinforce the metropolitan roots of Empire. It was not enough to 
blunt the hostility of subject people; it was essential also to cre­
ate an imperial ethos at home to enlist the active support of the neces­
sary minions of Empire, the soldiers and officials who shored up the 
imperial edifice. The dissemination of imperial ideas and the creation 
of an imperial spirit enabled the builders of Empire to deflect cri­
ticism. This diffusion of the imperial ideology within the metropoli­
tan society was carried out at several levels.
Patrick Dunae has shown, for instance, how between 1870 and 1914 
popular literature for boys mirrored British imperial thought and 
played an important part in promoting an imperial spirit (12).
School textbooks also reflected imperial ideas, and rarely contained 
views critical of Empire, especially in the 'imperial' period (13). 
Young people were influenced in other ways also. Youth movements 
conditioned them to accept and cherish the idea of Empire (14).
It may also be relevant to consider in this context Edward 
Said's concept of 'Orientalism'. According to him, Orientalism was 
a 'western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority 
over the Orient', which prepared the way for imperial armies and ad­
ministrators (15). In other words, in Said's view, ideas about the 
Orient enabled the West to exercise cultural hegemony over the East, 
which in turn permitted political conquest.
Interestingly, as the British Empire was increasingly chal-
9lenged by destructive forces, imperialists adopted more vigorous 
methods to inculcate an imperial ethos among the people of Britain 
to ensure the survival of the Empire. Organizations such as the 
Royal Colonial Institute, the League of the Empire, and the Victoria 
League attempted to promote an imperial ethos through lectures, and 
activities like the Empire Day Movement (16). Significantly, at a 
still later stage, the Empire Marketing Board along with the Impe­
rial Institute sought to create an enthusiasm for the Empire by col­
lecting films about it and showing them to the public (17).
Imperial ideology, then, formed one of the important props of 
Empire. It nurtured the imperial spirit at home and at the same time 
conditioned the colonial people to perceive the imperial yoke as a boon 
rather than as a burden.
Nevertheless, not all the ideas that emerged from and during an 
imperial relationship were ideas that supported the Empire. Antithe­
tical notions, critical of the Empire, could and did emerge.
Society is not homogeneous. It is divided in various ways, and, 
although the dominant ideas reflect the views and interests of the 
ruling social strata, other alternative and oppositional ideas can 
arise from any given social formation. These may spring from other 
social strata or from the very range of variations available in any 
given society (18). The dominant ideology may select from the range of 
ideas and thus exclude alternatives, and the dominant social groups 
may attempt to inhibit alternative ideas (19). Nevertheless, alter­
native and oppositional ideas can, subject to social and political 
forces, exist simultaneously (20). This was true of British imperialism 
also (21). It gave rise to an imperial ideology, but generated also 
antithetical ideas. These ideas influenced the way in which British 
imperialism operated in practice.
10
An examination of the interrelationship between ideas and Bri­
tish imperialism will therefore provide a more complete picture of the 
British Empire. The basic assumption in this context is not that 
ideas or ideology were the fundamental determinants of British imperi­
alism, but rather that they were intellectual or mental elements in 
the imperial matrix which exerted pressure and influenced the course 
of British imperialism.
One way in which the ideological component of British imperia­
lism can be investigated is to examine the attitudes of the British 
public towards colonial societies. This study attempts to do this, 
focusing upon British attitudes towards Indian nationalism.
An attitude has been defined as a 'relatively enduring organi­
zation of interrelated beliefs that describe, evaluate and advocate 
action with respect to an object or situation'(22). Attitudes con­
stitute the internal framework of perception of an observer which 
determines the manner in which the observer reacts to a specific situ­
ation. Often, the reaction can be the expression of an opinion. There 
is thus a basic difference between attitudes and opinions (23). How­
ever, attitudes can be ascertained through an analysis of expressed 
opinions. Indeed, there is an extremely complex relationship between 
attitudes and opinions, for the expressed opinions, though they are 
products of attitudes, also add to the intellectual milieu in which 
attitudes are formed, shaped and altered. That is to say, although 
attitudes are resistant to change, they are not altogether impervi­
ous to influences and pressures.
That attitudes can and do change is illustrated by the shifting 
perceptions of Britain's imperial role. P.J. Marshall has pointed out 
how the fears and inhibitions about Britain's role in Asia entertained 
in Britain during the eighteenth century were dispelled by the end of
11
the century by an intellectual transformation (24). This change can 
be explained as being due to the fact that the early contacts between 
Britain and Asia were between an emergent capitalist society on the 
one hand and a feudal society on the other. British society had not 
yet fully emerged from the chrysalis of feudalism and was still bur­
dened, it may be suggested, by the modes of thought and culture inhe­
rited from the past. These acted to inhibit the development of an 
imperial ethos. The later conjuncture of advanced capitalism, a more 
aggressive imperialism and the rapid efflorescence of an imperial 
spirit is significant and suggestive. It is not being argued here 
that the change in attitudes was the decisive factor in explaining 
the rise of an imperialist spirit, nor that material factors such as 
transformations in the social structure are sufficient to alter atti­
tudes .
What may be inferred, however, from this particular example, 
is that attitudes, despite an inherent inertia, undergo changes over 
time. These changes can be caused by modifications in the structures 
of society or in the dynamics of power relationships and also by intel­
lectual reorientations resulting from the emergence of alternative 
ideas and new images.
At the same time, since images of a situation are governed by 
the internal framework of perception, the study of attitudes becomes 
crucial to any analysis of British imperialism. Though the key deter­
minants of imperial policy lay in other spheres, the way in which 
problems and events were perceived was conditioned by the structure of 
ideas and beliefs. Since solutions and responses to events depended 
on the way in which problems were perceived, it may logically be con­
cluded that attitudes and actions had a close correlation. Given its 
nature, this correlation is not amenable to precise and rigorous analy­
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sis. Nevertheless, it can and ought to be examined, for the existence 
of the correlation demands such an investigation.
There have been several studies of British attitudes to India 
during the Victorian era (25). Similar studies for the more recent 
period, a period of imperial decline, are very rare, and those that 
exist have primarily dealt with sectional attitudes or the opinions 
of specific groups (26). Such studies provide useful insights into 
the modes of thought in the metropolitan society. But they do not 
encompass a wide enough perspective to allow comparisons. This study 
of British attitudes towards Indian nationalism between 1922 and 1935 
has been undertaken as an attempt to provide such a comparative per­
spective on imperial attitudes during a period when the Raj was being 
increasingly menaced by the rising tide of Indian nationalism. This 
was a period of storm and stress in India as well as in Britain, with 
intervals of relative tranquility. An examination of the wide range of 
British attitudes towards Indian nationalism during this period will 
therefore enable a fuller exploration of the relationship between these 
attitudes and imperialism.
British attitudes towards India and Indian nationalism can be 
discerned from several kinds of sources. Benita Parry, Allen J. 
Greenberger, and Shamsul Islam have explored the connections between 
imperialist attitudes and imaginative literature, in the specific con­
text of Anglo-Indian relations (27). Essentially their studies also 
confirm the findings of those who investigated the links between impe­
rialism and literature (28). These show that, although the dominant 
ideas reflected in literary works were those that exalted imperialism, 
there were also works that questioned the assumptions and attitudes 
of imperialism. If Rudyard Kipling was the archetypal imperialist 
writer who lyrically extolled the Empire, there were several others
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who, like Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, struck a contrapuntal note (29). Later, 
E.M. Forster captured, in his novel A Passage to India, the ambivalence 
towards the Empire that was beginning to be displayed in the Twenties.
Writers encapsulate the attitudes and ideas of the society in 
which they live. It may be logical to conclude, therefore, that the 
plurality of views about the Empire which could be perceived in lite­
rary works with Indian themes was not merely a product of the creative 
imagination of the writers, but reflected an underlying social reality. 
At the same time, such works helped to influence and shape attitudes, 
perhaps at a subliminal level, for they presented a particular image 
of Indian society which either reinforced existing ideas and beliefs 
or raised questions about them.
While the literature of the Empire had a degree of ambivalence, 
the medium of film displayed a remarkable singularity of purpose.
Films with Indian themes usually depicted a romantic image of a feu­
dal India peopled by Princes and Princesses, with gallant Europeans 
rescuing damsels in distress (30). The Indian Empire was shown as 
unchanged and unchanging, and constitutional developments found no 
place in them, while the European's typical dislike of the educated 
native and respect for the warrior native was reflected in these films 
(31).
The strongly imperialist tone of films was probably due to the 
rigid control that was exercised over them, as cinema was seen as a 
potent mass medium (32). Even American producers, apprehensive of 
possible banning by British censors and the consequent loss of the 
huge Empire market, perforce turned out 'imperial' films (33). Thus 
British censorship rules forced the creation of a counterpoise to the 
usually anti-imperialist stance of American publicists.
One of these rules was that films should not be allowed to show
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Europeans in a bad light (34). It was necessary to maintain the mys­
tique of a superior European culture, and Indians or any other colonial 
people could not be permitted to penetrate the mask of superiority.
This had in fact been recognized very early. Thus the East India 
Company, protesting in 1801 about proposals to end its commercial mono­
poly in India, argued that one consequence of terminating the monopoly 
would be that native Indian shipping would multiply, Indian lascars 
would flock to London, and, it added (35): ,
...the contemptuous report which they disseminate on 
their return cannot fail to have a very unfavourable 
influence upon the minds of our Asiatic subjects, whose 
reverence for our character, which has hitherto contri­
buted to our ascendancy in the East...will be gradually 
exchanged for the most degrading conceptions; and if an 
indignant apprehension of having hitherto rated us too 
highly, or respected us too much, should once possess 
them, the effects of it may prove extremely detrimental.
Even into the Nineteen Thirties, the authorities in Britain were con­
cerned about Indians receiving a ’wrong' image about British society.
For instance, as late as 1934, R.A. Butler, the Under-Secretary 
of State for India, was expressing surprise that a film like The Pri­
vate Lives of Henry VIII had got past the Indian censors (36). This 
film had won an Oscar, starred Charles Laughton in the title role, and 
was obviously set in the distant past. Yet it was feared that it would 
conjure up a false image for Indian audiences. Indeed, even earlier, 
the King himself had told the Secretary of State for India, Samuel 
Hoare, that there was a need for a more stringent film censorship in 
India, and several MPs had also expressed their dismay that films 
which disparaged Western morals and civilization were being shown in 
India (37).
The British authorities were not concerned only with presenting 
Indians with a sanitized version of British society. They were equal­
ly keen that British viewers should see only an approved image of In-
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dia. The India Office, for example, asked for special censorship of 
films showing rioting in India (38). There was thus a constant moni­
toring of films to ensure that images that would alter existing struc­
tures of beliefs would not be allowed to reach either Indians or the 
British public.
Similar control was also exercised over the ’new' medium of 
radio. Talks and other programmes on India helped to nurture the 
British stereotypes about India, for they were confined to subjects 
such as life in Indian villages, the caste system, and Indian langu­
ages, and presented no radical departures.
The control exercised over the 'popular' media of radio and 
cinema demonstrates the importance attached by the authorities to the 
need for preventing the dissemination of oppositional ideas about the 
British Empire in India.
Such official intervention and control is not easily visible 
however in the case of factual, as opposed to imaginative, publica­
tions. As the challenge of Indian nationalism forced itself upon 
British consciousness, the public in Britain responded with a ple­
thora of opinions expressed through books, pamphlets, articles and 
letters in newspapers and periodicals. Significant inferences about 
British attitudes can be drawn by examining even some of these. Since 
their message was direct, they had, it may safely be presumed, a grea­
ter influence on the public than works of creative imagination. It 
is not being argued here that these publications directly impinged 
on the official mind and thus determined imperial policy. On the 
other hand, they were predominantly reflections of a climate of opini­
on which policy-makers had to consider. British public opinion 
was, among several factors, one of the constraints acting on the 
imperial decision-makers (39). If it had not been, officials might
16
not have sought so assiduously to prevent any radical shifts of opinion.
This study will therefore take a (necessarily selective and im­
pressionistic) look at some of the publications on India and Indian 
politics that appeared between 1922 and 1935. These publications con­
tributed either to the reinforcement of existing beliefs about India 
or to the projection of alternative images. Who were the people who 
produced them? At which social strata were they aimed? The answers 
to such questions can lead also to conclusions about the sections of 
the British public which demonstrated an interest in Indian affairs, 
and the possible reasons for such interest, for the term 'public' sug­
gests a homogeneity which is absent in reality. Firstly, the fact of 
publication itself indicates an exclusive group of articulate indivi­
duals. More importantly, these individuals and their readers come 
from a variety of social strata, and it will be useful to know if 
any relationship exists between the writer, the idea, and the social 
stratum to which he belonged. On the other hand, there was an implicit 
attempt in all such writing to create a homogeneous 'public opinion'.
The tendency of the dominant groups to exercise ideological hegemony 
was reflected also in the tendency to manipulate and mould public 
opinion, or at a deeper level to shape and form attitudes.
British attitudes towards Indian nationalism can be inferred 
also from a perusal of the private correspondence of individuals who 
were interested in India for one reason or another. The correspondence 
of officials will offer clues about the extent of the influence that 
public opinion had on policy-making. That of non-officials, untram­
melled as it was by the requirements of officialdom, may be revealing. 
Again, the examination of such correspondence has been selective. Given 
the volume of correspondence available for study, selection is neces­
sary and inevitable. But selection, even if arbitrary, need not detract
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from or vitiate any conclusions that may be arrived at, since the pri­
mary purpose is to discover, so far as it is possible, the range of 
attitudes, and their contexts.
Any study of British attitudes and public opinion must remain 
incomplete if no attention is given to the activities of various groups 
that emerged in the Twenties and Thirties. Some of these were pressure 
groups which hoped to influence or alter official policy. Others mere­
ly sought to inform the public, and thus to reinforce or change the 
prevalent notions. The activities of such groups can be an index to 
trends of thought and also indicate the mechanisms used to influence 
or shape opinion.
One of the interesting questions raised by any study of atti­
tudes is whether any correlation exists between the social status of 
a group and its attitudes. Although a decisive answer cannot perhaps 
be given, this study will attempt to discover the social roots of 
groups which were actively concerned with Indian affairs in order to 
find if there was any such correlation. Some of these groups were 
sympathetic to Indian nationalism, while others were committed to the 
maintenance of the British Empire in India. Even a cursory analysis 
of the membership of the various groups should yield useful insights 
into the relationship between attitudes and social or economic factors.
Another significant factor which has to be considered is the 
role played by the State in attempting to shape attitudes. Although 
there exists a natural resonance between the dominant ideology and 
the ideas that the State seeks to propagate, there is also an ele­
ment of active propaganda by the State to sustain ideas which would 
support its policies.
Keith Wilson has recently argued that the Foreign Office took 
no positive steps to mould public opinion before the First World War, 
and that, on the contrary, it fostered the 'prevailing ignorance' of
18
the British people about foreign affairs (40). It would be instructive 
to examine the attitude of the India Office towards propaganda, and 
the methods that it may have used to influence public opinion on 
India. It seems logical to assume that, as criticism of Government 
policy on India increased, the India Office might have attempted to 
counter it through direct and indirect measures.
To summarize, this study will examine the published writing of 
the period, and the correspondence of officials and non-officials, 
and will also analyse the activities of various groups connected with 
Indian affairs, as well as the way in which the India Office reacted 
to public opinion. This will allow a range of attitudes to be deli­
neated and related to the political, social and economic context.
It may be useful, at this juncture, to briefly examine the 
context, both in its British and its Indian setting. In Britain, 
the period under study was a period that saw the paradoxical juxta­
position of rising affluence and of bleak poverty (41). Although sec­
tors of the economy were able to ride over the economic crises that 
marked this period, important areas of economic activity were devas­
tated, and this was to be crucial for shaping the contours of British 
attitudes towards India. Ian Drummond did not apparently take this 
significant aspect into account when he argued that, throughout the 
inter-war period, the Indian market was small and diminishing in im­
portance (42). It may be that Britain exported more to countries out­
side the Empire, and India might have been a small market in terms 
of the total volume of British trade, but perceptions, and particular­
ly contemporary perceptions, are not made by statistics alone. The 
decline in British industries, especially the 'old' industries such 
as textiles, iron and steel, and shipbuilding, was depressingly evi­
dent (43). As it was in these areas that Indian industry was offer-
19
ing increasing competition, the Indian market must have seemed as im­
portant as ever. Intensifying competition from other countries such 
as Japan, Germany and the USA meant in fact that India became econo­
mically ever more important (44). For businessmen, then, India was 
a vital element in the Empire, and concessions made to Indian entre­
preneurs, such as the fiscal autonomy convention, and the resulting 
tariff barriers, could only have seemed threatening. And, as A.P. 
Thornton suggested, in history it is not what is true, but what is
thought to be true that is often more significant (45).
The economic crisis that faced Britain was accompanied also
by a moral and intellectual crisis. There was a new climate of dis­
sent, an unwillingness to accept received notions about social order 
and justice. Intellectuals began to question the traditional assump­
tions about society (46). The questioning extended also to the Empire, 
and in particular to the exercise of control over India. In a poem 
published in 1932, Julian Bell captured the essence of the prevail­
ing trends of thought (47): . .
Instructed by their Press, such men are sure 
Of all our ills the empire is the cure.
As for the empire, it is plain, of course,
Since it was won it must be kept by force.
And so the case is simple and complete 
For spending eighty millions on the fleet.
True, now and then, some villain may observe,
Despite their Empire, men can all but starve;
And subject races oddly don't perceive 
What, except jail, the Empire has to give;
But plain blunt businessmen will not attend 
To mere ideas - who knows how that might end.
Such dissenting writing changed little, for attitudes and beliefs
resisted change. Nevertheless, the emergence of radical and critical
ideas indicated that a solvent was at work, slowly dissolving old ideas
and images about the Empire.
One of the factors responsible for the reappraisal of Indian 
affairs from new perspectives was the rapid pace of political change
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in India after the First World War. There had been criticism of impe­
rialism in the past (48). But the emergence in India of a new style 
of politics, under the leadership of Gandhi, forced the British pub­
lic to reconsider existing notions. The massacre at Amritsar, the 
Rowlatt Satyagraha and the boycott of the visit of the Prince of Wales 
all led to a remarkable shift in British opinion (49).
Such a shift could be seen, for example, in the gradual evolu­
tion of ideas on Indian constitutional reform within the 'Round Table' 
group. Although the members of the Round Table movement were initial­
ly convinced that Indians were unfit for self-government, by the end 
of the First World War they had come to see the necessity of reforms, 
and one of its members, Lionel Curtis, became closely involved in the 
making of the Government of India Act of 1919 (50). This is not to 
suggest that it was the shift in ideas that contributed to the idea of 
new political reforms in India. The reforms had become politically 
necessary, as a means of retaining the collaboration of Indian elites 
(51). But, it can be argued, the shift in attitudes facilitated and 
even perhaps shaped political change. Ideas may not be the progeni­
tors of political action. Nevertheless they can inhibit or, alterna­
tively, facilitate change. The flux of intellectual attitudes in 
Britain, and in particular the emergence of oppositional and alterna­
tive ideas following the social and psychological upheaval caused by 
the war, created a climate of opinion in Britain which must be ana­
lysed to obtain a more complete picture of Britain's imperial rela­
tions with India.
In India, also, the period after the war was a time of rapid 
change in economics as in politics. The war gave an additional sti­
mulus to Indian industry, and it grew quickly. At the same time, 
however, the war had also caused a serious dislocation of the economy,
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and thus created conditions in which militant agitation might thrive. 
Such agitation did take place, in localities at first, and then on a 
larger national scale.(52). It was in response to this growing mili­
tancy that the British fashioned the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, de­
signed at once to defuse the political tensions in India by streng­
thening the networks of collaboration, and, by shifting the focus of 
political power to the provincial level, to weaken the nascent over­
arching nationalism that would be a greater threat to imperialism.
In the event, the Government of India Act of 1919 could nei­
ther stem the tide of nationalism, nor effectively alter the politi­
cal geometry of India. If there had been a real transfer of power 
in the provinces, the fruits of office might have tempted more colla­
borators, and provincialism might have been strengthened at the ex­
pense of nationalism. At that time, however, any meaningful trans­
fer of power was anathema to the British, partly because of the no­
tion that Indians were unfit for self-government. The Act of 1919 was 
a compromise, more a temporizing expedient than a long-term solution 
for the Indian political problem.
The years following upon the reforms did appear to bring a
semblance of peace to India for a time, but it was not long before
the peace was fractured by a renewal of agitation, first over the 
Statutory Commission, and then as a more extensive civil disobedience 
movement. The Government of India Act of 1935 was a renewed attempt 
to win friends in India and to blunt the sharp edge of militant natio­
nalism. Between 1922 and 1935, the pendulum of Indian politics oscil­
lated between tranquility and trouble, evoking in consequence a variety 
of reactions in Britain.
It is upon these reactions that this study will concentrate, in 
order to elucidate British attitudes towards Indian nationalism, and
to discern the connections, if any, between these attitudes and the 
policies adopted. The efflorescence of British interest in India 
was partly due to the increasing pressure of Indian nationalism, and 
partly a result of the long and tortuous process of political change 
set in motion by the appointment of the Statutory Commission in 1927. 
These interrelated factors combined with the special attention given 
to India by newspapers and periodicals of the time to sharpen and re­
new British interest in Indian affairs.
It must be admitted perhaps that during the inter-war period 
domestic questions like unemployment, and international issues like 
disarmament, peace and security, appear to have been the major pre­
occupations of the British intelligentsia. Interest in India was 
displayed by a relatively tiny segment of British society. One of the 
secondary aims of this study will be to discover what prompted cer­
tain people to take a special interest in Indian affairs. One obvi­
ous motivation would be personal connections with India. Were there 
any other.reasons? Such an inquiry will also permit conclusions to 
be drawn regarding the social roots of the opinions and ideas expres­
sed by the British public.
To briefly recapitulate, this study will examine British atti­
tudes towards Indian nationalism between 1922 and 1935, and will at­
tempt to discern the connections between attitudes, policies, and the 
social, political and economic contexts.
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2. Reform and Reaction: The Illusory Peace 1922-6
In the summer of 1921, a Britain which had emerged victorious 
from the Great War contemplated a vast Empire which had by then grown 
to its maximum territorial extent (1). Ironically, however, the very 
dimensions of the British Empire seemed to precipitate crises, as 
though empires had a critical size beyond which they would begin to 
decay. In Egypt, Ireland and India, the once awesome and apparently 
invincible imperial power faced a series of challenges from new natio­
nalist leaders with new political strategies, and it appeared as if 
there was a general crisis of the Empire (2). At such a time, when 
the structure of Empire seemed threatened, as the sharp edge of natio­
nalist agitation chipped away at the imperial edifice, Britain 
sought to cling more tenaciously to the notion of Empire, and to 
the component parts of the Empire. This was particularly true of 
India, which had for a long time been regarded as the most vital 
element of the British Empire.
Till 1919, the Indian Empire had seemed everlasting and the 
permanence of the British Raj appeared to be beyond doubt. But the 
Raj had rested upon the active collaboration of some sections of the 
Indian people, and the passive acquiescence of the rest (3). The rise 
and growth of an increasingly militant nationalist movement had, how­
ever, begun to cast doubts on the continuance of this necessary colla­
boration and acquiescence. The Government of India Act of 1919
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was an attempt to stem the rising tide of militancy and to retain the 
collaboration of Indians. But this attempt seemed predestined to fai­
lure as the Rowlatt Act agitation, the Khilafat movement and then the 
non-co-operation movement struck, between 1919 and 1922, a series of 
sharp blows on the Imperial Government. Significant elements of 
Indian society, it appeared, were no longer willing to extend uncon­
ditionally the co-operation that had hitherto been given to support 
the imperial structure in India.
If the Rowlatt satyagraha and the Khilafat movement were straws 
in the wind, as it were, indicating the new direction of the Indian 
nationalist movement, the non-co-operation movement marked a new 
phase in the struggle, and it completely altered the nature and 
structure of Indian politics. The non-co-operation movement was un­
precedented , not only in the passionate political intensity it gene­
rated, but, more significantly, in terms of the new sections of In­
dian society which had been drawn into the political arena as a re­
sult of the. movement (4,).. The success of the movement in attracting, . 
widespread popular support, and the tactics used, perplexed the autho­
rities in India and in London, and quite unnerved Government officials 
(5). Not surprisingly, the movements of 1919-22 significantly affected 
British perceptions of Indian nationalism, and thus influenced British 
attitudes to Indian politics in the succeeding years (6).
In Britain, there was a reluctance to see the non-co-operation 
movement as a manifestation of a stronger and more vigorous nationa­
lism. The Times, for example, saw it as a 'symptom of a crude, but 
awakening national consciousness' (7). This perception of events 
in India as being symptoms of an emergent nationalism, rather than 
those of a mature, well developed political movement, reflected a 
curious refusal to recognize the changes in Indian politics. It was
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as if The Times was commenting upon the Swadeshi movement in Bengal 
in the first decade of the twentieth century, and not upon a situa­
tion that had been changed, and changed utterly, by a new spirit of 
militancy. Indeed, this change had been noted by the owner of The 
Times, Lord Northcliffe, who felt, after a visit to India, that the 
situation there recalled that which had prevailed before the mutiny 
of 1857, and who observed a new hostility towards Europeans (8).
Why then did The Times refuse to recognize the strength and nature 
of the nationalist movement in India?
One reason was that The Times, like several other observers 
and commentators, saw the unrest in India as being the result of 
other factors, most notably the Khilafat issue (9). Even the Sec­
retary of State for India, Edwin Montagu, thought that the prime 
factor in the Indian situation was the Khilafat question (10). 
Apparently, the fact that Hindus and Muslims, politically divided 
by the introduction of separate electorates in 1909, could now come 
together, united by a common cause, mystified British observers, and 
led them to invest the Khilafat question with an undue significance 
for explaining Indian unrest. The British had always perceived In­
dia as a land riven by communal and sectarian conflict and held to­
gether only by the unifying force of pax Britannica (11). The Hindu- 
Muslim unity forged in the white heat of post-war international and 
domestic politics appeared so contrary to the existing image of warring 
irreconcilables that it necessarily acquired a disproportionate signi­
ficance. Other causes, nationalism among them, were relegated to the 
background.
The strength of Indian nationalism was further obscured by the 
argument that Indian unrest could be attributed to the weakness of 
the Government in India as well as in Britain. The Daily Mail
suggested, for example, that the real source of trouble in India was 
weakness at home (12). The Observer, on the other hand, blamed the 
Viceroy, Lord Reading, and the Secretary of State for India, Edwin 
Montagu. It accused them of having struck a blow at the basis of the 
Empire by 'an incredible crudity of judgment and an inexplicable vio­
lation of their constitutional duty' (13). Even The Times, which had 
initially praised the Government for its handling of the situation, 
quickly shifted to an extremely critical stance. It called for strong 
action in India, and for the replacement of Montagu with a 'statesman 
of stronger fibre', since he was letting 'the sceptre of India fall 
from nerveless fingers' (14). The spirit of this increasing hostili­
ty to Montagu was perhaps best encapsulated in the Punch cartoon, 
which depicted Gandhi telling Montagu, 'One of us has to go', and 
John Bull remarking acidly, 'Why not both?' (15).
Montagu was a member of a coalition Cabinet. Such Cabinets 
are usually fragile structures, subject to inherent stresses and ten­
sions, and are held together only by the nuts and bolts of political 
exigencies. The Cabinet headed by Lloyd George in the spring of 1922 
was in this sense no exception. It was, in fact, already moving to­
wards a collapse as the Conservatives began manoeuvres to recapture 
the bastions of power for themselves (16). The attacks on Montagu, 
therefore, might have been merely the opening salvoes in an assault 
upon the coalition itself. Montagu became the prime target, however, 
because the Indian question provided the critics of the Government 
with useful ammunition. In the end, Montagu was compelled to resign on 
a technicality. He had sanctioned, without prior approval from the 
Cabinet, the publication of the Government of India's views on the 
Treaty of Sevres, and this was deemed to be an unpardonable trans­
gression of Cabinet ethics. Winston Churchill too had committed a
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similar solecism at this time, by making an unauthorized declaration 
on the status of Indians in Kenya. He however escaped criticism. 
Montagu, on the other hand, had already alienated the Cabinet too 
much to find many supporters among its members. Indeed, Montagu had, 
it would appear, little influence in the Cabinet by this time. Even 
on India, it was the advice of Curzon and Churchill that came to be 
followed in Cabinet, not that of Montagu (17). Apparently, Montagu 
fell victim to a newly ascendant reactionary policy on India, evident 
not only inside the Cabinet but visible outside as well.
There were several reasons for this shift in British attitudes 
towards India at this time. A.H. Grant, a former Chief Commissioner 
of the North-West Frontier Province, pointed out in a letter to The 
Times that the daily reports of the activities of the agitators, the 
ungracious reception of what was considered to be a very liberal 
scheme of reforms, and most of all the organized attempts to boycott 
the visit of the Prince of Wales tended to irritate and estrange Bri­
tish public opinion (18). Montagu also had sensed this feeling of 
exasperation in Britain. The British people were fed up with India, 
he wrote to Reading, and were in particular incensed by India's boy­
cott of the Prince of Wales (19). Chelmsford too detected what he 
termed a 'hysterical wave of feeling' in Britain with reference to 
affairs in India (20).
The swing to a reactionary policy on India may also have been 
a part of the general movement in Britain from a 'rhetoric of pro­
gress' to a 'rhetoric of resistance' (21). Beset by problems emana­
ting from the war and its aftermath, Britain was perhaps retreating 
wearily to a more conservative position, and was probably in no mood 
to put up with the apparent intransigence of Indian nationalists.
This swing was reflected even in the usually radical columns
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of the New Statesman. Obviously reacting to the apparent inaction 
of the Government of India, it pointed out in a leading article that, 
if the 'Gandhi Movement' was allowed to spread as widely and rapidly 
as it had in the previous two years, Britain would be left with only 
two choices: either to quit altogether, or to use force on a massive 
scale (22). The adoption of the latter course would arouse the pro­
tests of 'civilised democracy all over the world', the New Statesman 
declared, while, on the other hand, abdication of British rule would 
lead to anarchy and ultimately to autocratic monarchies, and thus 
would constitute treason to democracy. Pursuing a middle course 
between these extreme positions, the New Statesman recommended the 
continuation of the reforms policy coupled with the use of sufficient 
force to maintain peace. Clifford Sharp, the editor of the New 
Statesman at this time, was prejudiced against Indian nationalists 
(23). His personal predilections might have coloured the editorial 
stance of the New Statesman, and led it to advocate a judicious mix­
ture of reform and repression as a cure for Indian ills. At the 
same time, this solution closely echoed existing British notions 
about the nature of the Indian nationalist movement, and about the 
consequences of a British withdrawal. That even a radical journal 
like the New Statesman should have accepted and reiterated stereo­
types about India indicates the hold such ideas had upon the British 
intelligentsia.
In India also, the Viceroy was at this time receiving similar 
advice. Willingdon, Governor of Madras, urged Reading to combine 
suppression of the non-co-operation movement with positive steps 
to secure further constitutional advances (24). This resonance of 
ideas between a Governor in India and a radical English journal was 
not inexplicable. It could be argued that the hostility of the
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radicals to the new Gandhian nationalism might have stemmed in part 
from their dislike of Gandhi's ideas on religion and caste. But, it 
can be suggested, the more basic determinant of the attitude of the 
New Statesman and its editor was the persistence of the notion that 
there could only be anarchy in India if the British left.
Moreover, the solutions advanced by Willingdon and the New 
Statesman were basically derived from a fundamental tenet of British 
political strategy in India: that the maintenance of Empire required 
the conciliation of the moderate elements and the repression of 
extremist agitation. The assumptions underlying this strategy were 
that the moderates could prop up the Empire in India, and that the 
extremist agitators were weak enough to be easily suppressed. These 
assumptions, it may be suggested, were themselves conditioned and 
shaped by the preconceptions about the strength and character of 
the Indian nationalist movement, particularly those which regarded the 
movement as the activity of a minority. It was the strategy based 
on these assumptions which contributed in part to the forging of the 
Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, which would, it was hoped, recover the 
support of the moderates in India for ensuring the permanence of the 
raj .
The assumptions were so strong indeed that, despite the fai­
lure of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms to effectively rally the 
Indian moderates, and in spite of the visible success of the extre­
mists in launching and sustaining the non-co-operation movement, the 
desire to conciliate the moderates did not disappear. On the con­
trary, the attempts to extinguish the fires of nationalist agita­
tion with the help of the moderates continued to dominate British 
strategy. One retired ICS official, H.V. Cobb, who had been the 
Resident at Mysore, and the Chief Commissioner of Coorg, went so far
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as to suggest that the moderates should be actively organized, as 
that was the only way of saving India (25). The fact that Cobb had 
served in areas which were outside the ambit of nationalist agita­
tion might have led him to take a more optimistic view of the strength 
of the moderates, for he believed that for every 1seditionist' there 
were a thousand moderates (26). But his views were not entirely ex­
ceptional, and in fact, shorn of the rhetorical exaggeration, were 
typical. It was the desire not to alienate the moderates which pro­
bably restrained the Government of India from taking harsh measures 
against the non-co-operation movement, although it must be recognized 
that the Government of India might have been merely awaiting an op­
portune moment to arrest Gandhi and strike a decisive blow against it.
Gandhi was arrested on 10 March 1922, just as Montagu's resig­
nation was announced, and thus gave rise to speculation that Montagu's 
exit had inaugurated a new more assertive policy in India. In fact, 
the Daily Herald, commenting on Montagu's resignation, had expressed 
the fear that Montagu and Reading would be replaced by 'worse men', 
to be followed by the adoption of a policy of extreme coercion, 
which in its opinion would mean disaster for the Empire (27). The 
Daily Herald naturally saw in the arrest of Gandhi a confirmation 
of its worst fears (28). Such speculation was fuelled also by the 
exultation of the conservative newspapers, which saw the arrest of 
Gandhi as the necessary beginning of a more stringent policy in 
India (29). Ironically, the arrest of Gandhi had nothing to do with 
Montagu's exit from the Cabinet, for the arrest had been contemplated 
for a long time, and carried out at what was deemed to be an opportune 
moment. In fact, the relative calm with which India reacted to the 
arrest was interpreted as signifying that the Government had indeed 
chosen the right psychological moment (30). In Britain those
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clamouring for more forceful action in India welcomed Gandhi's ar­
rest and his imprisonment. As Lord Montagu of Beaulieu pointed out 
to the Viceroy, the strong measures taken by the Government of India 
following Gandhi's arrest comforted English opinion (31). Only the 
Daily Herald raised its lone voice of protest, describing the sen­
tence of six years' imprisonment imposed on Gandhi as a step taken 
to satisfy the 'primitive desire of our imperialists for revenge...' 
but one which would do nothing to solve the Indian problem (32). Bri­
tish opinion in 1922, with a few exceptions, welcomed the inauguration 
of a more assertive policy in India. It must also have been comforted 
by the fact that Montagu was replaced, not by another Liberal, but by 
Peel, a Conservative. It is not being suggested that the personal 
predilections of the Secretary of State for India made a significant 
difference in the India policy. To contemporary observers, however, 
it seemed that there was a shift, a change in the way Government 
dealt with Indian affairs (33).
There was perhaps a compelling economic reason for quickly,
restoring order in India. Although British trade with India was not 
seriously affected by political agitation in this period, it could 
not proceed smoothly. Insurance underwriters in London, for example, 
began to charge high rates for covering risk of damage through riots 
or civil commotion to goods warehoused in Indian cities (34). There 
was a noticeable decline in the imports of textiles, partly due to 
the boycott campaign. W.H. Pease, the Secretary of the Indian Tea 
Association, London, asked the Secretary of State for India for assu­
rances that the strong action taken against political agitators in 
Assam tea districts would be continued (35). As Lloyd George pointed
out to Reading, if British businessmen and financiers were to be en­
couraged to invest in India, it would be necessary to reassure them
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regarding political conditions there (36).
Perhaps it was this thought that led Lloyd George to declare 
in the House of Commons on 2 August 1922 (37):
One thing we must make clear - that Britain will 
in no circumstances relinquish her responsibility for 
India. That is a cardinal principle not merely of the 
present Government, but I feel confident that it will 
be a cardinal principle with any Government that could 
command the confidence of the people of this country.
Increasing participation of Indians in the Government was an inevitable 
evolution, agreed Lloyd George, but, he added, that was not in order 
that it may lead up to a final relinquishment of British trust.
Lloyd George then placed the coping stone on this emphatic restate­
ment of imperialist policy by declaring that, whatever might be the 
success of the Indians, as administrators or Parliamentarians, he 
could see 'no period when they can dispense with the guidance and 
assistance of this small nucleus of the British Civil Service', as 
it was the 'steel frame' of the whole structure, which would collapse 
if it was taken out.
As for the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, the Prime Minister was 
at pains to point out, in almost lyrically repetitive phrases, that 
the changes were 'in the nature of an experiment, and they must be 
treated as an experiment, a great and important experiment, but still 
an experiment'.
Although this speech was delivered in the course of a debate 
on the appropriation of funds for the Indian Civil Service, Lloyd 
George used the opportunity to quell the many critics of the Govern­
ment's policy in India by emphasizing the permanence, not only of the 
Indian Civil Service as then constituted, but also of the British Raj 
in India, and strengthened his arguments by reference to the experi­
mental nature of the reforms of 1919.
Not surprisingly, this speech caused a great deal of resentment
in India, especially since, in his references to the experimental 
nature of the reforms, Lloyd George had also suggested that future 
policy would depend upon the way in which Indian politicians opera­
ted the machinery provided to them. This seemed to the Indians to 
be suggesting that they were on probation, so to speak, and all sec­
tions were united in denouncing the implications of the speech. 
Interestingly, Colonel Josiah Wedgwood had reacted immediately in 
the Commons itself, pointing out that the Prime Minister's speech 
not only constituted a new declaration regarding India, but was also 
an implied threat that, if non-co-operators got into the councils and 
there conducted a campaign of opposition to the Government, the re­
forms scheme could be withdrawn (38). Indian reactions must have 
been fuelled by this interpretation, and the efforts made by the 
Under-Secretary of State for India, Earl Winterton, to deny that any 
such threat was implied did not serve to attenuate Indian anger.
Whatever Indians might have thought, the reforms of 1919 were 
indeed seen in Britain as an experiment (39). The Observer, for ex­
ample, declared that it was Indian goodwill and capacity that were 
being tested by the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, and, if co-operation 
in full measure was not given, Indians would have defeated the 
'attempt to admit them to the progressive control of their own for­
tunes...' (40). Writing in the Fortnightly Review, Michael O'Dwyer 
expounded a similar view. He asserted that Parliament should reite­
rate that no further constitutional advance was possible till the full 
ten years of experience had shown that the necessary conditions had 
been fulfilled (41). Given the prevalence of such ideas, it was not 
surprising that Lloyd George should have so categorically asserted 
the experimental nature of the reforms. It was not surprising either 
that Indians saw the speech primarily as an assertion that Britain
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would continue to rule India with a heavy hand.
In Britain, the stresses were heard differently, and the speech 
was seen essentially as a defence of the Indian Civil Service. J.R. 
Chancellor, the Principal Assistant Secretary of the Committee of 
Imperial Defence, in fact thought that it was regrettable that the 
Prime Minister's speech had such a bad effect in India, as he was 
merely trying to 'cheer up' the ICS (42).
It was true, of course, that at this juncture the ICS needed 
reassurance. Due to various factors, there had been a serious decline 
in the numbers of young Englishmen applying to join the Indian Civil 
Service, and this caused concern in Britain (43). So few British 
candidates came forward after the war that special recruitment from 
among discharged Army officers had to be resorted to so that the pro­
portion of 'Europeans' in the ICS would remain high (44). David 
Potter has argued that this decline was essentially due to economic 
crises in Britain, rather than Indian nationalism (45). It would be 
more logical to expect that domestic economic crises would make im­
perial service more, not less attractive. Indeed, T.H. Beaglehole 
has shown how British interest in the ICS actually increased in the 
last years of the Raj (46) - years in fact, when the British economy 
was under great stress. But in the immediate aftermath of the Mon­
tagu-Chelmsford reforms, the heaven-born service seemed to have been 
shorn of its erstwhile glamour, pomp and power. Moreover, the pos­
sibility of having to serve under Indian ministers was a prospect not 
entirely to the liking of those brought up on images of Indian inef­
ficiency and venality. It seems plausible, therefore, to argue that 
the main reason for the reluctance of British candidates to try for 
the ICS was the inherited set of images about Indian society. Quite 
a few of those who had been serving in the ICS took advantage of an
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opportunity to retire early, thus indicating their apprehensions about 
serving under the reformed constitution.
Even five years later, Reginald Coupland, in India with the 
Lee Commission investigating the Civil Services, noted a sense of 
demoralization and defeatism in the Indian Civil Service (47). The 
origins of such demoralization lay in the British image of India.
It was difficult to reconcile the notion of the ICS as the guardians 
with the idea of sharing power and responsibility, especially 
with the very Indians who were supposedly unfit to share them.
Philip Mason has recorded how, despite the recognition that 
significant changes were taking place in India in the Twenties, the 
illusion of permanence had not been shattered (48). It would appear, 
therefore, that the reason for the demoralization of the ICS was not 
the imagined immediate end of the Indian Empire, but the feeling 
that the once glittering 'steel frame' would be quickly corroded by the 
advancing tides of nationalism, both in the form of increasing devo­
lution of power and also the rapid Indianization of the Service.
So concerned was the Government about the unintended Indiani­
zation of the ICS, brought about by the lack of British candidates, 
that it resorted to complicated manoeuvres to maintain what it deemed 
a safe proportion of 'Europeans' (49).
What is of relevance here is the implication that India could 
not do without a virtually permanent corps d'elite of British of­
ficers. The permanence of the Indian Empire could be ensured only 
by, it was apparently believed, preserving such a European core, 
and, though the illusion of permanence was still intact, there were 
real fears in Britain that the Empire in India was slowly but surely 
vanishing. The speech of Lloyd George, ostensibly in defence of the 
ICS, was intended, it would seem, to explicitly reassert the continu-
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ation of British hegemony over India.
Ironically, one of the devices used to ensure the maintenance 
of the Raj was itself the cause of fears that India was acquiring too 
much freedom too rapidly. The fiscal autonomy convention was designed 
to retain the support of the moderates and thereby to ensure the per­
manence of the Empire (50). Under the convention, India was left 
relatively free to erect tariff barriers and thus seemed to have 
acquired an excessive degree of economic freedom, especially with re­
gard to imports from Lancashire's textile mills (51). The Lancashire 
cotton magnates made strenuous attempts to get the India Office 
to persuade the Government of India to rescind or reduce the import 
duties on cotton goods, which had been increased by 4% in the begin­
ning of 1921. But these attempts were unsuccessful, although they 
were met to some extent in the spring of 1922, when the Government 
of India increased the excise duty on cotton goods to 7%%, the tariff 
on imports having been at the same time put up to 15%. The Executive 
Committee of the India section of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce 
passed a resolution expressing its regret that the Indian tariff was 
increased, but appreciating the accompanying increase in the excise 
duty on Indian manufactures (52).
It was not merely in the case of fixing of tariffs that India 
appeared to be exercising an undue amount of fiscal freedom which 
was damaging to British interests. What caused consternation among 
British businessmen was the question of Indian orders for the supply 
of material and equipment. In India, the demand was being made that 
nothing should be done that subordinated the interests of the Indian 
tax-payer to those of the British manufacturer. Even as early as 
September 1921, the Legislative Assembly at Delhi had passed a reso­
lution recommending that the High Commissioner for India should be 
instructed to buy stores in the cheapest market, and that any devi-
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ations should be reported, with actual reasons being given (53).
The Indian stance prompted a group of MPs representing British 
commercial interests to seek a meeting with the Secretary of State 
for India, and he did meet them on 26 July 1922, along with the High 
Commissioner for India, officials of the India Office and others in­
volved in the purchase of stores for India (54). The Secretary of 
State agreed that it was certainly important to get the largest pro­
portion of Indian orders for Britain, especially in view of the rising 
unemployment. Earl Winterton, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of 
State for India, then went on to point out to the delegation that the 
High Commissioner for India had come in for criticism in the past when 
he had given preference to the manufactures of Britain, and that, in 
practice, Britain in any case got the largest share of the contracts. 
(In the financial year April 1921 to March 1922, out of a total of 
£11,052,755 placed on contract, £10,895,907 went to Britain.)
It would be useful to examine, at this juncture, some contem­
porary British opinions on Indian protective tariffs, and on the In­
dian economy. Although such opinions did not directly determine the 
commercial and fiscal policies of the Government or the decisions of 
businessmen, they constituted the intellectual matrix in which Govern­
ment and businessmen functioned. Besides, these opinions emanated 
from persons who were likely to have exercised a great deal of intel­
lectual influence, either because of their official positions or their 
expertise in Indian economics. While reflecting certain fundamental 
assumptions about the Indian economy, these expressed opinions also 
reinforced, through reiteration, such assumptions.
One such assumption was that India must remain predominantly 
an agricultural country. Charles Ernest Low, Secretary to the Govern­
ment of India in the Commerce and Industry Department, and a member 
of the Indian Industrial Commission, declared in a paper read to the
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East India Association in December 1923 (55):
...it is hardly necessary to insist on the fact 
that India must always be primarily an agricultural 
country, and that industries must always take a 
secondary place in her economic life...
(emphasis added)
The members of the Round Table group also felt that 'The economic 
condition of India is, and must always be, the economic condition 
of the peasant and the countryside' (56) (emphasis added).
This descriptive and normative insistence on India remaining 
a primary producer of agricultural commodities, and consequently a 
consumer of manufactured goods, meshes so well with the imperial eco­
nomic relationship that it may be conjectured that supportive and 
reinforcing statements necessarily emanate from that relationship.
An unsigned article in the Asiatic Review, discussing Indian 
trade statistics up to 1924, made this idea more explicit. In it, 
the anonymous author pointed out the importance of the Indian market, 
and went on to say (57):
But India is not only our biggest market. She 
is also our best market in the sense that she supplies 
us with foodstuffs and raw materials, and takes in ex­
change the products of our factories. In the latest 
year for which statistics are available, 90 per cent 
of our imports from India consisted of foodstuffs and 
raw materials and 10 per cent of manufactured goods, 
while our exports to India consisted of manufactured 
goods to the extent of 95 per cent. The percentages 
are practically the same as they were before the war.
In a similar vein, Gilbert Slater argued that there was no
need to artificially stimulate industrialization in India through
protectionist policies as there was fairly rapid development already,
and such rapid industrialization was not desirable in any case (58).
Gilbert Slater had been in India for seven years, first as the
Professor of Indian Economics at the University of Madras from 1915
to 1921, and then as a member of the Madras Legislative Council. His
opinions would therefore have carried great weight as coming from one
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who had close, informed and first-hand knowledge of Indian conditions. 
Since the audiences at meetings of the East India Association and the 
readers of the Asiatic Review usually included important and eminent 
public men connected with Indian affairs, the influence of such ideas 
and opinions as those expressed by Slater would have been very great.
The dominant economic ideas of this period, then, were that 
India should remain a captive market for British manufactured goods . 
and a producer of raw materials, and, as a corollary, that protective 
tariffs should not be established.
These ideas undoubtedly contributed to developing resistance 
in Britain to further constitutional advances in India, for greater 
political freedom necessarily meant greater 'fiscal autonomy' for 
India. Not surprisingly, therefore, Indian demands for an early re­
vision of the reforms of 1919 were viewed with apprehension. Such 
demands were considered to be premature and presumptuous.
There was evident exasperation in Britain about the way in 
which Indian leaders appeared to reject what most people in Britain 
considered to be extremely generous constitutional measures. Refer­
ring to the manner in which the Legislative Assembly had refused to 
vote supply, The Times, for example, hinted darkly that the grant 
of reforms was not unconditional, and that there might even be reverse 
steps if Indians did not co-operate in the fulfilment of their new 
duties and responsibilities (59).
Some observers and analysts felt that the Indian refusal to 
properly work the new system stemmed from an inability to take ad­
vantage of the opportunity provided. For example, the missionary and 
educationist, J.H. Oldham, who had visited India in the winter of 1921, 
wrote to Lord Lothian that Indians did not realize what could be 
achieved through the existing constitution, because of their political
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inexperience, and also because the constitution was quite alien to 
Indian nature (60).
Even the Liberal intellectual, H.A.L. Fisher, had come to the 
conclusion that the Indian tactics of using the machinery provided 
by the reforms to hold up the work of the Government and to make the 
position of the British officials in India intolerable would provoke 
a violent reaction in the British Parliament, thus making it impossible 
to go further on the constitutional path (61). Fisher's fears were 
realized a few months later, in the form of the 'steel frame' speech 
of Lloyd George.
But it was not only Indians who felt that the system of 
Dyarchy was unworkable and that it needed to be reviewed and amended 
long before the expiry of the ten years stipulated for its trial. 
Willingdon, the Governor of Madras, was convinced that the system was 
contrary to all constitutional principles, and that, unless it was al­
tered quickly, all shades of Indian political opinion would unite 
to wrest another concession out of Britain (62). The irony was that 
Willingdon's own province, Madras, was the most successful in imple­
menting the reforms. It might be that he was taking an objective, 
all-India view.
It would seem that the Indian reactions to the reforms so puz­
zled and perplexed the British that they too began to have doubts 
about their efficacy and usefulness. Thus even Montagu came to be­
lieve that success in solving the Indian problem would rest upon get­
ting away from Dyarchy and introducing 'responsible' ministries which 
would work with British assistance, the ICS functioning merely as an 
executive service (63).
Winston Churchill also interpreted the Indian reaction as 
indicating an incapacity for self-government. Although he had
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supported the Montagu-Chelmsford scheme for reforms, Churchill came 
to believe that public opinion would question the expediency of grant­
ing democratic institutions to backward races which had no capacity 
for self-government, and thought that the solution would be to extend 
the system of native states (64).
These two complementary ideas, that democracy was unsuitable 
for India, and that the solution lay in extending the system of prince­
ly states, were to be expressed again and again by various publicists 
in Britain. Such ideas were at such a great distance from the pre­
dominant ideas, however, that there was very little likelihood of 
official policy being changed by them. Nevertheless, by creating 
doubts in the public mind about the utility of introducing democracy 
into India, and by positing an alternative, ostensibly Indian, system, 
these ideas increased public resistance to further constitutional 
advance.
There were others who, like Churchill, criticized the reforms 
of 1919 on the grounds that they were totally unsuited for India.
Sir Henry Craik, MP, a die-hard Conservative, declared that the re­
forms of 1919 were the work of 'pedantic theorists', and went on to 
say that 'the scheme could not work; and if the truth were fairly al­
lowed to be known, it is already proved to be bankrupt of all practi­
cal statesmanship' (65).
Craik's interest in India might have stemmed from his visit 
to India in the winter of 1907-8, which he described in Impressions 
of India. It would appear that Craik could not let the impressions he 
had formed in the high noon of Empire be dislodged by new notions of 
introducing democratic institutions into India. Significantly, another 
individual for whom also India must have seemed immutably fixed in 
an era of Curzonian pomp and imperial splendour was Sir Bampfylde
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Fuller, who had been the first Lieutenant-Governor of the newly cre­
ated province of Eastern Bengal and Assam. Fuller, who had left In­
dia in 1906, wrote, in a letter to The Times (66):
The changes that were inaugurated in India by Lord 
Morley, and brought to completion by Mr. Montagu, 
have had the effect of wrecking what was perhaps, 
the most capable, just and economical system of 
government that the world has ever known...No lover 
of India has desired to see her kept for ever in 
alien leading strings. It was just and proper that 
her people should be given an increasing share in 
the government of their country. But why upset the 
system of government to introduce democracy - a method 
of state management for which no people are suitable 
until they have learnt to think commercially.
An older generation of public men in Britain, who regretted even the 
minimal devolution of power under the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, 
were thus laying the foundations for a die-hard campaign against 
Indian reforms. Such opposition was not entirely new, of course.
There had been a great deal of resistance to the reforms of 1919, 
even while they were being debated in London (67). But the non- 
co-operation movement and the subsequent tactics of the Indian 
nationalists further fuelled the opposition to constitutional change.
But if the die-hard conservatives were opposed to any change, 
those adopting a more liberal approach were willing to consider the 
possibilities of change, but only when Indians had shown by their res­
ponsive co-operation that such change was useful and desirable.
Thus The Times, while rejecting the notion that the Montagu- 
Chelmsford reforms were premature or undesirable, declared that the 
Government could not be rushed into making further concessions, since 
a measure drafted with such care could not be subjected to review and 
revision within a few years of its inauguration (68). The Times was 
inclined to reflect the widely held British opinion that Indians 
lacked the necessary administrative skills, and therefore needed to
learn these skills under the 1919 Act before they could legitimately
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seek an extension of the reforms (69). The implicit assumption of 
Indian inferiority and the consequent necessity of tutelage was not 
missed by Indians, and Indian demands for equality might have been 
intensified by such assumptions. It was true that on occasion such 
assumptions were given an explicit reinforcement by some Indians them­
selves. Bhupendranath Basu, who had been on the Council of the Secre­
tary of State for India, declared in March 1924 that his experience of 
recent events in India had proved to him the truth of Lord Morley's 
dictum that India was no more suited for Parliamentary government 
than Indian men were to wear fur coats (70). Basu was a moderate, 
and was perhaps expressing an opinion born in extreme despair. But 
even Lala Lajpat Rai, an ardent nationalist, told Beatrice Webb that 
he too had little confidence in Indians and was too fearful of other 
imperial powers to want Britain to leave India completely (71). These 
were isolated examples. Yet they were significant because they rein­
forced notions already entertained by important members of the British 
intelligentsia.
Another such notion, inherited from the past, and firmly embed­
ded in the imperial mind by frequent reiteration, in various places, was 
the idea that constitutional changes were sought by a tiny minority, 
and that the majority were content to be under British rule. A few 
individuals detected a growing hostility to British rule among the 
Indian masses (72). But such opinions, contrary to the popular pre­
conceptions, could not dislodge the idea that Indian nationalism was 
the political activity of a minority, and even the nationalist movements 
of 1919-22 failed to alter that idea.
The inclination of the British to see Indian nationalism and its mani­
festations as being confined to a very small segment of Indian society 
meant that they never formed a proper intellectual perception about
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the nature and strength of Indian nationalism. At a pragmatic level, 
no doubt, the responses of the Government were dictated to some extent 
by its perception of the strengths and weaknesses of the nationalist 
movement in India. And this explains too why the authorities, in In­
dia and in Britain, were keen to stifle expressions of nationalism, 
which appeared to them to be seditious, if not actually treasonable.
Two examples from this period illustrate this attitude.
An Indian student at the Dundee University College of St. 
Andrew's University, speaking to the Hibbert Literary Club, said that 
India had been systematically robbed, oppressed and demoralized by an 
insidious military conquest under the guise of commercial invasion, 
and that ever since the British came to rule in India they had subor­
dinated Indian interests to those of Britain. The Senate of the Uni­
versity felt that such outbursts should be met with some rebuke severe 
enough to deter other students, and sought the advice of the India 
Office. The India Office, in its reply to the University, indicated 
that the Secretary of State concurred with the opinion of the Senate, 
and that he would welcome any disciplinary action that the University 
might propose to take (73).
The other example concerns the flying of the nationalist or 
swaraj flag on municipal buildings in India. The victory of the ex­
tremists in the municipal elections in the United Provinces had made 
it probable that swaraj flags would be flown, and Sir William Marris, 
the Governor of the United Provinces, felt that the Government could 
not acquiesce in such an act, and that a quick blow ought to be struck, 
either by prosecutions under Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code 
(which dealt with sedition) or by an ad hoc law prohibiting the flying 
of flags upon buildings controlled by legally constituted or Government- 
aided local authorities (74). In the India Office, there was virtually
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total agreement with the opinion of Marris (75).
It was perhaps natural that the British authorities should take 
exception to official bodies flying the banner of nationalism or to 
students expounding anti-British sentiments in Britain. Sir William 
Duke had in fact regarded the Dundee speech of the Indian student as 
ill-mannered, apart from its political considerations (76). What is 
of significance in these instances is the fact that such manifestations 
of Indian nationalism were seen as necessitating stern action to pre­
clude their recurrence in the future. It would appear, therefore, 
that the British, while denying the spread of nationalist sentiments 
to deeper levels of Indian society, were, at the same time, unwilling 
to let any overt display of nationalism pass unnoticed.
It was, however, in the Legislative Assembly and the provincial 
councils that Indian nationalism found its expression during this peri­
od of relative peace. The rejection of finance bills and the refusal 
to accept office were clear demonstrations of nationalist sentiment.
To the Viceroy, Reading, these steps seemed to be wresting self-govern­
ment in the very face of Government opposition (77).
To others, the response of the Indians seemed to suggest that 
the policy of conciliation had totally failed (78). The Montagu-Chelms­
ford reforms had been designed to conciliate the Indian moderates and 
thus secure willing collaborators. That the reform scheme could not 
do this was an index of the new, more assertive nationalism in India.;
The British failed to recognize this because they were unable to escape 
from the influence of inherited images about Indian nationalism.
The result was that Britain tended to adopt a more reactionary 
attitude towards India. The apparent failure of the policy of concili­
ation, the growing hostility of the Indian nationalists, and the waning 
of imperial prestige, coupled with an imperfect understanding of Indian
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nationalism, caused a reaction to set in.
Thus, when the Labour Party came to power in London in January 
1924, they were faced, not merely with the very real Parliamentary 
constraints of being a Government without a majority, but also with 
an atmosphere of strong and articulated hostility to Indian nationalism. 
The Labour Party had always expressed sympathy for the aspirations of 
the Indian nationalists, but now, when they actually had the reins of 
Government in their hands, they could not move as they wished, either 
in the case of India or in domestic politics. This fact was recognized 
by the outgoing Secretary of State, Lord Peel. He doubted if the Labour 
Party could undertake any major constitutional change in India, given 
its preoccupations with domestic issues and international problems 
such as the Ruhr question, and the fact that they could not do much 
anyhow without the agreement of the other Parties (79).
It was during the Labour Party's brief dalliance with the sem­
blance of power that B.C.H. Calcraft Kennedy published, under the pseu­
donym of ' A1. Carthill', The Lost Dominion, a book in which he suggested 
that it was impossible to maintain or re-establish British control over 
India, as the Indian Empire 'must now continue with ever increasing momen­
tum to follow the course on which it has been launched' (80). Its ap­
pearance at this juncture perhaps increased the fears of those who belie­
ved that a Labour Government would lean rather too much towards the In­
dian nationalists. But could the Labour Party in power have put into 
practice what it had preached when in opposition? The constraints were 
far too many for the Labour Government to have taken any effective steps 
towards meeting Indian political demands.
Gandhi recognized this. He felt that, since it was dependent 
on the support of other Parties, the Labour Party was bound to sacri­
fice India for the sake of domestic policies and thus might even turn
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out to be worse than the Liberals or the Conservatives (81).
The Prime Minister hastened, in fact, to assure everybody that 
the Labour Party was not going to alter the policy towards India. In 
a statement to The Hindu of Madras, Ramsay MacDonald declared that no 
Party in Britain would be cowed by threats of force or of policies 
designed to bring government to a standstill, and warned that, if the 
Swarajists persisted in unconstitutional methods, the Labour Government 
would deal with them as firmly as any other Government (82).
The Swarajists, who had won majorities in the Legislative Assem­
bly, in the province of Bengal, and in the Central Provinces in Decem­
ber 1923, had already passed a resolution in the Assembly demanding that 
immediate steps should be taken to grant full responsible government.
But, in the circumstances, the Labour Government could hardly consider, 
let alone act upon, such a demand. Sir Leslie Wilson, Governor of 
Bombay, correctly analysed the situation in Britain, and came to the 
conclusion that no Party was likely to raise a major question on India 
with so many international and domestic difficulties facing the coun­
try, and he was of the opinion that the new Secretary of State for 
India, Lord Olivier, would give the required support to the Government 
of India to meet the difficulties in India (83).
The Prime Minister had in fact given assurances to Baldwin and 
other Conservatives which satisfied them (84). Presumably MacDonald 
had indicated that he was not likely to initiate any radical change 
in India. At the same time, he expressed the idea that it was unfair 
that Indians should be taking action to force his hand so soon after 
he had taken office, and before he had had time to explore the whole 
situation, as no Government could rush headlong into great policies (85).
After all, it was inconceivable that the Conservatives would 
have accepted any suggestion of a change in India, especially under a
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Labour Government which had, when in opposition, proclaimed its sym­
pathy for Indian self-government. The British Empire was an essential 
element of Conservative political philosophy. Hence even a hint of 
weakening the imperial structure was intolerable to the Conservatives 
(86). What were seen to be the 'antics’ of the Swarajists,in the Assem­
bly (their rejection of the Finance Bill, for example) and elsewhere, 
tended to harden attitudes against Indian nationalists (87).
Sir Michael O'Dwyer argued that abandoning the trust of the In­
dian masses at the bidding of a 'small Indian oligarchy' would consti­
tute the greatest betrayal in history (88). The imperial historian, 
Reginald Coupland, in India with the Lee Commission on All India Ser­
vices, was convinced that Parliament must refuse to grant self-govern­
ment when the 1919 constitution came up for revision in 1929, and that 
on the contrary it should retain the safeguards of an active governor 
and a corps d 1elite of English ICS and police officers under the con­
trol of the Secretary of State (89). Reginald Craddock was even more 
emphatic. He too had gone to India with the Lee Commission, and gave 
the impression that he thought on Morning Post lines, believing that, 
when the reforms failed,the 'good old days' of paternal government 
would return (90).
Lord Meston gave a new explanation of Indian nationalism. He 
asserted that it was only the Brahmin who desired self-government, so 
that he could preserve his dominant position in the face of increasing 
challenges from the lower castes (91).
Indian nationalism was essentially a secular phenomenon, although 
it might have, in the localities, derived some energy from latent 
forces embedded in religion and caste. Gandhi's tactics of political 
action and his ideas on religion and caste appeared to British obser­
vers to be investing Indian nationalism with a religious tint. To them,
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nationalist politics seemed to be a mask for hiding the struggle be­
tween castes and religions. Meston's argument reflected therefore a 
fairly common notion in Britain that Indian nationalism was high-caste 
Hindu nationalism, and thus to be despised by democrats.
But what all the various ideas meant at this time was that India 
was not ready for any change in her constitution.
The Government could not, at the same time, appear to be total­
ly indifferent to the Indian demands, for, it was recognized, unless 
something substantial was done quickly in India, the Swarajists would 
gather even more strength (92). An initial idea that was seriously 
considered was the one promoted by Josiah Wedgwood, the Chancellor of 
the Duchy of Lancaster, and the confidant of several Indian leaders, 
who suggested that a group of Indian leaders should be invited to London 
to hold discussions with the Government (93). But the idea ran aground 
in the conservative shoals of the India Council. Sir Charles Bayley, 
the Senior Member of the Council, was incensed by the thought that 
there could be any such contact between the King-Emperor's Government 
and extremists and seditionists who were trying to make government im­
possible while also cursing it in the vilest terms (94).
But it was not only India Office die-hards who thought the idea 
unsuitable. Even Lionel Curtis, one of the architects of the 1919 Act, 
thought that it would be better to send someone like Hilton Young to 
India to report on the working of the Act, rather than have a 'lot of 
extremists brought over here for a conference' (95).
The strenuous opposition of Readingfinally killed the idea, and 
the Government had to consider other means of satisfying Indian poli­
tical demands which would also be acceptable to the British Parliament. 
This necessarily hinged upon the continual demand made in India for an 
inquiry into the working of the Act of 1919 earlier than 1929.
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The Government, however, was unable to accede to this, partly 
due to the personal predilections of the Secretary of State, and partly 
due to the opposition of the Council of India (96). In a Cabinet Memo­
randum, Olivier argued that it was not practical politics to institute 
an earlier inquiry, and to accede to the demand for self-government 
would be an act of insane levity (97). He was unwilling to advance the 
date of the inquiry because he thought that it would imply that the 
1919 reforms were a failure, or that they had served their transitional 
function as a training school (98).
It would appear that there were at this time a set of forces
which were interacting and in turn influencing the policy towards
India. One was the need to do something in India that would stop the 
slide of the nationalists in India towards ever more extreme positions.
Then there were the critics of the Government's policy whose voices were
more influential at this juncture because the Government was in a weak 
position. Finally, there was pressure within the Labour Party to take 
progressive, measures in.India, The.result, at this time, of these. . .
interacting tensions was an offer of a Departmental Inquiry under the 
chairmanship of Sir A.P. Muddiman, with extremely limited terms of refe­
rence. It was charged with an examination of the Government of India 
Act to see what remedies were necessary and possible within the struc­
ture of that Act (99).
Meanwhile, Willingdon, who alone among the Governors in India 
had been able to operate the reforms fairly successfully, continued to 
lobby for quick action, although he had left India. He felt that leaders 
could not emerge in India unless some responsibility was given, and more 
of it must be given to the Indians, and given at once, or the alternative 
would be the production of another Ireland in India (100). Willingdon was con­
vinced that any return to the old days and to the path of the die-hards
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would result in a revolution in India which could be suppressed for a 
time, but which would ultimately succeed through sheer numbers(101).
It is possible that Willingdon was expounding, although from a 
different viewpoint, a view which was as alarmist as that of the die- 
hards, for the Government of India had earlier refused to pay heed to 
such warnings and had continued to take a calmer view of the Indian situ­
ation (102). At the same time, there was evidently a visible ground- 
swell of political discontent in India, which needed to be deflected, 
if it was to be prevented from overwhelming the Raj. An attempt was 
made in this direction by Mrs Annie Besant. As General Secretary of 
the 'National Convention', a coalition of moderate politicians in India, 
she led, in July 1924,a deputation to the Prime Minister, and stated on 
their behalf that the Government should either do or say something which
would tend to make India believe that the Government was sincere in its
desire to help India to freedom (103).
Mrs Besant suggested that either a Commission should be appointed
which could receive the Constitution Bill drafted by the National Con­
vention, or, alternatively, such a Bill would be introduced as a Pri­
vate Bill in Parliament. This Bill, which came to be called the Com­
monwealth of India Bill, was adopted by the National Convention, then 
cast in Parliamentary form by Henry Slesser and Arthur Henderson Jr. 
(104). By this time, of course, the Labour Party had ceased to hold 
office, and could take up a more sympathetic stance on India once again, 
and Mrs Besant tried to get Ramsay MacDonald to become one of the Parli­
amentary sponsors of the Bill (105). Although she failed to persuade 
MacDonald (it is probable that as leader of the Party MacDonald wanted 
to keep his options open), the Bill was sponsored by leading Labour 
MPs such as George Lansbury, Josiah Wedgwood, Hugh Dalton and Henry 
Lees—Smith. The Bill could not, however, have much success. While it
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must have seemed too radical in Britain, it was unacceptable to the 
Swarajists, who had had no hand in its formulation, and, as they were 
becoming the clearly dominant group in India, a Bill remote from them 
had little chance of being accepted officially. Besides, events such as 
the General Strike of 1926 overtook it in England, and ultimately it 
was sidetracked by the appointment of a Statutory Commission in 1927,
and the consequent events.
If the inability or unwillingness of the Labour Party when it 
was in office to take any effective steps to meet Indian aspirations 
disillusioned Indian leaders, what evoked their overt hostility was 
the position that the Labour Party adopted on the Bengal Ordinance. The 
Governor of Bengal, Lord Lytton, had sought special powers to contain 
what he and his government regarded as the rapidly growing terrorist 
movement, arguing that even the Swarajist leaders in Bengal, Subhas 
Chandra Bose and C.R. Das, were financing the terrorists (106).
Reading was reluctant to sanction the adoption of such special powers, 
partly because he felt that the result would be to unite Indian politi­
cians of all shades (107). The Cabinet in London was also unwilling 
to accept Lytton1s arguments, and it agreed with Reading that existing 
measures should be fully tried and that new legislation was not neces­
sary (108).
Josiah Wedgwood, who was opposed in principle to such coercive 
legislation, nevertheless proposed that it should be used as a bar­
gaining counter. His idea was that the Cabinet should agree to the
special powers requested by Lytton, with the proviso that Lytton should 
offer 'office' to C.R. Das (109). He reiterated this idea in Cabinet, 
arguing, with C.P. Trevelyan, that the proposed coercive measures 
should be accompanied by conciliatory measures (110). Olivier and 
Chelmsford demurred, however, as they were unwilling to couple
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concessions of any kind with a measure designed to repress violent 
crime (111) .
In the end, the arguments of the Bengal government persuaded the 
Viceroy to support its demand for special legislation, and the Home 
Government had no choice but to comply. It had no choice because 
of its inner weaknesses, and the dominance of anti-Indian views, along 
with the necessity of appearing to be opposed to terrorist violence.
It had no choice also because the Cabinet was divided in its atti­
tudes, and it would appear that Chelmsford and Olivier tilted the 
balance (112). As a sop to its conscience, and to possible critics, 
the Cabinet expressed its desire that the powers sanctioned should 
be limited to acts which involved physical violence, although Chelms­
ford felt that this need not hinder action (113). The Cabinet also 
expressed its anxiety that the Viceroy should immediately devise some 
political policy which would rescue India from drifting further into 
the revolutionary movement (114).
In India, the Ordinance did evoke an angry response from all . 
shades of political opinion, but Olivier dismissed it as indicating 
the practical weakness of the Indian politician (115). But Olivier 
could not help criticizing the Ordinance for prohibiting the employ­
ment of Counsel to defend persons proceeded against under it: he could 
see that there were reasons for the prohibition, but felt that it was 
an objectionable clause, and that Reading, a former Chief Justice, 
must find it disagreeable to take up and defend such an attitude (116).
The fall of the Labour Government and the return of the Conser­
vatives with a large majority in November 1924 could not have made 
much difference to Indian nationalists, since the preceding Labour 
administration had done little to meet their demands, and in fact had 
initiated repressive legislation. Arthur Hirtzel, Under-Secretary of
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State at the India Office, did think that, if the Labour Party had con­
tinued in power, a determined effort might have been made to go beyond 
the recommendations of the Muddiman Committee Report (117). But,given 
the political constraints which operated, it was extremely unlikely 
that the Labour Party would have gone much further with Indian reforms. 
British public opinion was also an obstacle which at this juncture was 
still insuperable.
It must have been recognized in India that the Labour Party had 
been a prisoner of Parliamentary politics, and that it was therefore 
rendered incapable of effecting any significant changes in the Indian 
constitution. But even an ardent moderate like Srinivasa Sastri, one 
of the leading Indian liberals, was moved to remark that history had 
taught him that nothing could be got out of England except by agita­
tion (118).
But,if the Labour Government had been struggling with its con­
science and with those who wanted a sterner attitude adopted, the new 
Government was avowedly imperialist, and also hostile to Indian natio­
nalism. The Cabinet chosen by Stanley Baldwin was replete with figures 
not too friendly to Indian nationalism - Lord Curzon, Winston Churchill, 
Joynson-Hicks, and the Secretary of State for India, Lord Birkenhead.
Birkenhead, for example, thought that it was inconceivable 
that India would ever be fit for Dominion self-government, and doubted 
that re-examination in 1929 (at this time he was certain that the date 
of the statutory inquiry should not be altered) would suggest even the 
slightest extension of the reforms (119). Birkenhead came to the India 
Office with the clear conviction, fostered by his reading of Indian 
history, that the British Government in India, resting as it did upon 
prestige, could stand anything but a suspicion of weakness (120).
The Cabinet as a whole, Birkenhead pointed out to the Viceroy,
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was under the influence of a reaction from the 'Montagu Reforms', as 
it was thought that too much had been given away, under the Coalition, 
and since (121).
But, inherently hostile to Indian nationalism as it was, the 
new Government too had to confront and attempt to solve the problem 
of Indian political change. Acts of terrorism might be extinguished 
by special legislation, but the smouldering fires of nationalism were 
not, could not be,quenched by temporary expedients such as departmen­
tal inquiries. A way had to be found to snuff out these slowly burn­
ing fires, and at the same time keep India firmly within the Empire.
It must have been evident that this could not be done with an unbri­
dled use of force, although this was always being urged by various 
people, for the nationalist movement was now too strong to be put 
down by force alone. The composition of the new Cabinet perhaps was 
another factor in determining the policy that it would adopt towards 
India, for, unlike previous Conservative Cabinets, this one was domi­
nated by businessmen, Stanley Baldwin himself being an industrial 
capitalist of the first rank (122).
It was only logical that these businessmen should have sought 
to restore peaceful conditions in India, so that India could continue 
to be an arena for profitable investment by British capital. The 
growth of the Indian business class, quickened during the Great War 
and subsequent years, had already proved to be an important element in 
shaping the nature and strategy of the nationalist movement. Indian 
capitalists were seeking greater economic freedom, and thus providing 
the economic component (and, in the process,the economic wherewithal) 
of the nationalist movement. India was no longer a mere producer of raw 
materials. It was quickly becoming a rival to British industry, even if on a 
limited scale, and in limited commercial spheres. The time had come
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for British commercial interests to retain the association of the In­
dian capitalists, albeit in a subordinate role, and this, it must have 
seemed at that time, could be done only through a solution of the poli­
tical problem, not by coercion, but across the green baize table.
This, however, was a very difficult proposition for a Con­
servative Government. To overcome imperial hubris and forsake the 
traditions of the Empire, to negotiate with the very people who were 
insidiously and persistently undermining the very foundations of that 
Empire, must have seemed an impossible idea. Yet, if India was to be 
prevented from sliding down the slippery slopes of nationalism towards 
independence, it had to be done.
Initially, it did seem to Birkenhead and others that the Swara­
jists were losing ground in India. Birkenhead saw the development of 
what he called a promising split between the moderates and the Swara­
jists, and hoped that it would grow (123). Willingdon too, probably 
deriving his information from the India Office, thought that the 
Swarajists were nearly finished (124).. Perhaps the moderates in India 
were still nurturing hopes that the Government would act on the 
Muddiman Committee Report, hopes that may have been reinforced by 
the fact that Reading was visiting London (125). The Muddiman Commit­
tee had presented two reports, the majority confining themselves 
strictly to the terms of reference under which the Committee had been set 
up and therefore recommending minor modifications to the Government of 
India Act, while the minority recommended radical alteration of the Act, 
and suggested the replacement of Dyarchy with a unitary system of res­
ponsible governments in the provinces, as well as at the centre. The 
Legislative Assembly had adopted a resolution recommending the accep­
tance by the Government of the minority report, and in fact going 
beyond it.
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The Indian leaders did not have to wait long for the response 
of the Government. After talks with Reading, Birkenhead made a state­
ment in the House of Lords on 7 July 1925, in which he rejected the 
minority report of the Muddiman Committee and stated that the Govern­
ment would consider the majority report to see what steps could be 
taken as a consequence (126). He also reiterated the sentiments ex­
pressed by Lloyd George in 1922, but in much more emphatic terms. The 
Act of 1919 had been an experiment> he said, and declared that the 
Government would not be 'diverted from its high obligations by the 
tactics of restless impatience. The door of acceleration is not open 
to menace; still less is to be stormed by violence' (127). Birkenhead 
did not fail to repeat the argument that India was not yet a nation, 
and, as if to support his argument, threw down a challenge to the cri­
tics in India: if they thought that their greater knowledge of Indian 
conditions qualified them to succeed where they claimed the British 
had failed, 'let them produce a constitution which carries behind it a 
fair measure of general agreement among the great peoples of India' (128).
Birkenhead was probably counting on the fact that, in addition 
to the lack of national unity, Indians lacked political unity, and 
would therefore be unable to produce any such constitution. It had 
indeed been an enduring tenet of British attitudes to India, that 
India was not a nation, and the continual conflicts that appeared to 
cleave Indian society along religious, political and economic lines 
seemed to confirm this idea.
On the other hand, attitudes are conditioned and shaped also 
by the existing notions, and observers of the Indian scene tended 
to see the divisions and ignored the rapidly forming web of relation­
ships that was creating a unity of purpose and, in the process,
developing a national consciousness. It can also be argued that 
the negation of nationalism was a means of rationalizing continued
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subordination of India. If the nationhood of India was denied, then 
it would be logically easier to argue that the politicians who were 
demanding self-government did not represent the people of India, and 
could therefore be ignored. It was in the nature of the political struc­
ture of India that there should be contending factions and groups, all 
vying for scarce political rewards. But there was an external force, 
which, while contributing to these divisions, also, paradoxically, pro­
vided the unifying force. This was the common desire for freedom, al­
though the measure of freedom desired might have been varied.
It is possible that Birkenhead, when he made the challenge to 
Indian leaders, was aware that they might have been able, because of 
this common desire, to sink their differences long enough to forge a 
constitution, because he did not promise that such a constitution would 
be accepted, oj"  even that it would be presented to Parliament. He 
stated merely that it would be carefully examined by the Government 
of India, by himself, and by the Statutory Commission, whenever that 
body might be appointed (129). It is also interesting that, in making 
such a statement, he sought to attempt to detach the moderates from 
the extremists, by expressing the hope that the liberals, reinforced 
by new moderate elements, would play a great part in the constitution- 
making of the future, thus illustrating one of the cornerstones of 
British policy, namely the necessity of securing the support of mode­
rates, in order to undermine the political influence of extremists.
Not surprisingly, Birkenhead's speech was seen as a successful 
attempt to rally the Indian moderates to the side of the Government, 
while shattering false Indian hopes and boosting the morale of the 
Services in India (130). Birkenhead's object was to embarrass the 
Swarajists while satisfying official opinion in India, noted an 
India Office official, adding that he could have made a Morning
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Post speech, aimed at cheering up the English in India (131).
There were several reasons why attempts were continually 
made to dislodge, and, if possible, destroy the Swarajists. First, 
they were, unlike the moderates, making increasingly untenable demands, 
such as full, responsible government. Second, they were putting across 
these demands and sustaining them, using political tactics that seemed 
to the British to be at once strange and abhorrent. Third, the atti­
tudes of the British to the Swarajist, or the extremist nationalist, 
were conditioned by their strongly held notion that he (or she) was, 
in many ways, a contemptible creature (132). It was not just the 
fact that the moderate delivered eloquent speeches in calm, measured 
tones to request politely the grant of some concession or other, where­
as the Swarajist demanded freedom in violent language, and used unaccep­
table tactics like political and economic boycott that estranged the 
latter more and more from his political masters. It is likely that 
the Swarajists were in fact reacting to the attitudes of the British. 
There.was.also the related fact that the British tended to see the 
worst of the Indian politician, and did not attempt to see Indian prob­
lems from an Indian angle.
Edward Thompson, the noted missionary and writer, recognized 
this to be a key problem. In a letter to The Times Literary Supple­
ment , he wrote (133):
Our attitude, not that of Indians is the key to the 
situation. A change of heart on the part of Indians, 
however desirable, would be ineffective. Both par­
ties in an imperial relationship can be exasperated to 
the point of violence, but only one side is efficiently 
armed.
In fact, Thompson himself made an attempt to correct the imbalance in 
attitudes, in his book on the Mutiny of 1857 entitled The Other Side 
of the Medal, in which he sought to present a more balanced view of 
the events of that 'Red Year'. The Mutiny and its memories still lived
on, and its events were even, on occasion, re-enacted for visiting digni 
taries.(134). It was an important element in shaping the psychological 
perspectives of the Briton, official or non-official. The Amritsar 
Affair and its consequences served, not to counter this perspective, but 
paradoxically, to strengthen it. When, in the libel case between Sir 
Michael O'Dwyer and Sir Sankaran Nair, Mr Justice McCardie, delivering 
judgment in favour of O'Dwyer, made certain obiter dicta indicating that 
the force used by General Dyer was necessary, and that he was wrongly 
punished, he was demonstrating an unjudicial sentiment, but expressing 
a widely felt opinion (135). Lord Olivier, when he was Secretary of 
State,had felt, in fact, that such opinions as the British held about 
the nationalists in India, that they were all irreconcilably anti- 
British, and that they were seditious, made for political difficul­
ties (136).
The argument that can be advanced is not that the psychological 
attitudes determined the political policy actually adopted at any given 
time, but that they tended to influence policy. That is to say, it was 
very difficult for any British official or politician to view with 
equanimity the idea of negotiating with or treating as an equal any 
Indian leader. But in the ultimate analysis political realities had 
to be faced, and this meant that Swarajists had to be reckoned with.
This must have been one of the reasons why Birkenhead, who had 
declared against an advancement of the date of the statutory inquiry 
into the 1919 Act when he came to the India Office in November 1924, be­
gan, by the end of 1925, to consider the idea of an early inquiry seri­
ously. No doubt, the reason for the change that he actually advanced 
was that this would preclude a more radical Commission being appointed 
by a Labour Government that might come to power in the future (137).
But it does seem very likely that he was hoping through this means to
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further sharpen the divisions among the Swarajists. Indeed, at the very- 
time that Birkenhead was consulting Reading about this idea, Hilton 
Young was describing how the more reasonable wing (as he put it) of 
the Swaraj Party was inclined to split off to accept an earlier re­
vision of the constitution in return for co-operation in the mean time 
(138). The Viceroy too thought that an early appointment of the Com­
mission would have a distinctly favourable effect on the political situ­
ation in India (139). It may be safely surmised, therefore, that it was 
not purely for the sake of pre-empting a Labour-Party-appointed Commis­
sion that Birkenhead decided to advance the date of the required inquiry. 
Interestingly, in a statement of policy, the Independent Labour Party 
also indicated that neither India nor Britain could wait until 1929 
for the statutory inquiry, and that the Labour Party should press 
for immediate action (140). Having virtually decided upon the advance­
ment of the date, Birkenhead then took up the question of the composi­
tion of the Commission. He was inclined to think that it should in­
clude Indians (141).
Ironically, Lord Irwin, who had succeeded Reading to the Vice­
royalty, and who had been of the opinion that the Indian leaders let 
their hearts mesmerize their heads, and who had been told that they 
were singularly responsive to ordinary courtesy, nevertheless advised 
Birkenhead against the inclusion of Indians (142). He reinforced this 
by suggesting that the best defence for not having Indians would be to 
have only members of both Houses of Parliament on the Commission (143).
A new Viceroy, still coming to grips with the immense complexities of 
the Indian political scene, succumbed to his official advisers, and 
tilted the balance in favour of an all-British Parliamentary Commis­
sion, and thus contributed to the storm unleashed by that tactical 
blunder.
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It can be argued that the predominant reason for the decision 
to appoint a Parliamentary Commission without including Indians was 
the feeling that Indian nationalism was too weak a force. The five 
years of 'peace' had created the impression that the force of nationa­
lism, which in any case had been regarded as insignificant, had spent 
itself. Thus, Sir Warden Chilcott, a die-hard MP, could write in March 
1926 that no 'important' section or Party in India desired to see the 
end of the 'White Raj' (144). The illusion of peace created, or rather 
reinforced, the illusion of Indian nationalism as a spent force. This 
illusion was naturally stronger in Britain, and as most of those expres­
sing opinions on this issue had been exposed to Indian nationalism in 
its nascent period, they too reinforced the illusion. The British image 
of Indian nationalism remained virtually unaltered in the five years 
after the end of the non-co-operation movement, and it was this fact 
which led Irwin and Birkenhead to launch an all-British Commission.
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3. The Gathering Storm: The Simon Commission Decision and the
Aftermath, 1927-9
The decisions to advance the date of the statutory inquiry 
into the working of the Act of 1919 and to exclude Indians from the 
Royal Commission marked the beginning of a new phase in Anglo-Indian 
relations. They did not,however, indicate any shift in the way Indian 
politics was perceived. Indeed, the decisions, fraught as they were 
with serious consequences, can be understood only in the context of a 
continued misperception of the Indian scene.
The appointment of a Parliamentary Commission to report on 
Indian constitutional reforms naturally generated a renewed interest 
in India, and the subsequent controversy and boycott of the Commission 
in India sharpened the interest. The British public became more aware 
of the Indian problem, as it was debated and analysed much more fre­
quently than before. Nevertheless, the dominant tendency was to per­
sist in viewing Indian nationalism as a weak force, and, despite the 
emergence of alternative images of Indian society and politics, it 
would appear that traditional ideas still held sway.
In January 1927, the Swarajists in the Bengal Legislative 
Council lost a motion to refuse payment of Ministers' salaries.
The Times detected in this event an indication that the Indian electo­
rate was rapidly moving towards co-operation with the Government, and 
thought that the defeat of the Swarajists in Bengal would hasten the
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growth of the 1responsivist' movement in other provinces (1). Nearly 
five years had elapsed since the cessation of the non-co-operation 
movement, and India, it seemed to British observers, had entered a 
period of political calm. This notion - that in India resurgent 
moderates were vanquishing extremist relicts of a previous era - 
now became crucial. Such a notion reinforced the tendency to view 
the extremists as being a weak and insignificant minority. Converse­
ly! it renewed hopes that the Indian moderates could once more be ral­
lied to the banner of the Raj.
In the end, it was this, more than anything else, that led to 
the decision to exclude Indians from the Statutory Commission. This 
decision, which widened the gulf between the Indian nationalists and 
the British Government, was the result of several factors. However, 
it is fully explicable only if one takes into account the British con­
viction that the extremist nationalists were not significant, and that 
it was still possible to reconstitute the moderates into a political 
force.   . .
The Government of India Act of 1919 did not specify the member­
ship of the Commission to be appointed under Section 84A of the Act, 
although the Joint Committee of Parliament had recommended that it 
should be a Parliamentary Commission. There were Indian expectations, 
therefore, that, when the time came to hold the required inquiry, In­
dian political aspirations would be acknowledged by the inclusion of 
Indians in the Commission. Indeed, the Secretary of State for India, 
Birkenhead, had been inclined to think that Indians should be included, 
partly for pragmatic reasons: he thought that there would inevitably 
be dissensions among the Indians, and that this might be of some 
political use to Britain, especially if the Commission reported 
against any advance (2). Sir John Simon, who was to be chosen to be 
the chairman of the Commission, also thought that it would be logi-
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cal to have Indians on the Commission, and therefore that it should 
not be a purely Parliamentary Commission (3).
The Viceroy, Irwin, together with his advisers in India, saw 
the issue differently. They were convinced that, if all the various 
Indian interests were to be fairly represented, the inclusion of In­
dians would make the proposed Commission too large and unwieldy (4). 
They were convinced, too, that a boycott move would not succeed. Since 
they were in India, they supposedly had a more intimate knowledge of 
Indian political conditions. Their opinions proved to be very influ­
ential, therefore, and the Cabinet took the decision to appoint an 
all-Party Parliamentary Commission. In any case, the members of the 
Cabinet, and the officials of the India Office were, in effect, influ­
enced by the same inherited images about India that influenced the 
Viceroy and his advisers. These images of an India divided by reli­
gious strife were perhaps intensified by the more frequent communal 
rioting during this period, and thus prevented the British from per­
ceiving the nuances of Indian politics with greater sensitivity.
It is necessary to indicate that the term 'the British', as 
used in the discussion here, refers to the dominant elite, or to those 
expounding the dominant ideology. Not all viewed the Indian problem 
from the same perspective. For example, W.A.J. Archbold argued force­
fully that the only solution to the problem of constitutional reform 
in India was a federal system devised, not by a Royal Commission, but 
by an Indian constituent assembly (5). Archbold knew India well, and 
perhaps his suggestions stemmed from his deeper knowledge of the In­
dian situation. His idea of an Indian constituent assembly, although 
qualified by the argument that its members did not need to be elected, 
was probably too far ahead of its time to be acceptable. It indicated, 
nevertheless, that there were individuals in Britain who were beginning
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to consider the Indian question from viewpoints different from those 
adopted by the dominant elite.
So strong was the dominant conviction that Indians would re­
ceive the announcement about the Commission, if not with zealous en­
thusiasm, then at least with an optimistic wariness, that the actual 
reaction of the Indians came as a surprise. The announcement, on 
8 November 1927, that a purely Parliamentary Commission would be in­
quiring into the question of Indian constitutional reforms united In­
dian leaders of various political persuasions as no other British ac­
tion had done for a long time. Moderates and extremists alike denoun­
ced the decision to exclude Indians, and the chorus of protests cul­
minated in a resolve to boycott the Commission when it arrived in 
India (6).
What was most perplexing was the attitude of the moderates. 
Boycott of the Commission by the extremists was anticipated, and was 
therefore easily understood. But when other groups also joined the 
Indian National Congress in the decision to boycott, and persons 
like Tej Bahadur Sapru chose also to join the boycott campaign, 
the British were puzzled, so much so that the Viceroy could only 
attribute this seemingly inexplicable behaviour of the Indian mode­
rates to personal pique at having been ignored (7). Such a conclu­
sion could only have been arrived at because of a lack of awareness 
about the intensity of nationalist sentiment in India.
It was this lack which also led, in spite of the apparent 
depth of Indian feelings on the issue, to the conjecture that the 
boycott campaign would not succeed. Birkenhead, for example, ex­
pressed the hope that the Congress plan to boycott the Statutory Com­
mission would quickly fizzle out, while Valentine Chirol of The Times, 
an expert on Indian affairs, was even more emphatic in his belief 
that the boycott would never succeed (8).
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If in India there was virtually unanimous opposition to the 
idea of an Inquiry Commission without any Indian members, in Britain 
the idea had few enemies and many friends. As Birkenhead wrote to 
Irwin, the announcement was received very well, with only the Daily 
News, the Manchester Guardian and the Westminster Gazette expressing 
indignation at the non-inclusion of Indians (9). The Times declared 
that the 'Imperial Parliament is the sole authority which can deflect 
or hasten the course of reform', and that no other kind of Commission 
was either possible or desirable (10). When Sir Robert Horne, Unio­
nist MP for the Hillhead division of Glasgow, and a director of several 
companies, including the P&0 shipping company, said in Glasgow that 
it was right that the Commission was composed entirely of British 
people, he was cheered (11). Lord Ronaldshay, former Governor of 
Bengal, speaking at a London Missionary Society luncheon said that, 
while Indians might resent the composition of the Commission, he be­
lieved that the decision of the Government was correct, and that he 
regretted the hostility of the Indian moderates (12).
Support for the Government's action was evident even in
Parliament, and came from all directions. The first debate was in the 
House of Lords, on 24 November 1927, when, in addition to Lord Birken­
head, only Lords Reading, Olivier and Chelmsford spoke (13). Birken­
head referred, inter alia, to the suggestion he had made earlier, 
that Indians should formulate their own constitution and present it 
to Parliament, and said that it was still open. Olivier, who had 
been Secretary of State in the first Labour Government, expressed his 
support for the Commission, said that there ought to have been more 
consultation with Indian representatives, and hoped that the failure 
to do so did not arise from the notion that the British were going to
India like a physician to cure the ills of India, or an examiner going
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to India to examine the fitness of Indians for self-government.
Although in the Commons too the Government decision was ap­
proved without a division, there were a few dissenting voices (14). 
Colonel Josiah Wedgwood, the Labour MP for Newcastle-under-Lyme, 
declared that sending the Commission to India would widen the gulf 
between Britain and India, and added prophetically that the process 
would take a long time, and that the legislation that would be intro­
duced, in 1930, 1931, or 1932, 'will not depend upon the report of 
this Commission, but upon the actual state of affairs in India at 
that time' (15).
An amendment to the main resolution was moved by Mr Shapurji 
Saklatvala, the Communist MP for North Battersea, suggesting that 
Motilal Nehru should be invited to the Bar of the House, to explain 
Indian sentiments and to guide the House before the names of the mem­
bers of the Commission were submitted to the King. In moving the 
amendment, Saklatvala attacked the attempts at unanimity, stating, 
'While you make a hideous picture of the Indian people, you try to 
make a virtuous picture of yourselves, and you know that both are un­
true ' (16).
Even those Labour Members who supported the resolution did not 
do so wholeheartedly. Mr E. Thurtle, a Labour MP from Shoreditch, re­
ferred to the tendency to exaggerate the differences that existed among 
the Indians (these had been cited as one of the reasons for not inclu­
ding Indians in the Commission), and declared that the Government was 
using this concern for minorities as 'a screen for the continuance 
of British dominance of India' (17).
In effect, however, only three speakers in the House of Commons 
opposed the Government resolution. Britain thus appeared to present a 
solid phalanx of support for the Commission. But, underneath this 
facade of unanimity, cracks of dissent began to appear. It was in
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fact to preserve the image of all-Party support that Irwin had mooted 
the idea of securing statements of support from MacDonald, Olivier, 
Wedgwood and others (18). Birkenhead did not think this would be 
possible: while MacDonald could be induced to state that he did not 
oppose the proposal, the other Labour Members would not show any great 
enthusiasm (19).
MacDonald became in fact an ardent supporter of the Statutory 
Commission, and successfully parried the criticism of his left-wing 
colleagues, who attempted to secure the withdrawal of the Labour 
Party representatives from the Commission.
The Labour Party's stance on the Statutory Commission is an 
illustration of an inherent ambivalence in its attitude towards the 
British Empire. For most people, the Labour Party was essentially 
anti-imperialist. Thus a prospective member of the Labour Party 
sought assurances from MacDonald that the Party would support the 
Empire as it then stood (20). A retired Colonel argued that a large 
number of affluent people, who were with the Labour Party as regards 
socialism, were prevented from supporting it because they believed 
that the Party was opposed to imperialism (21).
Such beliefs were probably derived from the Labour Party's 
ideological and rhetorical statements on the Empire and imperialism, 
and its public support for self-determination for India. In practice, 
however, the Party was constrained by the needs of electoral politics. 
As a Party claiming to support and represent the British worker, it 
could not actually seek to dismantle the structures of Empire without 
losing ground to its political rivals, especially since it was diffi­
cult to argue convincingly that the Empire was inimical to the inte­
rests of the British worker (22).
The converse argument, that the Empire was directly beneficial
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to the British people, and even the British worker, was easier to esta­
blish. For instance, an economist, F.L. McDougall, writing in The Times, 
argued that, but for the export trade to the British Empire, Britain 
would have suffered from a much more severe industrial depression (23).
No doubt McDougall was not here addressing himself to the British worker, 
but the idea that he was expressing was a widely prevalent one, and one, 
moreover, that apparently seemed logical.
There were radical journals and pamphlets which attempted to 
demonstrate to the British worker that imperialism was exploitative, 
not only of the worker in the colonies, but of the worker at home 
as well (24). But such arguments were too abstract, and appeared to 
be too far removed from reality to be convincing and persuasive.
The Labour Party was therefore compelled to adopt a cautious 
attitude towards imperial questions. At the same time, however, 
there were within the Party groups and individuals who were not only 
intellectually committed to the idea of dismantling the Empire, but 
who sought to work actively towards that goal (25),
The Labour Party's attitudes towards the Empire were shaped 
in effect by the interaction between the ideas of the moderate lea­
dership and those of the radical factions. This was particularly 
apparent in its attitudes towards Indian reform.
In its Annual Conferences, the Labour Party adopted resolutions 
which committed the Party to the idea of self-government and self- 
determination for India. When it came to detail, however, the Party 
was averse to proposing any radical change. Thus, in a memorandum 
drafted in November 1927, the Labour Party Advisory Committee on 
Imperial Questions (LPACIQ) suggested that, in any new Indian consti­
tution, there should be a provision to protect the existing treaties 
between the British Government and the Indian Princes (26). Here,
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obviously, the considerations of practical politics quite vanquished 
the Party's ideological opposition to aristocratic remnants of a feu­
dal society.
The ambivalence of the Labour Party towards Indian constitu­
tional reform was reflected also in the opinions of its members. The 
views of F.W. Pethick-Lawrence, the Labour MP who was later to become 
the Secretary of State for India, serve as a striking example. Pethick- 
Lawrence visited India in the winter of 1926-7, and set down his opi­
nions on Indian politics in a letter which he later circulated to 
several Party leaders (27). In this letter, written on the voyage 
back to Britain, Pethick-Lawrence asserted that the 'educated Hindu' 
of every caste, every region and every political persuasion was 
'passionately desirous' of self-government, and of self-determination 
as complete as that possessed by the self-governing Dominions, al­
though what was desired was not so much immediate self-government as 
a precise timetable for securing it. The Muslims too were in favour 
of self-government, he thought, provided their interests were pro­
tected. What is of particular interest is that Pethick-Lawrence 
should also have utilized the separate categories of 'Hindu' and 
'Muslim' for a description of the Indian political situation. While 
it was true that the communal problem was more acute at that time than 
it had been for several years, and thus brought the differences into 
a starker relief, the tendency of observers of the Indian scene 
to perceive Indian politics through such categories also served 
to prevent the perception of Indian nationalism as nationalism. The 
predominant image of India was that it was divided by religion, and 
that nationalism, seen as Hindu nationalism, was incapable of over­
coming these divisions.
Indeed, Pethick-Lawrence himself felt that the three main ob­
stacles to self-government in India were the army, the princely states,
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and the communal problem (28). But he was certain that time would 
overcome these problems, and hence concluded that, although the 
granting of self-government to India was inevitable, it could not 
be immediately effected, needing at least 25 years as a period of 
transition.
These observations were in fact echoed in another LPACIQ 
memorandum, in which it was argued that Britain should make 'libe­
ral concessions' in good time, and that a precise timetable should 
be fixed, for devolution in India, and for the training of Indians 
to take charge of the administration (29).
The Labour Party was committed in principle to the notion 
of granting self-government to India. But practical politics and 
the political reality of India as perceived by the leaders of the 
Party prevented the Party from giving wholehearted support to the 
principle. There was another important reason for the ambivalence of 
the Labour Party. It was the idea that the Indian nationalist lea­
dership represented an oppressive and exploitative elite. Support 
for such an elite seemed therefore to imply a tacit acceptance of ex­
ploitation and oppression of the Indian masses.
The caution induced in the Party by such an idea could, how­
ever, be interpreted as being an implicit prop for imperialism.
The Communist writer Clemens Dutt attacked the Labour Party's argu­
ment that, without a guarantee that the interests of the Indian 
workers and peasants would be protected, the Party could not agree 
to any transfer of power in India, calling it a 'cover for support 
of imperialism' (30). Similarly V.H. Rutherford, a former Liberal 
MP and a member of the Labour Party, accused his Party of having 
acted as the agent of British capitalism while it held office (31).
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Despite the apparent contradictions in its attitudes, the 
Labour Party was assumed, nevertheless, to be more sympathetic to 
Indian nationalist aspirations. It was for this reason that Irwin 
felt apprehensive that the Labour members of the Statutory Commission 
might produce a separate report (32). Similar ideas were entertained 
by the Conservative Party leaders in Britain as well. At a meeting 
of Government Whips held in July 1927 to discuss the probable composi­
tion of the Commission, the Chief Whip, Sir Bolton Eyres-Monsell, ex­
pressed the opinion that it would almost be impossible to prevent the 
Labour Party from appointing extremists, and thought that George Lans- 
bury and Ben Spoor might be nominated (33). Birkenhead declared that 
he would absolutely refuse to accept such people, but was hopeful of 
securing 'reasonably moderate representatives' through negotiation (34).
Birkenhead had in fact already discussed the issue with 
MacDonald, pointing out (to overcome possible Labour objections) 
that Indians could be associated at a later stage, and, if the In­
dians were 'reasonable and moderate., there is every probability that 
they may exercise a profound influence' (35). The idea of Labour 
participation in the Commission had implicitly been accepted in prin­
ciple by MacDonald, who was clearly concerned that Labour MPs might 
be approached directly rather than through him (36). If Birkenhead 
had directly approached MPs, he could not perhaps have secured more 
'reasonably moderate' representatives than the ones ultimately chosen: 
Stephen Walsh and Clement Attlee. Birkenhead tried, in fact, to get 
Lord Thomson nominated as a Labour representative, when Stephen Walsh 
showed some initial reluctance, but MacDonald did not think that the 
Party Executive would approve (37).
The Labour Party was thus committed to the idea of the Statu­
tory Commission, despite serious misgivings in the Party. These mis­
givings were reflected in the resolution adopted at the Annual Confe­
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rence of the Party held in October 1927 at Blackpool. This reso­
lution reaffirmed the right of the Indian people to 'full self- 
government and self-determination', and added, apropos the pro­
posed Commission, that it 'should be so constituted, and its method 
of doing its work so arranged, that it will enjoy the confidence 
and cooperation of the Indian people' (38).
When it becamsclear, after the announcement of 8 November, 
that the Commission was not likely to have either the co-operation 
or the confidence of the Indian people, the apprehensions of the 
Labour Party's Executive - of its left wing, at any rate - seemed 
to have been realized. MacDonald, Philip Snowden and George Lansbu- 
ry met the Secretary of State to discuss the issue (39). The Exe­
cutive of the Labour Party, unhappy about the outcome of this dis­
cussion, and dissatisfied about the statement that Birkenhead pro­
posed to make, drafted a statement of its own, to be read to a Party 
meeting on 24 November (40). In this statement, the suggestion put 
forward was that the Commission should consult on equal terms with 
a Commission appointed by the Indian legislature, that both Commis­
sions should have joint meetings for taking evidence (though they 
could also take evidence separately), and, most significantly, that 
the reports of the two Commissions should be presented to the Joint 
Committee of Parliament. The representatives of the Labour Party 
should remain on the Commission, the draft concluded, only if these 
conditions were met.
Interestingly, MacDonald sent the draft to Birkenhead for 
amendments (41). Birkenhead suggested the exclusion of the conclud­
ing passage, perhaps because of its minatory tone (42). In any case, 
it was unlikely that the suggestion of two Commissions functioning 
on an equal plane would have been accepted. Simon himself rejected 
it right away, arguing that it was impractical and conducive to
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accentuating differences (43).
MacDonald clung to the idea, however, for it alone offered 
him a reasonable defence against critics. One such critic was 
Wilfred Wellock, a Labour MP. He wrote to MacDonald, declaring that 
he was opposed to participation in the Commission by the Labour Par­
ty, and that there was not much point in suggesting that Indians 
could appoint their own Commission, since only the report of the 
Simon Commission would carry any weight (44). MacDonald insisted, 
however, that the idea of two Commissions functioning on an equal 
plane was a correct one (45). MacDonald was apparently upset by the 
criticism that emanated from within the Party, and he tried to sug­
gest that it was criticism inspired by 'outside bodies' (46).
MacDonald responded in a similar fashion when Peter Freeman, 
a prospective Labour candidate for the Parliamentary constituency of 
Brecon and Radnor, sent him a circular entitled 'Affairs in India' 
(47). In this circular, which he had also sent to 200 local Labour 
Parties and to a few MPs, Freeman argued that, in view of the re­
port on labour conditions in India by Purcell and Hallsworth, and 
the several Labour Party resolutions on India, the attitude of the 
Party should be changed (48). As if to indicate the direction of 
the change that he desired, Freeman appended to his circular a 
draft resolution to the effect that, in view of the Indian boycott, 
the Labour Party should withdraw its representatives from the Com­
mission, unless equality of status was given to the representatives 
of the Indian people, that is, to the Indian 'Commission'.
In his reply, MacDonald expressed regret that Freeman should 
have taken such action without consulting those 'who had the matter 
in hand', and added that the impression he had got from some lead­
ing Indians he had met had been neither helpful nor hopeful (49).
MacDonald had committed the Party to participation in the Statutory 
Commission, and, despite the sustained pressure from various angles, 
he was unwilling to retreat. He tried, therefore, to assert that 
the Party's support for the Commission did not contradict the Party's 
resolutions on India (50). This was a viewpoint echoed by George 
Lansbury also, in his speech to the Commons (51). The very fact 
that reference had to be made to the compatibility of the Labour 
Party's resolutions on India and its support for the Commission per­
haps underlines the apparent contradictions that were seen by Party 
members at that time. It is likely, however, that the resolutions 
were seen as expressions of an ideal to be attained, while the Statu­
tory Commission was perceived as a step towards that goal, which in 
any case most Labour members considered to be a distant one.
Labour's stance on the Commission issue did not, it would ap­
pear, completely destroy the Indian trust in a sympathetic Labour 
Government acting at a later stage to redress Indian grievances, 
for Simon reported that a hope was being entertained in India that, 
if the boycott continued, the existing Commission would be replaced 
by another, containing Indians, and that this hope was being nur­
tured by the 'irresponsible talk' of an MP, also in India, at the 
same time as the Commission (52). The tacit assumption was that this 
new Commission would be set up by a future Labour Government. Simon 
suggested therefore that MacDonald should send a telegram repudiat­
ing this idea and explicitly stating that no responsible Government 
in England would go any further in the future (53).
Birkenhead consulted MacDonald, who then sent a telegram to 
Vernon Hartshorn, in the terms suggested by Simon (54). This ges­
ture, which could only have served to strengthen Simon's position in 
India - at least with those already co-operating with the Commission -
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was naturally acknowledged as a generous gesture by the Cabinet (55). 
It also gave the impression that once again Indian issues had been 
placed above Party politics (56).
The boycott, which surprised Simon by its intensity and be­
cause of the support it received from the moderate Indian politi­
cian, continued, in spite of the concessions made, ostensibly to 
satisfy Indian demands for equality of status for the Indian 'Com­
missioners' (57). But these concessions had been made, Birkenhead 
admitted, not because of any 'positive contribution the select In­
dian Committee may make,but because it would appeal to the Indian 
amour propre' (58)
In fact, this idea of placating the Indians by making inno­
cuous concessions seems to have arisen from the notion that the 
Indians had an inferiority complex which led them to reject British 
overtures as patronizing gestures. Indian political behaviour did 
not seem explicable in terms of normal categories, and thus seemed 
to necessitate the invocation of an 'inferiority complex' as an 
explanatory factor.
The psychological explanation for Indian politics was espoused
by various people across the British political spectrum. Reading, for
example, agreed with Irwin that a great deal of Indian politics
could be explained by the Indian sense of being treated as inferior
by the British (59). Even a left-wing Labour Member of Parliament,
Ernest Thurtle, once asserted in the Commons that there was 'some
strange and very strong inferiority complex in the Indian mind' (60).
✓
Ramsay MacDonald, explaining to the diplomat Sir Esme Howard why he 
could not meet him, remarked that he (MacDonald) had been interview­
ing some Indians 'who...are very touchy', and, as he wished to smooth 
the way for the Simon Commission, he could not allow anything to
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interfere with the interview (61). Geoffrey Dawson, editor of The 
Times, met Motilal Nehru and Purushottamdas Thakurdas, and came away 
with the impression that both were suffering acutely from 'suspi­
ciousness and an inferiority complex' (62).
Sir John Simon himself subscribed to preconceptions about the 
Indian mentality, and these preconceptions would undoubtedly have in­
fluenced the way in which he looked at Indian politics and society.
In his note on the first visit of the Commission to India, Simon
attempted to explain the boycott by arguing that 'the methods of
the Oriental Bazaar come so natural to an Indian politician that he
finds it almost impossible to believe that the first word may also 
be the last' (63). Even the resolution of the Legislative Assembly 
to boycott the Commission need not be considered too significant,
Simon argued, because 'Indian politicians are so totally destitute 
of moral courage that they find it almost impossible to resist sup­
porting the most extreme proposition' (64).
Casting about for more, reasons for.the Indian refusal to co­
operate, Simon produced an even more amazing explanation. An Indi­
an Committee would be unable to write a report at all, Simon declared, 
because 'the task of reviewing and revising the present constitu­
tion of India is one of extreme difficulty in any case', and the 
Indian mind was 'not good at construction' (65).
Perhaps there is a touch of implicit self-glorification in 
such reasoning. But assertions like these also reflected the pre­
vailing notions of British superiority. It was not entirely a co­
incidence that the Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin, chose to con­
clude the Commons debate on the appointment of the Commission with 
a quotation from Milton which read (66):
When God wants a hard thing done,
He tells it to his Englishman.
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Some of these opinions might have been mere rhetoric engen­
dered in anger and passion. Others were the result of a desire to 
interpret Indian political behaviour in psychological terms. What 
is significant here is that these opinions were based on certain 
traditional assumptions about the Indian character, and even a Com­
mission ostensibly going to India with an open, inquiring attitude 
carried these assumptions with it as intellectual baggage.
There was also a tendency to see the Indian boycott as demon­
strative of a lack of political wisdom. Thus, The Times argued that, 
if the boycott represented the degree of political judgement that 
now prevailed in India, the Commission needed to go no further than 
Bombay (67). Similarly, Sir Reginald Craddock remarked that the boy­
cott demonstrated 'the complete lack of any political commonsense on 
the part of the extremist politician' (68). Birkenhead too thought 
on similar lines, and, with bitter irony, wrote to Irwin that the 
'extremists' in the Assembly and some of the provincial councils 
were providing valuable evidence about the political sagacity and 
fitness for further responsibility of the Indian Party leader (69).
Another curious feature of the British perceptions of the 
Indian boycott was the refusal to see it as an expression of 
Indian nationalism. Instead, the traditional view of India as a 
mere geographical expression was revived, and Indian politics were 
seen only in terms of warring factions, religions and castes. This 
perspective, like the psychological one, prevented the policy-makers 
from seeing the strength of nationalism in India. Even when Muslims 
joined the boycott, they were dismissed as being insignificant and 
non-representative, and their decision was attributed to factional 
fighting (70). The Indian National Congress was never seen as a 
secular national Party cutting across communal barriers. The Times
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persisted in seeing only the 'Hindu' Parties as opponents of British 
rule (71). Sir Michael O'Dwyer went further, and saw Swarajist poli­
tics as the attempt to resurrect Brahmin domination in India (72).
Another influential publicist who subscribed to this theory 
of a Brahmin revival, and thus implicitly rejected the Congress con­
tention that it was an Indian Party, was Sir Reginald Craddock. In 
an article in the Contemporary Review, Sir Reginald not only equated 
Indian militants with Brahmins, but suggested that for them 'History 
has no meaning, and words and facts bear no relation to one another'
(73). Craddock went on to state that the task of governing India 
was beyond the capacity of Indians, not because of any intellectual 
defect, but because 'India is too divided into races, creeds, na­
tions and languages to enable any composite body on any sort of demo­
cratic basis to command the obedience of the whole' (74).
This picture of an India too divided to be capable of self- 
government is a constantly recurrent theme. It is a notion which 
reflected the British view of India, and, in thb process, tended to 
reinforce that view (75). Since such notions were widely prevalent, 
it is difficult to dismiss the possibility that the Simon Commission 
went to India with a set of preconceived notions about the country 
and its politics. Even before the Commission was officially consti­
tuted, The Times had suggested that the Commission should function 
as a rapporteur rather than as a judge, merely distilling common 
principles and elements from a free expression of a variety of opini­
ons (76). The Times returned again and again to this notion of im­
partial rapporteurs functioning like those at the League of Nations 
at Geneva, the implication being that, if the Commission did function 
thus - and The Times had no doubt that the Commission was qualified 
to do so - Indians did not need to see any dangers in their exclusion (77).
94
Birkenhead also thought that the attitude of the Commissioners' 
minds should be 'receptive, analytic and non-commital' (78).
It was extremely unlikely, however, that any Member of 
Parliament could have gone to India at that time without preju­
dices, preconceptions and an entire perceptual apparatus inherited 
from the past. Even Simon, despite his legal training and liberal 
outlook, could not have entirely rid himself of the images of India 
which had been imprinted on generations of British people. In 
fact, Simon had returned from an earlier private visit to India 
convinced that the Oriental was not 'really adapted to an English 
scheme of Parliamentary Government' (79).
Perhaps it was impossible for any member of the British intel­
ligentsia who had any interest in India to remain objective and un­
biased at a time when a flood of publications about India began to 
appear, partly stimulated by the renewed interest in India result­
ing from the appointment of the Simon Commission.
Of these, the book that stirred up the greatest interest was 
Katherine Mayo's Mother India. Published in Britain by Jonathan 
Cape in July 1927, this book, with its lurid and controversial depic­
tion of India, became a bestseller and a cause celebre (80).
Katherine Mayo was an American writer who had already pub­
lished several polemical books (81). In one of these, Mayo argued 
that the people of the Philippines were better off under the rule 
of the USA, and that self-government would be hostile to their inte­
rests (82). In Mother India, ostensibly an investigation of Indian 
society, Mayo set out a similar theme. According to her, the inor­
dinate and uncontrolled sexuality of the Indian male not only sapped 
his physical energy, but also destroyed the moral basis of Indian 
society, leading to abuses like child marriage. It was a direct
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and dramatic indictment of Indian character, and, although Mayo did 
not explicitly refer to the Indian capacity for self-government, her 
criticism of Indian society seemed to suggest that Indians were un­
fit for political responsibility.
It is significant that Katherine Mayo should have chosen to 
focus her attention on the supposedly excessive sexuality of the 
Indian male. Franz Fanon has shown how imperialism, racialism, and 
the attribution of hypersexuality to subject peoples were interrela­
ted (83). Mayo's Mother India is an interesting example of this 
argument, for it also portrayed an India being corrupted by the 
force of sexual indulgence.
Ordinarily, perhaps, the book might not have attracted much 
attention. There had been a long tradition of books which sought 
to present a bleak and critical image of India, and Katherine Mayo 
did not produce anything extraordinarily new. But her book appeared 
at a critical juncture. India was about to be examined by a Royal 
Commission, and Indian affairs were generally attracting much more 
attention. To those who still tended to see Indian society through 
Victorian spectacles, Mayo's book appeared to reinforce the ancient 
images. Mother India acquired, therefore, a notoriety out of all 
proportion to its worth as an objective report, and the little-known 
author became famous as the fearless dissector of Indian society.
It was read by new recruits to the ICS (84). Winston Churchill 
admired the book (85). Clifford Sharp, the editor of the New States­
man , wrote a lengthy review, in which he described Mother India as 
the 'most fascinating, the most depressing and at the same time the 
most important and truthful book that has been written about India 
for a good deal more than a generation' (86). Sharp went on to add 
that the book made the claim for Swaraj seem nonsense and the desire
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to grant it, almost a crime (87).
The correspondence provoked by the fulsome praise bestowed on 
Mayo's book by the New Statesman review showed that not everyone was 
convinced by Mayo's assertions, while it also indicated the fact 
that the book struck a responsive chord in several minds. For ex­
ample, H.J. Maynard, a former ICS officer, questioned the validity 
of several of Mayo's statements, while 'D.M.L.' declared that it was 
impossible to make generalizations about India, a country with so 
many variations (88). Another correspondent, 'BM/PWMS', sprang to 
the reviewer's defence, arguing that, but for the British, the 
Hindu would have 'sunk to the lowest depths of barbarism under the 
evil practices and gross superstitions fostered by Brahminism' (89). 
G. Wren-Howard, a director of Jonathan Cape, the publishers of 
Mother India, argued that Mayo wrote the book from a totally unpre­
judiced viewpoint, and that her sole object was the 'betterment of 
the world' (90).
Even those who thought that Katherine Mayo's analysis lacked 
precision and rigour were of the opinion that there was sufficient 
merit in the book to make it noteworthy. Thus Professor L.F. Rush- 
brook Williams, reviewing the book for the Asiatic Review, accused 
Mayo of 'undue simplification' and lack of care in the use of statis­
tics, and yet concluded that, with all its weaknesses, the book was 
'notable' (91).
Significantly, many reviewers saw the book as striking evi­
dence for delaying constitutional reforms in India. Clifford Sharp 
did so. So too did Lord Meston. He admitted that the picture 
painted by Mayo was highly coloured and too sweeping, but, since 
many of the evils described by her were deeprooted and widespread, 
the continued presence of the British was necessary to combat those
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evils (92).
The implication in such remarks was not lost on Indians.
They had already been smarting under the blow of being excluded from 
the Statutory Commission. The publication of Mayo's book and the 
enthusiastic reviews which greeted it in Britain seemed to them to 
suggest a conspiracy to denigrate India. There was also conjecture 
that the book was officially sponsored to discredit India and delay 
constitutional reform. Denials by the India Office had no effect 
on such conjectures. The fact that a copy of Mother India was sent 
anonymously to every MP fanned the rumours of an official conspiracy. 
Indian suspicions were further heightened when The Times refused to 
publish a letter from a group of incensed Indians, including Tej 
Bahadur Sapru, A.C. Chatterjee and Chimanlal Setalvad, all highly 
regarded Indian liberals. Geoffrey Dawson, the editor, had invoked 
a rule whereby The Times would not accept controversial correspon­
dence on any writing but their own, and later published an editorial 
explaining that The Times had at no time given any Special prominence 
to Mother India. This did not, however, quell Indian anger, and sus­
picions lingered (94).
There is no evidence to indicate that there had been a con­
spiracy between the British Government and Katherine Mayo to deni­
grate India. There was the usual official co-operation and perhaps 
a little more than usual unofficial help (95). But there was no 
need for a conspiracy. Katherine Mayo was merely echoing a line of 
thought that was predominant in Britain at that juncture.
For example, R.J. Minney, a journalist who had worked for a 
while with the Englishman in Calcutta, declared, in his Shiva or the 
Future of India, that (96):
...left to herself India can accomplish nothing.
The three hundred million people have neither the
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wish nor the will to attain predominance or 
prosperity. They are content to jog on along 
life's easiest path, sleeping, copulating, 
praying, over indulging in each of these neces­
sary functions and though they know it not, 
burdening the nation with the price of their 
folly.
In India and the West: A Study in Cooperation. F.S. Marvin, 
one time Professor of Modern History at the University of Egypt, and 
a positivist writer, reiterated the traditional picture of India at 
the eve of the British conquest as a decaying, anarchic and impove­
rished society, and went on to assert that 'Great Britain will and 
should remain in a position of power in India for at least a consi­
derable time' (97). Sir Claude Hill, a former member of the Vice­
roy's Executive Council, envisaged a similar period of probation and 
experimentation before India could become a Dominion (98).
Minney, Marvin and Hill were in effect enunciating a widely 
held view about the nature of Indian society and about the necessity 
of continuing British rule. But in all such writing there was an 
inherent paradox: that defects should persist in Indian society 
after nearly a century of British rule. This paradox was either 
ignored or resolved by accusing Indians of an unwillingness to 
change (99).
Works critical of India and Indians held the stage because 
they apparently struck a responsive chord in Britain. They did not 
conflict with prevailing notions of Indian backwardness. Indeed, on 
the contrary, they reinforced existing stereotypes, and thus made it 
more difficult to break them down.
Attempts were made, nevertheless, to construct alternative 
frameworks of perception. Several publications appeared at this 
time which presented India in a more favourable light. A few were 
responses to Mother India (100). Others were more general (101).
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But they were often derisively dismissed in reviews (102). They were 
usually put out by the smaller publishing firms, and had a limited 
readership. Above all, since they were going against the grain of 
British thinking on India, these alternative images could not easi­
ly dislodge the older, traditional images. Their existence indi­
cates, however, that, despite the hegemony of imperialist ideas 
about India, voices of dissent were beginning to be raised. Sec­
tions of the British intelligentsia were slowly moving away from the 
intellectual constructs of imperialism.
The strongest criticism of British rule in India came, not 
surprisingly, from Communist writers. In his booklet, How Britain 
Rules India, R. Page Arnot rejected the traditional view of Britain 
as the benevolent rescuer of India, and argued that it was British 
merchant capital which had entered India , and, by transferring wealth 
to Britain, enabled the rapid development of industrial capital there
(103). Communist writers castigated not only British imperialism in 
India, but also the leadership of the Indian nationalist movement
(104). The latter were, according to the Communist critique, repre­
sentatives of the bourgeoisie, and therefore tended to make compro­
mises with imperialism in order to acquire and preserve the dominant 
position. There were inherent contradictions between imperialism 
and the national bourgeoisie. Yet, if the latter were to seek domi­
nance over the masses, they needed to strike bargains with the impe­
rialist rulers. Similarly, imperialists also needed to compromise 
with the national bourgeoisie, so that control of the Indian economy 
could be continued, even if the control was hemmed in to some extent.
There was, therefore, a curious convergence of views between 
the Communists and the imperial ideologues, vis-a-vis Indian natio­
nalists. Both saw the nationalist leadership as an exploitative
100
minority, and both cast themselves in the role of champions of the 
Indian masses. The difference lay in the way Communists and imperi­
alists envisaged the future development of Indian society.
Communist writers saw the nationalists as striving to pre­
vent a revolutionary upsurge of the Indian masses , through negotia­
tion of compromises with the imperialist rulers. They anticipated 
that ultimately the Indian masses would succeed in their struggle 
against both the imperialists and the national bourgeoisie.
Imperialist writers, on the other hand, while viewing the 
nationalists as a power-hungry, oppressive minority, sought to 
visualize an unchanged India, in which feudal structures would 
remain intact, with the British exercising an overarching suzerainty. 
Imperialism must and will preserve feudal structures in colonial 
societies, for, although it can often make the necessary compromises 
with an emergent national bourgeoisie, in the long run the colonial 
bourgeoisie and the imperial power will find few areas of compa­
tibility. There is, however, no such fundamental contradiction 
between imperialism and feudalism. Not surprisingly, therefore, 
critics of Indian nationalism quite often sought to make a case for 
the support of Indian Princes.
It is true that any practical programme for Indian constitu­
tional reform had to take cognizance of, and accommodate, the Indian 
Princes. But arguments advanced on this problem often went further; 
they suggested, in fact, that rule by the Indian Princes would be 
more suitable for India than a Westminster-style democracy (105).
An industrializing India was not in the economic interests 
of Britain. On the other hand, India remaining a feudal society 
was in British interests, since it would then continue to be a 
producer of raw materials and a consumer of British industrial
101
products. The problem was, of course, rather more complex, since 
the Indian economy could not remain static, if Britain were to de­
rive any profits from trading with India. Indian agriculture had 
to be made more productive, if the profits of imperialism were to be 
maximized. Yet, if India remained a feudal economy with pockets of 
controlled capitalism, it was unlikely that the economy could have 
become more productive. However, if the Indian bourgeoisie were 
allowed to develop freely, they were likely to corner the Indian 
market. There were inherent contradictions in the imperialist posi­
tion, and these could not easily be resolved by a simple solution 
such as buttressing feudal elements or preserving a feudal economy. 
Nevertheless, the tendency to see India as continuing to be 
a primarily feudal and agricultural country seems explicable in terms 
of that being in the economic interests of Britain.
It is because of the reluctance to see any change in the social, 
economic and political structures of India that the British took such 
serious note of the embryonic Communist movement, which, was ostensi­
bly aimed at the liberation of the Indian masses. It was not, how­
ever, the fear that the Communists would engineer a revolution that 
sharpened the hostility of the Government of India and the British 
Government. The fledgling Indian Communist Party and its supporters 
had managed to spread their influence into some industrial areas, 
and they took an active part in the mill strikes of 1926 and 1927.
But, significantly, no real and tangible links developed between the 
Communists and the nationalist movement, because the Communists saw 
the nationalist leadership as class enemies of the masses, and the 
common element of anti-imperialism was not sufficient to overcome 
this ideological barrier. Thus, imperial interests were not immedi­
ately threatened by the possibility of combined action by the
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Communists and the nationalists. Even the possibility of such action 
vanished when Jawaharlal Nehru, the leader of the radicals in the 
Indian National Congress, broke off the links between the Congress 
and the League Against Imperialism (106).
The Government of India decided, nevertheless, to destroy the 
emergent Communist movement in India, and launched a trial of most 
of the major leaders, who included some Englishmen. One of the rea­
sons for this action was the traditional fear of an expansionist 
Russia. If in the 19th century it was the threat, real or imagined, 
of an expanding Czarist Empire, now it was the Soviet Union which 
was seen as waiting on the frontiers of India, and attempting, 
through the Comintern, to insidiously plot the overthrow of the Bri­
tish Raj in India. Sir Francis Younghusband, the veteran exponent 
of Lord Curzon's forward policy, declared in a speech to the Oxford 
Luncheon Club that the Bolshevik menace to India was far greater 
than that which had been posed by the Czarist Government (107).
The Commander-in-Chief in India, Sir William Birdwood, did not hesi­
tate to use the Bolshevik menace as a convenient argument. Especi­
ally because of it, he told the Indian Council of State, the expen­
diture on defence could not be reduced to Rs 50 crores as recom­
mended by the Inchcape Committee (108).
The launching of the trial of the Indian Communists, which 
came to be known as the Meerut Conspiracy Trial, generated little 
interest in Britain, if only because all the major Parties were 
united in their opposition to the Communists. There were Communist 
sympathizers in the trade unions, and in the Labour Party itself, 
but there was much mutual hostility between the Communists and the 
Labour Party. The Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) saw the 
Labour Party as an ally of capitalism and imperialism, and this of
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course was unacceptable to the leaders of the Labour Party. In fact, 
they saw the CPGB as 'the most bitter enemies' of the Party and of 
organized labour (109). It is because of the hostility between Bri­
tish trade unions and the Communists that The Times was able to sug­
gest that it would be useful to encourage links between the trade 
unions in Britain and Indian labour organizations, so that the Commu­
nist influence in India could be exorcised (110).
The Governments in India and Britain had much less to fear 
from the activities of the Communists than from the efforts that 
the Congress had begun to make to reach sections of rural popula­
tions that had hitherto been left out in the political wilderness.
It was with the advent of Gandhi on the Indian political scene that 
the Congress had begun transforming itself from a Party purely of 
the urban middle classes to one which sought to widen the base of 
its support, and one example of this growing tendency to draw in 
elements of rural India was the launching of a movement in Bardoli 
in 1928 (111). Bardoli had already had a taste of modern agita­
tional politics in 1918, and now, as the Simon Commission was tour­
ing India, the fairly prosperous peasants of Bardoli, in Gujerat, 
under the leadership of Vallabhai Patel, bestirred themselves once 
again to defy the might of the Raj, in order to secure a revenue con­
cession. The Secretary of State was perturbed by the turn the agi­
tation was taking, and especially by the stand that the government 
of Bombay appeared to be taking, that it was more important to con­
ciliate public opinion in India than to take stern measures to stamp 
out what was in effect an anti-Government agitation (112).
Birkenhead thought, in fact, that, despite the possibility 
of any repressive action reducing the prospects of Indian co-opera­
tion with the Simon Commission, reassertion of Government authority
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was more important, for it was 'surely impossible to tolerate the 
sort of unofficial government which seems to have been set up...', 
and it seemed to him 'imperative before things go any further to 
demonstrate unmistakably that Government can and will govern' (113).
In phrases later to be echoed by Winston Churchill as Prime Minister, 
Birkenhead declared to Sir Leslie Wilson, the Governor of Bombay, 
while asking him to take effective measures for restoring order,
'I cannot, while I am Secretary of State, have any part of British 
India in which the King's writ does not run' (114). The apparent 
reluctance of the Government authorities in India to take stern mea­
sures against the agitators appears to have caused concern, not only 
in the Cabinet, but also in the Conservative Party (115).
This concern was also a reflection of the slowly growing aware­
ness that Indian nationalism was acquiring a harder edge. Several 
writers were still depicting the Indian nationalist movement as the 
preserve of an urban, high-caste Hindu coterie. But the almost 
united rejection of the Simon Commission, and the boycott movement 
that followed, began to raise doubts and compelled reconsiderations. 
Attempts were made to dismiss the participation of different sections 
of society on the grounds that ignorant masses were being duped by 
artful leaders or being bought by the power of money (116). But the 
events in India began to subtly alter perceptions. As early as 
September 1928, Irwin was beginning to be concerned by the degree to 
which 'Indian political thought' had moved to the left, and especi­
ally by the extent to which the moderates were willing to make 
terms with the proponents of the idea of independence (117).
By the time the Indian National Congress met at Calcutta in 
December 1928, Irwin was even more convinced about the shift in In­
dian politics. Describing the Calcutta Congress to the new Secretary 
of State for India, Peel, Irwin stated that there was a noticeable
105
swing to the left, and that independence had ceased to be an academic 
ideal (118). Irwin was also persuaded that it was necessary to 
split what he considered was the 'artificial unity' among the diffe­
rent Indian groups, and felt that Simon was also inclined to think 
on similar lines (119). Perhaps they thought that it was possible 
to split the Indian nationalists because, as Geoffrey Dawson put 
it, some of the moderates were beginning to be frightened of the in­
dependence wing (120).
There was not much hope perhaps that the Simon Commission would 
recommend anything that would achieve such a split among the nationa­
lists. Given the attitudes of the Commissioners, it was extremely 
unlikely that they would have suggested any major advance. Even the 
'Nehru Report' (the constitution drafted by the Indian All Parties 
Committee) was dismissed by Simon as a 'very empty performance, most­
ly copied from the Australian Constitution, and evading nearly all 
the difficulties' (121). Vernon Hartshorn, one of the Labour members 
of the Commission, also urged MacDonald not to take notice Of the 
Nehru Report, as responsible self-government could not be granted 
immediately (122). Meanwhile, Burnham had, according to Lane-Fox, 
made up his mind to write a separate report on die-hard lines (123).
The Statutory Commission had gone to India with certain pre­
conceived notions about India, Indian nationalism and Indian charac­
ter. It could not have been otherwise. The various Commissioners 
might have brought forensic detachment to their task, but they could 
not have left behind in Britain their intellectual heritage, the 
images of India that formed the paradigms of their perception. How­
ever assiduously and dispassionately the members might have col­
lected the evidence for their report, that evidence must necessarily 
have been selectively filtered because of their preconceptions.
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While the Statutory Commission was carrying on its work, the 
Labour Party came to power in Britain after the General Election of 
May 1929. The Indian extremists had, by this time, lost faith in 
the capacity or willingness of the Labour Party to implement any 
real and tangible changes in India. But there were still some people 
who hoped that the Labour Government would at least make an immediate 
pronouncement about the granting of Dominion status for India (124). 
Ramsay MacDonald, Prime Minister for a second time, regretted the 
fact that some Indians were still suspicious of the Labour Party, but 
felt that no statement could be made while a Commission was inquiring 
into the question of constitutional reform and was about to present 
a report (125). Although Labour was in power, it was again a minori­
ty Government. Its Cabinet was dominated by the right wing (126).
It was preoccupied with international affairs. The new Government 
was unlikely to do much to alter the Indian situation.
The Government attempted, however, to do something in Egypt. 
Lloyd George thought this was dangerous. Whatever the Simon Com­
mission recommended might appear so far short of what had been of­
fered to Egypt that it would seem inadequate and ungenerous, and 
would lead, Lloyd George felt, to the rejection by the Indian natio­
nalists of a reasonable scheme of reform (127).
What cast a maleficent shadow on the Indian reforms programme 
was not, however, the Egyptian proposals of the Labour Government.
It was the British reaction to the 31 October declaration by Irwin.
In a long statement that also set out the plan for a Round Table 
Conference, Irwin declared (128):
I am authorised on behalf of His Majesty's Government, 
to state clearly that in their judgment it is implicit 
in the declaration of 1917 that the natural issue of 
India's constitutional progress, as there contemplated, 
is the attainment of Dominion status.
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On the face of it, the declaration was innocuous, and was merely re­
iterating what had been stated before by several British spokesmen. 
Yet it unleashed a storm of protests and thus negated its primary 
purposes.
These were the defusion of a potentially explosive situation, 
and also the destruction of the 'artificial' unity between the oppo­
nents of the Empire in India. The Congress threat to launch a civil 
disobedience movement if Dominion status was not granted by the end 
of 1929 could not be dismissed too lightly, especially since Irwin 
was convinced that the left wing of the Congress was rapidly gain­
ing ground. This appears to have been one of the factors that led 
to the declaration, although it had to remain a hidden factor for 
obvious reasons (129).
On the other hand, the belief that the moderates could still 
be detached from the extremists did not entirely evaporate. Motilal 
Nehru had, for instance, told Geoffrey Dawson that the demand for 
Dominion status was not seriously meant; what was really needed 
was that an assurance should be given that Dominion status was on 
the way (130). Irwin seems to have seized upon such an idea. He was 
convinced that Indians understood by the phrase 'Dominion status' a 
declaration of intent rather than the actual achievement of immedi­
ate Dominion status (131). It has been suggested that Irwin was 
deliberately attempting to exploit the difference between the British 
perception of the phrase and the Indian one (132). But this was evi­
dent in Irwin's expressed opinions. Where Irwin erred was to think 
that Indians would be satisfied with a mere declaration of British 
intentions. The ascendancy of the extremists in the Congress had 
perhaps rendered such acceptance of a mere declaration virtually 
impossible. Irwin erred too in thinking that the British reaction
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would be muted. This is even more surprising, since it had become 
clear early that both the Liberals and the Conservatives were hostile 
to the idea.
Lord Crewe for example thought that it was a 'mistaken stir­
ring of the pot' while the process of cooking was going on (133).
Lord Salisbury was shocked that such a declaration was to be made 
before the Simon Commission had reported (134). Reading, Simon and 
Peel also privately expressed their opposition to the idea (135). 
Birkenhead tried to get a letter on the subject published in The 
Times, perhaps hoping that premature publicity would prevent the 
declaration. But Geoffrey Dawson dissuaded him (136).
Irwin knew of the opposition. Yet he made the declaration , 
with minor amendments. Almost every newspaper and journal in Bri­
tain criticized the declaration. Among the leading newspapers, only 
The Times supported Irwin's action, arguing that the declaration con­
tained no promises and revealed no change of policy (137). Indeed, 
Irwin had, in the course of the statement, asserted that, in the view 
of the Government, it would be improper to forecast any constitutional 
change before the Statutory Commission had reported. Why then was 
there such an outcry (138)?
Some contemporary observers of the controversy felt that oppo­
nents of Baldwin were attempting to make political capital out of the 
acquiescence, albeit conditional, of Baldwin in the making of the 
declaration (139). There was probably also the expectation that a 
fatal blow could be struck at the Government itself. But both Bald­
win and the Government were able to weather the storm, partly be­
cause the immediate Indian response seemed to be conciliatory and 
optimistic.
The deeper, more important reason for the British response to
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the Irwin declaration was that, despite all protestations to the con­
trary, the fact that the declaration was made at all was taken to mean 
a new departure in policy, and the British public was not yet prepared 
to alter its images of India. The idea of India as a fully fledged 
Dominion did not fit into the existing paradigm about India. The 
British reaction took away the meaning of the declaration and turned 
it into an empty, rhetorical exercise. The declaration had been in­
tended to be a bridge between Britain and the Indian moderates. The 
reaction in Britain, however, undermined its structure and rendered 
it useless. As Irwin put it later (140),
I cannot doubt that the choice by public men in England 
of an attitude and language so lacking in imagination 
and sympathy was not without its influence at a formative 
moment in shaping Indian political opinion upon the ques­
tion of the relation of the new India towards the British 
Commonwealth and strengthened the demand for independence.
Between 1927 and 1929, the decisions of Britain regarding India 
reflected the continued predominance of inherited ideas about India. 
Although there were groups and individuals struggling to erect alter­
native structures of perception, the dominant ideas were those that 
persisted in viewing India as a backward place, and one in which, more­
over, the British presence would be required for a very long time to 
come.
The arguments for continued British rule in India stemmed from 
two sources. One was the ideological reluctance to perceive possibi­
lities of change in India. Received images, reinforced by constant 
reiteration, prevented important elements of British society from ac­
cepting either the validity of Indian nationalism or the notion that 
political change in India was desirable. The other source was the 
material one of British economic interests. India was still an impor­
tant market for British exports. And it seemed to British busi­
nessmen that greater political freedom for India would spell economic
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ruin for them. Their apprehensions were probably increased by a state­
ment which the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce made on 
21 October 1929, just a few days before Irwin made his controversial 
declaration. In this statement the Federation declared (141):
There can be no self-government in India if she 
is to be denied the power to devise and follow 
a national economic policy, including the right, 
if her interests require it, of making economic 
discrimination against non-national interests.
No more explicit declaration could have been made of Indian economic 
intentions, and that would have been reason enough for British busi­
ness interests to have insisted on retaining political control.
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4. Responses to Radicalism: From the Lahore Congress to
the Gandhi-Irwin Pact
The resolution of the Indian National Congress at 
Lahore on 31 December 1929, declaring complete independence 
as its goal, marked a decisive turning point in the history 
of Indian nationalism. Mere declarations from London would 
no longer be enough, it seemed, to stave off the ascendance 
of extremists. The spirit of militant nationalism display­
ed at Lahore struck observers of the Congress as being re- 
mar kab1e .
One such observer was Professor J.L. Morison of Arm­
strong College, Newcastle on Tyne. In a letter he wrote 
from Lahore, Morison declared (1):
The present movement is a deep all-India affair. It's 
no use pretending that it is the concern of the Indian 
'intelligenzia'. No doubt the great mass here is natu­
rally uninterested in all-India politics, but most of 
the leaders come from that mass, are representative of 
it, are related to it with an intimacy lacking even in 
the best English administrators... In other words we are 
dealing, not with a pathological state, but with some­
thing fine and wholesome, and in the end as irresistible 
as a law of nature.
Morison went on to argue that Indians should be given 
'complete self-government' which included the right to 
secede from the Empire, as anything else was a sham. The 
tone of the letter surprised Thomas Jones, the Deputy Sec­
retary to the Cabinet, who had always regarded Morison as 
as 'ardent imperialist' (2). Obviously the surge of natio-
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nalism that Morison witnessed at Lahore was sufficient to 
overcome his imperialist sentiments.
Even in distant London, the events at Lahore created 
some apprehension. There was a significant fall in the
London Stock Exchange, primarily as a result of the Con­
gress resolution on the repudiation of debts (3). But, if 
investors were visibly alarmed, others took a more sanguine 
view. declared that 'It would be a profound mis­
take to underrate the influence of the Congress P arty', but 
that there was nothing in 'their latest manifestations 
which should cause unusual surprise or deflect in the 
slightest degree the course of British policy' (4). The 
crux of this policy, according to The_Times, was to rally 
the moderates in India.
pressing dismay at what it called the folly of the Con­
gress in declaring for complete independence and in pro­
posing civil disobedience, the Spectator argued in favour 
of a firm response, but without provocative restrictions 
and repression (5). It went on to clarify its position 
in response to a letter from Charles G. Spencer, a former 
judge of the Madras High Court, who had stated that in 
India there was a need for 'far-sighted statesmen, not men 
who pardon rebels and try to placate irreconei1ab1es ' (6).
The editor replied that the Spectator supported the Vice­
roy, Irwin, because the ’only means of ensuring that India 
remains within the British Commonwealth is to enlist libe­
ral and constitutional elements on our s i d e ' , and complete
prices of Indian and Government stocks on the
A similar stance was adopted by the Spectator. Ex-
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self-government without limitations was the goal that could 
never be lost sight of (7).
The idea that moderate elements in India should be
wooed away from the extremists and to the side of the
Government had been one of the important determinants of
British policy in the preceding years. As extremism raised 
its head once more, this idea came to the fore again. 
Wedgwood Benn, the Secretary of State for India, was for 
example keen that, in meeting the threat posed by the Con­
gress, the Government of India should ensure that moderate 
opinion would be carried with the Government in enforcing 
the law (8).
Some entertained the hope that the very extremism 
shown at Lahore would push the Indian moderates towards 
the Government (9). The Ranchester_Guardian, for example, 
argued that Indian moderates had a chance to regain con­
trol of India's political course because Congress had 
decided to base its policy on emotions and not upon facts. 
It suggested that the moderates should form a Party (10).
It felt that the Indian moderates should be supported by 
demonstration through definite action that Britain was de­
termined to remove the obstacles in the path towards Domi­
nion status (11).
An influential section of British opinion was thus 
urging the continuation of the traditional policy of sup­
porting moderate elements in India in order to defeat the 
extremists. But not all were convinced of the efficacy of 
such a policy, which necessarily involved a cautious and 
moderate response to moves by the Congress, for severe
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repression would have further alienated the moderates. To 
several right-wing elements in Britain, this very caution 
and moderation seemed to be the cause of the problems 
in India. The Daily_Mai:l and the Morning_Post argued in 
fact that it was the weakness of the Viceroy, Irwin, that 
was causing all the pr ob1e m s (12). Lucy Houston, the ec­
centric and right-wing owner of the Saturday_Review, even 
wrote to the Prime Minister, urging the recall of Irwin and 
his replacement by Lord Lloyd, who, according to her, should 
be given a carte_b 1 anche (13). The Dai 1 y_Mai. 1 too echoed 
this idea (14).
Sir Reginald Craddock,the die-hard Conservative and 
former Indian Civil Servant who had just published The 
Dilemma_in_India, sent a note to the Secretary of State, 
recommending a firm and forceful counterattack by Govern­
ment as soon as Congress began a civil disobedience move­
ment, especially through a special ordinance that would 
give the Government wide powers (15).
But it was not only Conservative die-hards who were 
urging more forceful action in India. Lloyd George also 
attacked the policy of moderation being adopted by the 
Government (16). And Reading, asked to comment on the 
draft of a speech that Irwin was proposing to make to the 
Legislative Assembly in India (setting out Government po­
licy), declared that the speech would give the impression 
that the Government was vacillating and apprehensive about 
the consequences of action against the extremists (17).
It is probable that some of the criticism stemmed 
from a desire to make political capital out of the Indian
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problem, although Indian policy was in effect still being 
pursued on non-partisan lines. There was also a tacit fear, 
perhaps, that India was on the brink of irrepressible revo­
lution, that she would indeed become the 'lost dominion'.
It was probably to allay such fears that Earl Russell, the 
Under-Secretary of State for India, declared at a meeting 
in Cambridge that, whatever might be the nature of the Simon 
Report, or of the discussions at the proposed Round Table 
Conference, Dominion status for India was not possible for 
a long time (18). Russell's intention might have been to 
silence British critics of the Government's India policy.
In India, however, his remarks had the opposite effect. 
Russell attempted to repair the damage by explaining that 
he had been misreported, and that he was merely pointing 
out that there had to be a long period of transition. In­
dians saw his statement as the inadvertent revelation of 
the true policy that the Government sought to adopt. Moti- 
lal Nehru, for example, declared that Russell had blurted 
out the 'unvarnished truth', and that the later repudiations 
could change nothing (19).
The Government was obviously caught in a critical po­
sition. In India, it had to tread cautiously to avoid the 
alienation of the moderates. At the same time, it could 
not ignore the domestic critics of its policy in India.
Its task was further complicated by the state of the econo­
my, especially its impact on the textile industry of Lan­
cashire. On the one hand, the growing demands in India for 
protection could not be brushed aside. On the other hand, 
British textile interests were also exerting an increasing
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pressure on the Government, seeking to remove all barriers 
that restricted British trade with India.
This conflict of economic interests had always been a 
recurrent theme in the imperial relationship; the situation 
in 1930 was more critical than it had ever been. Unemploy­
ment in Lancashire was rising as the world economic crisis 
bit deeper into the British economy. At the same time, po­
litical and economic conditions were interacting to increase 
the likelihood of a total exclusion of the products of 
Lancashire. The possible loss of the Indian market at a 
time when competition from Japan, Germany, and the United 
States was threatening an already weakened British indus­
try could not have been viewed with equanimity.
India was not the only market for the goods of Lan­
cashire. Nevertheless, it was undoubtedly the most impor­
tant at that time. As T.M. Ainscough, the Senior British 
Trade Commissioner in India, pointed out in a speech to 
the Royal Empire Society , India absorbed 11 Vz% of the total 
UK export trade, and 28% of the UK cotton piecegoods ex­
ports (20). The loss of such a market at a critical junc­
ture could not have been contemplated with detachment.
The Labour Government was perhaps perplexed also be­
cause it was committed on the one hand to support the Bri­
tish worker, while on the other it had professedly greater 
sympathies for Indian nationalism than the other Parties.
It tried to persuade the Government of India to modify the 
duties on cotton goods imported into India, by arguing,
» that the tariff would have serious results not 
only for the poor of Lancashire, but also for the poor of
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India (21). The Viceroy would have none of this, however.
He pointed out that the purchasers of Lancashire products 
were mostly not the poor, and that in any case Indian in­
terests had to be put first, because there was a strong 
desire among Indians for protection, and a dangerous poli­
tical situation would be created if this desire was starved 
altogether (22). As a palliative, Irwin suggested, the 
Government of India was willing to propose a 5% protective 
duty to be imposed on plain grey goods from outside the 
British Empire, as this might be acceptable to Bombay inte­
rests (23). The President of the Board of Trade welcomed 
this idea, but pointed out to the Cabinet that it would 
cover only 19 million rupees' worth of goods out of a total 
of 427 million rupees' worth of goods imported into India (24).
Naturally Lancashire became a focal point, and in the
succeeding years the chief actors in the imperial drama all
at one time or another perforce made a pilgrimage to Lan­
cashire, to court the people of that area, workers and capi­
talists alike. But it was not only the cotton trade and
Lancashire that pointed to the growing contradiction in im­
perial policy, namely the need to reconcile the opposing 
economic interests of commercial forces in India and in 
Britain. Shipping was another area of contention: Indian
shipping interests sought reservation of coastal shipping 
for themselves, while British shipping companies opposed 
this (25).
There was therefore a strong economic component in 
the desire to contain the Indian nationalist movement.
But this was rarely used as an argument, since it could 
only have lent further credence to the Indian view that
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Britain was reluctant to yield her Indian sceptre because 
that would damage British economic interests. The argu­
ments revolved instead around traditional themes.
A correspondent to the Spectator declared that the 
Indian extremists represented no one but themselves, and 
that they should be dealt with firmly, as otherwise the 
'martial races', who would not tolerate domination by a 
class they despised, would rise up in rebellion (26).
H.S Barnes, a former member of the Council of India,
catalogued the benefits conferred by Britain on India, im­
plying that Indians ought to be grateful, and suggested 
that friends of Britain should be rallied by a declaration
that the British had no intention of leaving India, either
then or in the future (27).
Arthur Conan Doyle, the famous creator of Sherlock 
Holmes, thought that the agitation in India should be coun­
tered by asking Muslims if they would be prepared to obey 
laws passed by a Hindu majority, and by asking Untouchables 
if they wished to be left to the mercy of the Brahmins (28).
J.B. Macfarlan, a retired Lieutenant-Colonel who had 
served in India, asserted that a large majority of Indians 
placed greater trust in British rule than in native admini­
stration (29). And Michael O'Dwyer blandly declared that 
the Government merely needed to acquaint the Indian people 
with the 'true facts' to get them onto the Government 
side (30).
All these ideas were based on traditional images of 
India. Their reiteration strengthened the stereotypes,
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and precluded a proper understanding of the Indian situ­
ation. If the Indian people remained ignorant of the 
'true fa c t s ' , the British public also saw the Indian prob­
lem through the distorting prism of preconceptions and 
prejudices. Faced with a challenge to the British Empire 
in India, the British people were more unwilling than ever 
to reject their inherited ideas about India, and this un­
willingness certainly prevented them from accepting ideas of 
compromise at that juncture.
Not everyone was entirely oblivious of the economic 
element involved in the relationship between India and 
Britain. F. Anderson, an engineer in India, in a letter 
to the Liberal leader, Herbert Samuel, expressed his happi­
ness that Samuel (and, he hoped, the Party) was not commit­
ted to the granting of self-government to India, for it 
would mean the repudiation of every obligation by a Cong­
ress Government, which was the only possible Government, 
and Indian fiscal autonomy would help neither the unemploy­
ment problem nor free trade (31). John Dellbridge, an 
author who had spent some time in India, was more explicit 
and emphatic. In a pamphlet published in January 1930, he 
declared that the reason why Britain was in India was that 
India was a paying proposition 'well worth exploiting', 
and that 'the most bemused of hypocrites would hesitate 
before asking anyone to believe that we entered India in 
order to hold it in trust for India' (32). Dellbridge was 
no friend of India, for he repeated stereotypes to the ef­
fect that India was not a nation, and that the Bengali was 
a physical coward, and he defended Katherine Mayo by
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declaring that her Mother_India was nothing but the truth. 
Yet he was putting across an economic motive for Britain's 
continued dominance of India. His pamphlet reflected the 
idea that India was still profitable and therefore should 
be kept firmly within the British Empire.
Of course, there were others who recognized that 
there might be economic reasons for the Indian unrest.
C.J. O'Donnell, who had been in India in the ICS, and 
who had later represented Walworth as a Liberal M P , ar­
gued in his Why_India_is_Rebellious that the Indian peasant 
had no interest in constitution-building, but sought a 
change of Government because of discontent arising from 
impoverishment, and the 'agitators' derived their strength 
from this discontent (33). O'Donnell rejected the dominant 
idea that the Indian agitators were few in number and that 
they did not represent the rural masses, and indicated that, 
on the contrary, they were largely from that class. O'Don^ 
nell's Indian service had mostly been in Bengal, and,al­
though he had retired in 1900, before the anti-partition 
agitation, he had apparently sensed the rural roots of Ben­
gali nationalism, and had been led to conclude that Indian 
nationalism was not an elitist phenomenon.
There was a great deal of truth in the argument that 
the Indian nationalist leaders were taking advantage of, 
and were deriving their strength from, the economic dis­
content of the Indian people. Indeed, the attempt made by 
Gandhi in January 1930 to seek a £a£P£2£heinent with the 
Government through the eleven-point programme has been 
seen to be a deliberate and careful attempt to draw sup­
128
port from every class and social group (34). In reality, 
of course, the eleven-point programme, if accepted, would 
have been of great benefit to the Indian bourgeoisie, since 
among various items it included the reduction of the rupee- 
sterling ratio, a protective tariff on foreign cloth, and 
the passage of the Coastal Traffic Reservation Bill. But 
these were the very items that the Viceroy, as the repre­
sentative of the King-Emperor, could not accept, as they 
conflicted with the interests of Britain. To Gandhi, 
these constituted the essence of independence (35). But 
he must have known that the Viceroy could not accept these 
eleven demands, and could only have made this infructuous 
peace overture to satisfy his conscience that he had tried 
to avert the imminent conflict with the Government (36).
But attempts were actually made by Gandhi's British 
friends to persuade the Home Government to accept or at 
any rate explore their feasibility. C.F. Andrews, for ex­
ample, argued that Gandhi's eleven-point programme repre­
sented a minimum, but a real offer, and felt that the Secre­
tary of State should go to India and discuss it with Gandhi 
and the other Indian leaders, preceding this by the release 
of all the political prisoners (37).
It was, however, a futile hope, since the policy of 
the Government had been stated by Irwin in his speech to 
the Legislative Assembly, in which he had reiterated the 
policy expressed in his declaration of October 1929, 
stating that the declaration of the goal, and the actual 
attainment of that goal, were two separate things, and that 
the Round Table Conference would meet only for the purpose
129
of elucidating and harmonizing opinion, the Government 
having the responsibility for the drafting of proposals 
for the consideration of Parliament (38).
Besides, opinion in Britain tended at this juncture 
to await the Report of the Statutory Commission, and in 
fact to ignore the idea of the Conference (39). So, as the 
Indian National Congress tested its strength through 'Inde­
pendence Day' celebrations on 26 January 1930, the Govern­
ment of India and the British Government prepared for the 
coming conflict, buttressed certainly by the thought that, 
while any firm measures would be supported by the public 
at home, the idea of the Round Table Conference would keep 
alive moderate support in India.
Gandhi made, it would seem, another attempt to seek 
a compromise, by directly approaching the Prime Minister.
He sent a letter to MacDonald through S.R. Bomanji (40).
But nothing came of this, perhaps because Gandhi merely 
reiterated the eleven points he had already set out (41).
Having exhausted all possible paths to a peaceful 
resolution of the problem without injury to the Congress 
position, Gandhi finally cast the die by sending a letter 
to Irwin in which he set out a list of the evils resulting 
from British rule which he held to be the cause of India's 
ruin, and declared that, if Irwin could not see his way to 
deal with these evils, he would embark on civil disobedi­
ence (42). Irwin's Private Secretary sent a terse reply, 
expressing the Viceroy's regret that Gandhi contemplated 
a course of action that would involve violation of the 
law and danger to the public peace (43). Wedgwood Benn
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thought that the reply was precisely right (44). The time 
had passed for confabulations with people who had now be­
come, for all practical purposes, the enemy. There re­
mained, after all, the hope of retaining the support of 
the Indian moderates, and policy continued to be influen­
ced by that idea.
Wedgwood Benn thought that the use of force by the 
Government should be confined to the suppression of vio­
lence whether actual or intended, as this would make it 
possible to retain the tacit assent of 'thinking people' 
(45). In fact, to Benn, the effect on the Indian public of 
the methods adopted by the Government of India was much more im­
portant than opinion in Britain (46). Irwin, on the other 
hand, was concerned by the reaction of the British Press 
to the apparent inaction of the Government of India, in 
case they decided not to arrest Gandhi immediately (47).
Initially, there was little concern in Britain about 
the events in India, and the House of Commons extended its 
full support for the Viceroy (48). The Secretary of State 
was even hopeful that the civil disobedience movement
would soon disappear, leaving the Government free to fight 
with the terrorists, which, he thought, was a much more 
satisfactory job to undertake (49). But, as the movement 
in India took hold of the popular imagination, and more 
and more people began to defy the law, it became clear 
that it was no transient phenomenon. Within a few days of 
Benn's optimistic epistle to Irwin, Sydney Webb, the 
Colonial Secretary, was writing to his wife that the pros­
pects in India were very bad, and that serious trouble, 
much worse than 'the present', was feared (50). Sydney
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Webb was probably reacting to the news of the mutiny of 
some soldiers of the 2/18 Garhwal Regiment in Peshawar, 
but the events following the arrest of Gandhi on 29 April 
1930, especially the riots in Sholapur, served to deepen 
the anxiety of the British Cabinet.
Not surprisingly, the Prime Minister replied with 
anger to C.F. Andrews, who had suggested that the salt 
tax, and the strong measures that the Government was taking 
in India, should be abolished, and that Gandhi should be 
called to a conference (51). Andrews' letter obviously came 
at a wrong time, just as the Cabinet was considering the 
critical situation in India, and MacDonald replied in very 
strong terms. Are not Gandhi's hands red with the blood 
of his fellow countrymen, he asked, and categorically as­
serted that the Government could not allow either Gandhi 
or anyone else to deflect them from the liberal political 
policy that they were going to pursue in India (52). Ap­
parently stung by the suggestion that his Government had 
adopted strong measures, MacDonald went on to ask Andrews 
whether or not he was aiding and abetting the most ordinary 
kind of revolution in India, adding that there was no cheap 
and easy attitude which could be adopted at the time (53).
It is extremely likely that the Cabinet and MacDonald 
did think that they, and Irwin in India, were meeting the 
crisis in India with as much restraint as was possible.
The philosophy that underpinned the Government's policy 
was summed up by Wedgwood Benn, who felt that the main 
difference between war on civil disobedience and an inter­
national war was that, in the case of the latter, a knockout
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blow might be justified, while in the case of the former 
the use of force by the Government was intended to lead 
up to an armistice, thus retaining public support (54).
In other words, the policy to be followed was one that 
would not alienate public support, implying thereby the 
support of the moderates, as the extremists, by definition, 
were the main actors in the conflict.
But if the Government was banking on the moderates, 
not all were convinced that such support would be forth­
coming. Sir John Simon, in the throes of completing his 
Report, felt that there was no use in relying on the mode­
rates, and doubted very much whether even Sapru and Jinnah 
would have the courage to stand out from the 'swirling 
mob' (55). He was not alone in thinking that the mode­
rates were incapable of producing a countervailing force 
to combat the forces of disorder. Indeed, Irwin was con­
cerned that, if references were made in Britain to,the 
'craven spirit' of the moderates, the effect in India 
would be bad (56).
The Daily_Maj1l and the Daily_Telegraph, unconcerned 
about the effect in India, were doing exactly that, paint­
ing a lurid picture of Indian events, stirring up in Bri­
tain a feeling that the Indians were unfit for self- 
government, and that the Indian Government was reacting 
too weakly (57). Lord Beaverbrook, the proprietor of the 
» also thought on similar lines. 'The day 
that a policy of repression is decided on will mark the 
end of the crisis' , he wrote to Arthur Brisbane, and added 
that, whereas the English were never free to bomb towns or
133
machine-gun people in Ireland, they could do so in India, 
and the 'rebellion' would be crushed if the decision was 
taken to bomb or use machine guns (58).
The Sunday_Chronic1e sought at this point to project 
a bleak image of India by reproducing selected extracts 
from Mother_India . C.F. Andrews thought that such a pub­
lication at a time when the Indian Press was itself sub­
ject to the strict controls of the Press Ordinance was 
bound to create an indignant reaction, and wanted Mac­
Donald to intercede through Baldwin to prevent publica­
tion (59). Wedgwood Benn did manage to secure postpone­
ment of the publication of the extracts, but perhaps lost 
some of the advantage since the Sunday_Chronicle indicated 
that it was putting off publication at the request of the 
India Office (60).
Irwin had noticed that the Press in Britain was giv­
ing the impression t h a t .the Government of India was pur­
suing a weak policy, and asked Benn to get the Press to 
understand that the Government had acted with vigour and 
quickness, and that the policy followed had been justified 
by the results (61). If Irwin was anxious to appear to be 
firmly in control, he was also, at the same time, very con­
cerned about the possible repercussions of Government po­
licy, especially that adopted in the North-West Frontier 
Province, on the Muslims. In fact, Irwin was so apprehen­
sive that Muslims might join the movement that he asked 
Benn to privately suggest to Simon that he should avoid 
either by language or in substance anything in his Report 
that could discourage the Muslims (62).
In Britain, while one section of the Press was call-
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ing for more forceful action, the events in India began to 
arouse growing concern among the intelligentsia, and those 
who saw in India an unnecessary conflict. The Society of 
Friends sent a deputation to the Secretary of State to urge 
him to find a peaceful solution. Gilbert Murray, Arnold 
Toynbee and Philip Kerr had discussions with Benn as a 
result of Murray's proposal to publish an expression of non­
political opinion signed by distinguished philosophers and 
men of letters, pleading for understanding (63). Horace 
Alexander planned to go to India 'to help build a bridge', 
as he put it (64). The Women's International League for 
Peace and Freedom adopted a series of resolutions calling 
on the Government to declare an amnesty for political pri­
soners, to announce that the object of the Round Table Con­
ference was to formulate a scheme for full responsible 
government in India, and so on (65).
The Government, at this juncture, was not very recep­
tive to suggestions about policy. Wedgwood Benn saw the 
role of the Government as a neutral arbiter, maintaining 
peace, not in the interests of Britain, but of India, 
while being conscious both of the national sentiment in 
India and of public opinion in Europe and the USA (66). 
The Labour Government had the difficult task of recon­
ciling their sympathy for Indian nationalism (which the 
Party had proclaimed again and again from various plat­
forms) with the imperial task of maintaining order in India. 
That this dilemma exercised the Cabinet is revealed by an 
entry in Beatrice Webb's diary. Following Gandhi's arrest, 
she recorded (67):
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It is not prejudice in favour of autocratic British 
rule in the mind of the Labour Cabinet and the Vice­
roy that blocks the way to granting immediate Domi­
nion status, but sheer perplexity as to how on earth 
to do it, without tumbling India into a state of 
civil war.
This was not merely a moral dilemma of maintaining 
order in India without seeming to retreat from positions 
held in the past, but one which had immediate practical 
ramifications. Civil disobedience was not showing signs 
of petering out, as the Government had hoped (68). Yet 
the Government had to seek ways of restoring peace, first­
ly to create conditions in which the proposed Round Table 
Conference could take place effectively and usefully, and 
secondly to resurrect a dying economy (69). But, at the 
same time, the Government of India could not appear to be 
surrendering to the nationalist movement.
It was this attitude that led the Government of India 
to scotch all moves made between May and July 1930 to se­
cure some, settlement of the problem. , The first move, para­
doxically enough, was made by Indian commercial interests. 
Although they were supporting the civil disobedience move­
ment because in the long run it would, if successful, se­
cure for them the financial and commercial autonomy they 
desired so much, in the short term, the boycott campaign 
and the general political instability were affecting their 
interests as much as those of British commerce (70).
The initiative was taken by Husseinbhoy Laljee, the 
President of the Indian Merchants' Chamber. He proposed 
that they would persuade Gandhi to call off the movement 
if the Viceroy could declare support for full responsible 
government and fiscal autonomy, and stated the terms of 
reference for the Round Table Conference (71). The Vice-
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roy felt that there could be no negotiations before the 
movement actually c eased.because it was 'very important 
that no impression should anywhere be created that we are 
prepared to open negotiations with Gandhi' (72). For the 
same reason, Irwin refused to meet George Slocombe, the 
Correspondent of the Dai1ly_Herald who had earlier brought 
off a dramatic journalistic feat by interviewing Gandhi in 
jail (73). But Slocombe, perhaps with a journalist's feel 
for the political pulse, told the Private Secretary to the 
Viceroy that there could be no administrative solution, and 
that sooner or later negotiations would be necessary (74). 
Indeed, already Benn, while admitting that it might be pre­
mature to talk of one, made references to a possible armis­
tice in the future, arguing that the Government should 
leave a way open for continuing with positive steps towards 
constitutional reform through discreet use of repressive 
measures (75).
Parthasarathi Gupta has argued that Benn did not 
interfere with the Viceroy's tactics in dealing with the 
civil disobedience movement (76). While this is true, in 
so far as no explicit directives were forwarded to Irwin, 
it is apparent from the various letters and telegrams 
cited that Benn was strenuously attempting to create a 
framework in which the Government, while carrying out its 
task of governing, did not shut the door completely on 
possibilities of peacemaking without loss of face.
As noted, Benn had informed Irwin that he wished to 
keep the path to an armistice open, and was not too con­
cerned about the effect upon public opinion in Britain. 
Irwin, however, was conscious of the possible effect that
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his policies might have on the British public, and it could 
have been this that led him to reject the attempts made by 
Slocombe and Laljee. Besides, Irwin had formed the opini­
on that in some senses the civil disobedience movement 
was artificial in its inception and that it was maintain­
ed artificially; he saw commercial and economic discontent 
as having only a minor, insignificant, role, and he hoped 
that the Report of the Statutory Commission would help in 
combating the movement (77). He was inclined, therefore, 
to await developments, rather than diminish the reputation 
of the Government by entering into what he obviously 
thought were premature attempts to negotiate a peace.
If Irwin hoped that the Report of the Statutory Com­
mission would pave the way to peace, his hopes were soon 
to be dashed when the Report was published on 10 June 1930. 
In recommending only provincial autonomy, and even that 
hedged in by several safeguards, it fell far short of what 
the Indian nationalists had been demanding. Inevitably, 
it was rejected by them. It was clear, too, that the 
Government could not, in that political climate, back the 
Report, if it hoped to secure any co-operation from 
Indians .
In Britain, the Report was received with virtually 
universal acclamation. For one thing, it closely corres­
ponded to the existing image of India as being as yet un­
ready for any substantial movement towards Dominion status.
Besides, the unanimity of the Report, which Simon 
had engineered, tended to lend it a more forceful influ­
ence, and reinforced the hoary tradition of a non-partisan 
attitude towards India (78). The Report quickly became a
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bestseller, an unusual occurrence for a publication of 
HMS0, and that too on India (79). Two broadcasts made 
by Simon over the BBC presented to a wider audience a sum­
mary of the Report. It was used as a text-book in one 
school (80). The King thought that it was the 'most accu­
rate, faithful picture ever portrayed' of India, and he 
hoped that the Government would regard it as the core of 
their policy (81). Clifford Sharp, the editor of the
N^w S t a ^ f c e , wrote to Simon that he would extend his
unqualified support for the Report, and that, in his 
opinion, talk of going beyond it was nonsensical (82).
A few critical voices were also raised. The Daily
Hera l d _ , which had praised the first volume of the Report
as being an admirable survey of the Indian scene, dismissed
the second volume for virtually recommending a continuation
of the existing situation (83). Harold Laski pointed out
the main flaw of the Report. Writing in the Daily Herald,
Laski declared (84):
As a piece of analysis its finely meshed structure 
could hardly be bettered. Its argument is closely 
knit, its logical power superb. Everything is 
there save an understanding of the Indian mind.
The 'Simon Report' , as it came to be called, undoub­
tedly captured the minds of the members of the intelligent­
sia, and laid the framework in which they would view In­
dian constitutional developments during this period.
Simon began to feel unhappy, however, as it became 
clear to him that his Report (as he certainly seems to 
have felt) was going to be shunted off onto a branch line. 
Already, he had been upset that the Nation had made ad­
verse remarks about Volume I of the Report, and had tried
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to get Mes ton to write to the journal criticizing the 
review (85). But now he was unwilling to face the pros­
pect of the Report being shelved. Forwarding the second 
volume to the Warden of All Souls College, Simon remarked 
that he wished the Government of India would call for a 
careful perusal of the Report, rather than encourage the 
idea that it would be scrapped, because it was fatal to 
give the Indians the impression that they only needed to 
raise a clamour to compel a retreat (86). Simon thought 
that Benn was preparing to shelve the Report, and even 
presumed that he might not have read it at all (87). He 
tried, therefore, to whip up support in the Press, and to 
increase the readership of the Report (88). The decision
to exclude Simon, and the other Commissioners, from the
<\
Round Table Conference seemed the £2£ P _ de_grace, an<  ^ Ir­
win's explanations did not mollify him (89).
The Conservative Party decided to back the Simon 
Report, though some of its members must have felt that 
it went too far in recommending provincial autonomy. Soon 
after it was published, Birkenhead wrote to Baldwin that 
all the evidence indicated a tendency to shelve it, and 
that the Round Table Conference would try to destroy it, 
but that it should be 'our purpose, as far as we can, to 
render this impossible' (90). Already, Austen Chamber- 
lain had conveyed to the Prime Minister the Conservative 
Party's opinion that the Government should back the Simon 
Report (91). There was general concern in London, parti­
cularly among Conservatives, that Irwin might, in a 
speech that he proposed to make, give away too much, and 
give the impression that the Round Table Conference was
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going to meet to frame a Dominion status constitution. 
Baldwin, Chamberlain, Lloyd George and Reading met the 
Prime Minister and forcefully suggested that Irwin should 
make no reference to Dominion status in his speech (92).
But Irwin was increasingly convinced that it would 
be a mistake to ignore the force of nationalist feeling 
in India, and that the real problem was how to keep a con­
tented India within the Empire (93). When the Conserva­
tives sent him a message, therefore, .suggesting that the 
Viceroy should not, even to win the support of the mode­
rates, make any new announcement regarding Dominion sta­
tus, and that the Simon Report should not be disregarded, 
Irwin reacted angrily (94). The Conservatives were appre­
hensive that the Government might go much beyond the recom­
mendations of the Simon Commission, and agree to a trans­
fer of responsibility at the centre. Irwin thought that 
such Conservative ideas were deplorable evidence of the 
gulf existing between the progressive opinions held by 
the British in India and those held by the Conservatives 
at home (95). He was unwilling to modify his stand, and 
decided to indicate in his speech to the Legislative Assem­
bly that the Conference would not be fettered by the Simon 
Report, and that agreement reached at the Round Table Con­
ference would form the basis of the Government's proposals 
to Parliament (96).
It is clear that Irwin was responding to the growing 
strength of the civil disobedience movement, and was there­
fore prepared to take a more progressive stance. He was 
so anxious, indeed, that no impression should be given 
that the Government was backing the Simon Report that he
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asked Benn not to associate the Government of India or 
the Viceroy with a letter of thanks that Benn was writing 
to Simon, and even suggested that the word 'monument' 
should not be used to describe the Report, as it suggest­
ed immutability (97)!
But it was not only Irwin who was perturbed by the 
situation in India, and was consequently persuaded to 
adopt a more progressive stance. H.N. Gladstone, a Libe­
ral who had spent many years in Calcutta as a businessman, 
and who had been a member of the 1913 Royal Commission on 
Indian Finance and Currency, was convinced that people in 
Britain did not realize the gravity of the situation, and 
that it was Gandhi and the Congress Party that held the 
trump cards, not the Government (98).
Herbert Lewis, who reported the views of Gladstone 
to Lloyd George, was himself of the opinion that, although 
great forces could be rallied to the side of the Govern­
ment, it would be difficult to prevent the disaffected 
areas from inflicting 'immense damage on trade and employ­
ment' of British people (99). Lewis also sent a memoran­
dum written by a 'distinguished and highly placed' official 
to Lloyd George (100). In this memorandum, which was es­
sentially a critique of Reginald Craddock's book, The_Di- 
1emma_of_India, the official agreed with Craddock's opini­
on that an Indian administration would be corrupt and 
inefficient, and that the minorities in India would suffer 
under Indian rule. On the other hand, he rejected Crad­
dock's idea that there would be internecine war, as well 
as the 'martial races' theory. More importantly, the offi­
cial pointed out that it would be wrong to argue that the
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masses in India were in favour of a continuation of 
British rule, as the insurrections spreading in India 
could not be understood if it were thought that only a 
handful of lawyers believed in them. Government without 
the consent of the governed was impossible without the 
use of force, and this would not be supported for long by 
a democracy as in Britain. His suggestion, therefore, 
was the immediate grant of almost complete self-government, 
the British Army remaining in India while the Indian 
forces were being built up.
This was a radical and unusual view, but it was not 
likely to have influenced Lloyd George. He and Reading 
continued to hold views which were, as compared with the 
position adopted by Irwin or Benn, reactionary. But 
other Liberals held different views. Herbert Samuel, for 
instance, felt that the first thing to do was to create a 
better atmosphere through some gesture, and that too much 
was being made of the responsibility of Parliament (101). 
Rather too optimistically, Samuel thought that> after the 
second reading of the Bill following upon the Round Table 
Conference, a Joint Committee of equal numbers of Indian 
and British members should meet in Delhi to discuss de­
tails. Lothian had expressed the idea, long before, the 
Report was published, that there should be an absolutely 
unconditional conference of all Parties in India, with 
the Government of India, to see if an agreement could be 
reached. If there were signs of such an agreement, the 
Secretary of State or a British delegation should go to 
India, consolidate the agreement, and return to Britain 
with an Indian delegation to induce Parliament to ratify
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it (102). J.A. Spender thought that a reference to Domi­
nion status would be good, for it would strike the right 
note (103).
If the Liberal Party, one of whose members had been 
Chairman of the Statutory Commission, were unable to agree 
about Indian policy, the Labour Party, who had two repre­
sentatives in the Commission, were not in a much better 
position. Two memoranda prepared by the Labour Party's 
Advisory Committee on Imperial Questions were both criti­
cal of the Simon Report (104).
In one, G.T. Garratt argued that the proposals gave 
too much power to the Governors, thus creating a new sys­
tem of Dyarchy, while in the other Sir John Maynard sug­
gested that the Report failed to satisfy Indian amour 
p r o p r e . Attlee, who had been asked to comment on these 
memoranda, naturally defended the Report, but saw no use 
in his comments being forwarded to the Advisory Committee 
as its members, in his view, had 'fixed ideas on India and 
are not likely to be affected by the exposition of a con­
trary view' (105).
The divisions in the Parties, and the multiplicity 
of opinions, were reflected in the variety of opinions 
and attitudes held by individuals and groups as well. 
Beatrice Webb told Walter Layton that a conference of the 
Indian interests alone should be called to get an agreed 
constitution, and that, if they could not agree (she thought 
they were not likely to agree), Britain should help as an 
impartial arbitrator (106). Layton thought it might have 
to come to that, but not as yet. Beatrice Webb, like the 
anonymous official whose opinions were referred to earlier,
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felt that, while Indians might not be able to govern them­
selves, they could make it wholly impracticable for Bri­
tain to govern them, as neither her means nor her public 
opinion would permit any Government to reconquer India by 
force of arms (107).
One group of individuals published a letter in the 
Manchester_Guardian, urging the Government to emphasize 
that representatives of both Britain and India would meet 
on a basis of equality, and with a view to arriving at 
proposals for the attainment of Dominion status, subject 
only to transitional safeguards (108).
Mrs Annie Besant was also going round Britain, ad­
dressing meetings, where she criticized the Simon Report, 
and talking to M P s , trying to get support for the mori­
bund Commonwealth of India Bill (109).
Meanwhile, Irwin made a bold attempt to find a solu­
tion through negotiation. He had earlier rejected attempt 
made by Husseinbhoy Laljee and George Slocombe to mediate. 
That was in May. Even in late June, Irwin and his Coun­
cil rejected a suggestion made by Purushottamdas Thakurdas 
that Motilal Nehru, who had gone to Bombay, should be al­
lowed to meet Gandhi, because, Irwin telegraphed to Benn, 
allowing 'the two prime movers' of the civil disobedience 
movement to meet would 'encourage our enemies and dishear­
ten our friends' (110).
Within a few days, however, Irwin was willing to per 
mit two moderate leaders, T.B. Sapru and M.R. Jayakar, to 
act as mediators between the Indian nationalists and the 
Government. This dramatic change in Irwin's attitude was 
due to several factors. Firstly, there was the obvious
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need for a solution. Secondly, there was the disparate 
nature of British reactions. If there had been a clear 
and decisive directive from Britain at this juncture, Ir­
win might have continued to hesitate to embark on any nego­
tiations. Thirdly, the Labour Government, and in particu­
lar the Secretary of State, Benn, was constantly urging 
Irwin to keep the door open to an ultimate settlement. He 
had been making specific references to an armistice, and 
he continued to suggest the need for moderation (111). Ir­
win could not have failed to be influenced by this constant 
urging of restraint. All that was needed was a specific 
opportunity, a sign that could be seized.
This came in the form of a statement that Motilal 
Nehru gave to George Slocombe, the Correspondent of the 
(112). This statement, intended to be the 
opening gambit in an elaborate move towards peace, sug­
gested that the British Government and the Government of 
India should make private assurances that they would sup­
port the demand for full responsible self-government in 
India. Motilal Nehru would then carry such assurances to 
Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, and, if they agreed, the civil 
disobedience movement would be called off, the Government 
of India could withdraw all repressive measures and release 
political prisoners, and Congress would participate in the 
Round Table Conference.
Irwin thought that the statement marked a retreat 
from the Lahore Congress position to the one that had ob­
tained when he had met Motilal Nehru and other Indian lead­
ers on 23 December 1929 (113). Correctly perceiving it as a 
peace overture, Irwin persuaded a not too willing Council to
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agree to a postponement of the action proposed against 
the Congress, and the consequent arrest of Motilal Nehru, 
as such action would have seemed too much like a rejection 
of the proferred olive branch (114). Irwin might also 
have been influenced by the concern already expressed by 
Benn that action against the Congress, necessary as it 
might have been, would jeopardize the Round Table Confe­
rence, especially as any resultant penalties must fall up­
on Motilal Nehru (115).
Such was the delicate balance in India, however, that 
the postponement of the action against the Congress and 
Motilal Nehru was extremely short-lived, and the Government 
felt compelled to proscribe the Working Committee of the 
Congress, and, as a result, to arrest Motilal Nehru, among 
others (116). Given the imperatives of action, this did 
not scuttle the peace plan entirely. With Sapru and Jaya- 
kar acting as intermediaries, the Government of India 
launched an attempt to secure an agreement from Gandhi 
and his colleagues to cease civil disobedience, and to 
take part in the Round Table Conference. Irwin's calcu­
lated gamble was based upon the premiss that success would 
be beneficial, while failure could be no worse than the 
existing impasse, and, besides, would have demonstrated to 
the public that Government policy was not one of undiluted 
repression (117). Both Irwin and Benn were conscious of 
the vital necessity to avoid giving the impression that the 
Government was bargaining with Gandhi (118).
At the same time, Irwin had to contend with the sus­
ceptibilities of his political adversaries, with whom he 
was attempting a dialogue, and could not be too reticent
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and distant. There is no doubt that the Viceroy and his 
Council were keen to secure a settlement, and, to this end, 
even facilitated a joint meeting of all the principal archi­
tects of Congress policy, namely Gandhi, Motilal Nehru, 
Jawaharlal Nehru, Vallabhai Patel, and Syed Mahmud, as well 
as Sarojini Naidu and Jairamdas Daulatram.
In the end, despite much travelling by Sapru and Jaya- 
kar and various meetings witfc the principal actors, and 
several notes being exchanged, the negotiations resulted in 
failure. It has been suggested that one of the reasons 
for the failure was the influence of the more radical Jawa­
harlal Nehru on his father and the others (119). There is 
some validity in this argument, as Jawaharlal Nehru's 
diary reveals that he was reluctant to enter into peace 
negotiations (120). But he did participate in the negoti­
ations, and, although it is probable that he exercised a 
restraining influence upon those willing to reach a compro­
mise, individual predilections alone are not a sufficient 
expla nation.
The negotiations failed, ultimately, because the Con­
gress leaders could not have called off the civil disobe­
dience movement at that juncture without risking the pass­
ing of the leadership to more extreme elements. The move­
ment was not, at that time, at a low ebb. On the contrary, 
despite all the measures adopted by the Government, the
various aspects of the movement were widespread and flou­
rishing. Any sudden bottling up of the movement by those
who had launched it and brought it to fever pitch could
only have led to an undermining of their leadership and even 
to the disintegration of the Congress. The fact that the
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Viceroy could only offer them a vaguely phrased assurance 
in return made it virtually impossible for the Congress to 
agree to a peaceful settlement.
Irwin could only offer vague assurances, since he 
lacked the power to commit himself to anything more. Al­
ready even the very act of holding talks, even if through 
intermediaries, had come in for strong criticism from the 
Conservative die-hards. Winston Churchill, ever the cre­
ator of the vivid image, spoke for the die-hards when he 
told a Conservative meeting at Thanet of how the Government 
of India, having arrested Gandhi for breaking the law, now 
permitted him to hold cabinet councils with fellow-conspi- 
rators , and waited 'cap in hand outside the cell door 
hoping to wheedle a few kind words out of their prisoner' 
(121). From the very beginning of the process of negoti­
ating, in fact, the Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald, had 
been conscious of the Conservative shadow falling across 
the path towards peace. In a marginal note on a copy of a 
telegram from the Viceroy that Wedgwood Benn had sent him, 
MacDonald had remarked, around 6 July 1930, that the Vice­
roy should be warned to be careful to protect himself, in 
the expressions used in his letters and conversations, 
against accusations of surrender or bargaining (122). As 
the protracted negotiations went on, MacDonald's anxiety 
about the effect of Irwin's actions on opinion in Britain 
increased, and he was particularly concerned that nothing 
should be done and no pledge given without the consent of 
the Cabinet (123).
MacDonald's fears were not entirely unfounded. Lord 
Hailsham, for instance, expressed his uneasiness at the
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terms on which the Congress leaders would make peace (124). 
Churchill was even more emphatic. In a letter to Baldwin, 
Churchill stated that he was getting several letters which 
expressed the anxiety that the British position in India 
was being thrown away, and he hoped that Baldwin's friend­
ship for Irwin would not be allowed to affect his judgement, 
or that of what significantly Churchill called 'your' Party 
(125) .
It was therefore not easy for the British Cabinet to 
assent to any actual concession that would have been suf­
ficiently attractive to the Congress leaders to persuade 
them to come to a settlement. The hands of the Viceroy 
were hence necessarily tied, and an unsuccessful result, 
though not expected, was the only possible result at that 
time. The attempt was made only because a Round Table Con­
ference without the Congress participating would have been 
incomplete, and futile. Besides, the Government might have 
hoped to defuse the explosive situation created by the 
civil disobedience movement, a hope sustained by the parti­
ally accurate perception that the Indian business community 
was beginning to be tired of the struggle (126). At the 
same time, it must have been very evident to the Government, 
as it was to non-official observers, that the movement did 
not show any real signs of flagging.
Thus Horace Alexander, in Simla in August 1930, re­
ported that what was happening in India was of the stuff of 
revolution, and thought that the movement would intensi­
fy (127). His perception that women provided the backbone 
of the movement was remarked also by Wedgwood Benn as be­
ing one of the disquieting features of the movement, along
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with the fact that it had got a grip on the youth and com­
munities other than Hindu (128). This recognition that 
the movement was something more than ordinary law-breaking, 
that it was inspired by an irrepressible national sentiment, 
was one of the reasons why the Government risked political 
calumny from the die-hards in Britain to attempt a truce 
(129). But of necessity it was the very intensity of the 
movement that prevented the Congress agreeing to a truce.
The Government, quite naturally, blamed the Congress 
for failing to seize the opportunity (130). Even before 
the Congress rejected the peace offer, MacDonald in parti­
cular saw it as the obstinate stumbling block to any con­
structive plan for India. If India did not get what she 
wanted, he wrote to Sir Muhammed Shafi, nobody could be 
blamed but Gandhi and the Congress (131) . When Oswald Gar­
rison Villard, the editor of the American radical journal, 
Nation, referred to the failure of the Labour Government 
to end the 'cruelties of the authorities in dealing with 
the followers of Ghandi (sjic) ' , MacDonald replied as if he 
had been personally accused, asking Villard if he had learnt 
nothing from the fact that Gandhi, 'by declaring a senti­
mental non-resistance campaign, has spread hatred and 
caused bloodshed, has played into the very worst elements 
in Indian society, and has created a condition as diffe­
rent from his vague notions as night is from day' (132).
The strange strategy that Gandhi adopted and success­
fully used to launch and sustain the civil disobedience 
movement apparently proved a difficult problem, especially 
for a Labour Government. An armed rebellion could have 
been easily met with the full force of the State. But an
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unarmed people offering passive resistance was an altoge­
ther different phenomenon, and the British Cabinet was 
never certain about how to meet it, for it not only had to 
contend with accusations of weakness from the die-hards in 
the Opposition, but charges of too much repression from its 
own left wing, and from American critics (133). This ex­
plains both the defensive attitude adopted by MacDonald and 
Benn, as also the policy of combining strong action against 
the civil disobedience movement with constant attempts to 
keep alive the concept of a Round Table Conference.
But this was not as easy as it might have seemed.
The idea that the Conference should be only between the 
Government and the Indian delegates, mooted by Irwin, was 
scotched by the Cabinet, and it was decided that the Con­
ference should include the opposition Parties but exclude 
the members of the Statutory Commission (134). It would 
have been virtually useless to have held a bi-lateral Con­
ference at that time, as the Conservatives and the Liberals 
would not have accepted any proposal made by such a Confe­
rence.
The tradition that India had to be above Party poli­
tics was inevitably resurrected, not only to secure some 
necessary political support for the decisions of the Con­
ference, but also, as Wedgwood Benn explained to Irwin, 
so that 'the decisions of organised parties on Indian af­
fairs shall in no circumstances be conditioned by the exi­
gencies of home politics' (135). There were in fact domes­
tic crises gradually coming to the surface, which made it 
imperative for the Government to have the support of the 
other Parties, on India, at least. This too was fraught
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with difficulties, for the suggestion that the Simon Com­
mission's Report would be relegated to the background did 
not appeal either to the Conservatives or to the Liberals, 
and Simon himself was miffed by his exclusion from the 
Conference, but at the same time declined a proposal that 
he should be one of the Liberal delegates (136).
Simon's exclusion from the Conference did not, of 
course, mean that his influence was totally absent. As 
already pointed out, his Report, by articulating existing 
notions about India and giving them the weight and autho­
rity of a Royal Commission, had captured the minds of most 
of the British intelligentsia, and his radio broadcasts 
extended his sphere of influence. There is no doubt that 
the Report hovered like a dark cloud over the Conference 
Table, and Simon was careful to limit opportunities for 
public criticism of his Report. Thus, for instance, when 
Sir John Reith of the BBC proposed that Srinivasa Sastri 
should speak about the Conference, Simon scotched the idea, 
arguing that, while his own broadcasts had been mere state­
ments of fact, Sastri would have made a tendentious speech (137).
Simon himself was involved in the background, and must 
surely have influenced the various delegates at the Round 
Table Conference; indeed, the Secretary of the Conservative 
Party delegation was led to remark towards the end of the 
Conference that Simon had the Conference in the hollow of 
his hand and could wreck any agreement that might be 
reached (138). Probably because of his exclusion, and cer­
tainly because of his attitudes to Indians, Simon held a 
very low opinion of the Indian delegates to the Conference.
The list of people who were supposed to be qualified to
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draw up a constitution for India made him laugh, he wrote 
to G.R. Lane Fox, and added that he would like to set them 
an elementary examination on the constitution of India or 
of any of the Dominions (139).
Irwin, in India, must have realized that such atti­
tudes would only lead to a sterile and useless Conference, 
and perhaps for this reason urged the exclusion of Simon.
He was in fact very concerned that the delegates of the 
different Parties in Britain should be chosen carefully.
He wrote to Baldwin, for instance, pointing out the need 
for choosing as the Conservative delegates people who had 
a little of the 'human gift of sympathy and as little as 
possible of the superiority complex' (140).
Irwin tended to see the Indian problem in psychologi­
cal terms, and, of course, since he was in India, had an 
entirely different perception of the Indian situation.
India had, according to his perception, moved away from 
the status_pupillaris which was the accepted conception of 
the Indian problem fifteen years before, and, Irwin thought, 
people like Reading tended to underestimate the force of 
genuine national feeling (141).
In the end, the Liberal and Conservative delegations 
consisted of people who, if not sympathetic to Indian aspi­
rations, were not, at any rate, altogether hostile to them. 
The Liberal delegation was headed by Reading, and included 
Lord Lothian, Sir Robert Hamilton, and Isaac Foot. The 
Conservative delegates were Peel, Zetland, Samuel Hoare, 
and Oliver Stanley. Irwin was, in fact, satisfied with the 
composition of the Conservative delegation (142). The Bri­
tish delegations to the Round Table Conference thus repre­
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sented a wide range of attitudes, and, although far out­
numbered by the representatives from India, they wielded 
the crucial levers of decision-making power, since the su­
premacy of Parliament was never brought into question.
It was, in the ultimate analysis, immaterial who actu­
ally represented the various Parties, for the determinant 
factors were the Parties, and not their delegates. The indi­
vidual personalities of the delegates would have helped to 
some extent in maintaining harmony in the Conference Cham­
ber, making a reasonable dialogue between Britain and In­
dia possible. But the British delegates were subject, not 
merely to the mandates from their Parties, but also to the 
subtle influence of public opinion. It would therefore be 
instructive to attempt an assessment of what public opinion 
at this time was about India.
Not surprisingly, the very steps taken to convene a 
Conference, implying thereby a negotiated settlement with 
India, brought out the worst fears of the die-hards, and 
they decided to form an organization to counter what they 
held to be unwarranted surrender of British supremacy in In­
dia. This organization, called the Indian Empire Society, 
came into being in the autumn of 1930, as the delegates to 
the Round Table Conference were arriving in Britain, and 
very quickly became an important pressure group on Indian 
issues (143). Two other important groups also emerged in 
this period, the Commonwealth of India League, and the India 
Reconciliation Group, formed under the aegis of the Society 
of Friends (144). Their emergence and activity indicated 
a quickening interest in Indian affairs, and also the exis­
tence of a wide variety of opinions on India.
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Initially, informed public opinion on India at this 
time tended to fall into two main categories. One school 
was willing to concede that some sort of self-governing 
autonomy might become necessary in the provinces, but was 
totally against any relaxation of British control at the 
centre. This line of thinking obviously had its intellec­
tual roots in the Simon Report, and it is arguable also 
that the Report itself was articulating this opinion. The 
other school of thought held that the time had come for the 
transfer of substantial, if not total, responsibility at 
the centre as well. These were not clear polarities of opi­
nion, but significant points on a broad spectrum of opinion. 
There were also, on the extreme ends of this spectrum, those 
who were for total independence for India, and those who 
were for a total rejection of Indian demands.
At the Round Table Conference itself, however, the 
Liberal and Conservative Parties adopted the stance that 
they would only consider the question of autonomy for the 
provinces. They were especially suspicious of any reference 
to the phrase 'Dominion status', and were eager to secure a 
common front, or a non-partisan British policy (145).
In the British context, such a common policy might 
have seemed desirable, and even possible, and, after all, 
it had been the tradition to present a common front to 
India. But,given the necessity of making it possible for 
Indians to accept any constitutional plan, and the fact 
that British opinion was polarized, it was not possible any 
longer to forge a common policy. There were imperatives 
for such a common front. One such was the germination of 
a National Government idea, to meet the domestic economic
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crisis as well as the Indian problem (146). As yet, how­
ever, this idea was too vague and amorphous to determine 
Indian policy at this stage, and the attempts of the Con­
servative Party and the Liberal Party to get the Govern­
ment to agree to a common policy did not succeed. Their 
desire to do so was increased by fears that the Government 
of India, in its despatch on the Simon Report, would go 
much beyond what they would consider safe, and that the 
Home Government would feel bound to go even further than 
th a t .
In fact, Irwin and the Government of India were try­
ing to find a way to reconcile Indian opinion without de­
parting too much from the Simon Report: this could be done,
Irwin thought, by granting a fair measure of responsibility 
at the centre as well as provincial autonomy (147). This 
went against the grain of Conservative thinking, and Irwin 
must have been led to adopt that idea only because of his 
perception of the Indian problem from the position of a 
Viceroy in India. Irwin considered Simon's idea of a Cen­
tral Government a fallacy and a fraud, as it was dependent 
on getting a 'tame' Assembly through indirect elections, 
which itself was, in Irwin's opinion, a delusion.
British opinion had been strongly influenced by the 
Simon Report, however, and rumours about the contents of 
the Government of India's despatch on the Report served to 
strengthen support for Simon's views. This was one reason 
why, initially, there was little optimism about the Round 
Table Conference. G.R. Lane Fox, a member of the Statutory 
Commission, anticipated 'no valuable result' from the Con­
ference (148). The absence of representatives of the Con­
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gress must also have given an air of some unreality to the 
Conference. At any rate, the Morning_Post thought that 
the 'agitators in India' would reject whatever might be 
decided in the Conference, and that in the last resort it 
would be Parliament that would decide (149).
What transformed the situation to a large extent and 
averted a stalemate was the decision of the Indian Princes 
to accept the idea of an Indian Federation, of which they 
would be a part. The Morning_Post thought that they did 
so because of changes in British India which affected their 
dominions, and a feeling that they must begin to protect 
themselves, since the British were apparently so weak as to 
surrender their power (150). But the Morning_Post found 
consolation in this because it recognized good friends in 
the Indian States (151). Irwin thought that the Princes 
might have been motivated also by a desire to use the prin­
ciple of Federation to escape or elude paramountcy, but 
that the actual consequences of Federation in practice 
would lead them to realize that the problem was not as easy 
as might have been supposed (152). The Daily_Te1egraph 
also pointed out that, though the Princes' attitude had op­
ened up the way to a Federal India, several complex prob­
lems needed to be solved first (153).
If the Princes had not been aware of these problems, 
there was no lack of advisers to instruct them. Sir Wal­
ter Lawrence, for example, told the Maharajah of Bikaner, 
as he had advised Kashmir and Alwar, not to rush into
Federation, but to wait and see what kind of units in Bri­
tish India they had to federate with (154).
Lawrence was one of those who felt that the first
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step was to enable the provinces (restructured on national 
lines into a Maratha province, a Bengali province, and so 
on) to develop into self-governing units, and that, until 
this happened, a strong British Central Government ought 
to be maintained, as Indians were as yet unfit to govern
themselves (155). There were others too who thought that
the Round Table Conference should first deal with the pro­
vincial autonomy question before it proceeded to discuss 
the question of All-India Federation (156). J.L. Garvin, 
the editor of the Observer, tried to combine the concept 
of Federation with retention of British control, by argu­
ing that what was needed in India was 'a great Federal sys­
tem' with the 'strongest executive in the w o r l d ' , and in­
cluding the Princes (157).
Evidently, British opinion was taken unawares, as 
it were, by the sudden decision of the Princes, and it was 
a while before it coalesced into any form of coherent pro­
posals. It was recognized early on, and not only by the
» that the Princes would form a great conserva­
tive bulwark against the extremism of the Indian nationa­
lists. Indeed, Irwin thought that, if the Government had 
suggested the inclusion of the Princes in the Federation, 
British Indian politicians would have suspected it of try­
ing to block their aspirations, by invoking the conserva­
tive elements of the States (158). R. Wingate, an officer 
of the Indian Political Service, felt that the presence of 
the Princes in the Round Table Conference was one of its 
weaknesses, as the Princes were antagonistic to the democra­
tic ideals of nationalist India (159). Horace Alexander 
saw another danger from the inclusion of the Princes in the
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Federation. He thought that, however desirable their in­
clusion might be, it would delay social reform in India (160).
Though the responses to an All-India Federation 
which included the Princes were thus varied, and though the 
idea appeared to be very nebulous, it quickly took hold of 
the Conference. The Indian represent*atives must have seen 
it as the only possible way of securing, at that stage, any 
kind of responsible government at the centre, while the 
British must have recognized that, if '.ultimately more power 
was to be transferred to the Indians, the Princes would 
serve as a restraining influence. This did not mean, how­
ever, that the Round Table conference could proceed to ham­
mer out the details of a future constitution for India 
based upon a federal idea.
For one thing, the feeling that the Indians were 
forcing the pace tended to make the British delegates more 
cautious (161). The attitudes of the British delegates 
were also coloured by a feeling that the Indians were gra­
tuitously, and ungratefully, denigrating Britain's good 
work in India (162). The fact that the Indian delegates 
were using the Round Table Conference as a forum to criti­
cize British rule in India was apparently especially gall­
ing to British observers (163).
What haunted the Conservative and Liberal delegations 
more than anything else was the spectre of 'Dominion status' , 
which had in their eyes acquired an even more menacing 
aspect as far as India was concerned, after the delibera­
tions of the Imperial Conferences,which were to culminate 
in the Statute of Westminster. Since the Labour Government 
was willing neither to accept a common British policy nor to
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adopt any specific policy, the Conservative and 
Liberal delegates were perhaps even more sensitive than 
usual. So intense was this concern that even a misreport- 
ed speech, in which MacDonald was quoted as having referred 
to 'Dominion Self-Government1 for India, evoked instant 
and passionate questioning (164)
A further reason for their apprehension was the bar­
rage kept up by some newspapers against what they consi­
dered as surrender to Indian extremists. The Dai.ly_Mai]1 
declared for example that the danger of the Government 
surrendering to the 'Indian wild men' and granting de­
mands which could only lead to catastrophe was very real, 
and the danger was all the greater because some Conserva­
tives seemed to think that they were bound by Irwin's 
'rash and impulsive promises of Dominion status' (165).
The Morn^ng_Post rejected the argument of Sapru and 
Jayakar that concessions to India would remove discontent, 
and stated that, on the contrary, they would only result 
in Indian politicians asking for more (166). These die­
hard theses were given their sharpest edge in a speech 
that Winston Churchill delivered, appropriately enough, 
at the first public meeting of the newly created Indian 
Empire Society. Churchill declared that the speeches at
the Round Table Conference were creating false impressions,
and added (167) :
The British Nation, we believe, has no intention 
whatever of relinquishing effectual control of 
Indian life and progress... No agreement reached 
at the Conference will be binding in any degree, 
morally or legally upon Parliament...The truth 
is that Gandhism and all it stands for will,
sooner or later, have to be grappled with and
finally crushed. It is no use trying to satis­
fy a tiger by feeding him with cat's meat.
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Churchill's sharp attack on the Round Table Conference, 
and Indian nationalists, evoked the editorial commenda­
tion of the Daily_Te1egraph and the |vening_News (168).
The Da i ly_Ne ws_an d_Chr on i. c 1 e , however, termed it 
a deplorable speech which would sabotage the work of the 
Round Table Conference, and called upon Baldwin to pub­
licly repudiate Churchill's statement,so that the public 
did not assume that it represented Conservative opinion 
(169). Zl3£_ZilD£2. pointed out that this would not be nec­
essary as Churchill was no more representative of the Con­
servative Party than the assassins of Calcutta represent­
ed the Indians at the Conference (170).
Although the Conservative leadership was sensitive 
to criticism emanating from the right wing of the Party, 
and was therefore more cautious, it was certainly willing 
to move forwards, if slowly.
The Conservative Shadow Cabinet decided, by the mid­
dle of December, to authorize the Party delegates not to 
oppose the principle of some responsibility at the centre, 
but at the same time to examine the position carefully,to 
see if sufficient safeguards could be devised (171). They 
had been reluctant earlier to go beyond Simon. Now, it 
would appear, they were emboldened by the fact that the 
Princes would be a counterweight at the centre. At the 
same time, they had to take note of die-hard cries of sur­
render, and insist upon several 'safeguards' and indeed 
the progress of constitution-making was to be slowed down 
considerably by this emphasis upon safeguards.
The Liberals were prepared to go further and faster. 
Reading's announcement in the Conference that the Liberals
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were willing to support responsibility at the centre 
with safeguards was not intrinsically different from 
the position to which the Conservatives were gradually 
and slowly moving, but it nevertheless unleashed a storm 
of criticism from the right-wing, die-hard, Press. The 
declared that the support being extended by 
the Liberals and the Labour Party to responsibility at 
the centre would mean 'a large, if not a complete, dis­
placement, in the management of Indian affairs, of the 
wisdom and experience of trained officials by the vagari­
ous ebullience of Babu Jabberjees B . A . 1, and added that, 
unless the question of safeguards was settled, the status 
quo should be continued (172). The Dai:ly_Mail gave ex­
pression to what must have been the kernel of apprehension 
and fear that was at the back of the cry for safeguards, 
by pointing out that Reading's speech removed the last 
obstacle in the path of Indian separatists, and that,
'with an independent Indian Govern ment,...there would be 
no security for the enormous British investments in India, 
there would be no guarantee of fair treatment for British 
shipping and British trade' (173).
Herein lay the real paradox of the Indian problem.
If a greater degree of freedom for India was seen as a
real threat to British economic interests, it was also
recognized that it was no longer possible to hold down a
restless India through repressive force, and trade could
not flourish in conditions of anarchy. It was this recog­
nition, perhaps, that led Z , the periodical
that was, after all, aimed at the business community, to 
welcome Reading's speech, and to urge that the Prime
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Minister should go at least as far (174). Z]l®_Z££££nii£Z
had no doubt whatever that the vast majority of the 
people in Britain would prefer that the necessary risk 
should be taken in India in going as far as possible to 
meet Indian aspirations,rather than invite the intolerable 
prospect of anarchy and repression by putting back the 
clock (175). The Observer, which had already declared 
its support for a federal structure with a strong Central 
Government, now saw no difficulty in extending its support 
to the method enunciated by Reading (which J.L. Garvin 
termed 'Dyarchy at the Centre') and called upon Conser­
vatives to accept the principle which had now become ine­
vitable (176).
The Manchester_Guardian also pointed out that poli­
tic a 1 ly-c ons c i ous Indians were unanimously in favour of 
a Central Executive that was responsible to an elected 
legislature, and only the 'fundamentalists' led by Win­
ston Churchill failed to recognize this (177).
The 'fundamentalists' were at this time in the ascen­
dant, apparently. When the Conservative delegate, Samuel 
Hoare, spoke at the Round Table Conference the day after 
Reading's speech, he refused to commit the Conservatives 
to any specific policy such as had been implied by Reading. 
While not totally opposing the idea of responsibility at 
the centre, Hoare nevertheless raised several questions 
about the safeguards, and thus left the Conservative 
Party still uncommitted. It was a speech that naturally 
appealed to the die-hard Press. The Morning Post stated 
that the speech was all the more welcome 'after the sur­
render made by the Liberal delegates the day bef o r e ' , and
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that the only safeguard worth considering was the power 
to enforce it (178). Irwin saw in the attitude of the Con­
servative Party an undue veneration of the Churchillian 
school, and, with a touch of wry humour indicative of his 
exasperation with his Party's refusal to see the reality 
of Indian problems, wrote to Hailey that he would change 
his Party allegiance if this continued (179). 
too criticized the attitude of the Conservative Party, 
arguing that, if the Party was to pull its weight for peace 
and good government in India, it must change its emphasis, 
if not its policy (180).
The Daily_Te1egraph argued that, since the Conserva­
tives were uncommitted, the Labour Government could not 
give much weight to the Reading statement (181). On the 
other hand, Labour left-wingers like Wilfred Wellock were 
urging that the Prime Minister ought to go beyond the 
Liberal statement. Wellock suggested that the Government 
should offer India Dominion status with generally accepted 
safeguards, and immediately grant a political amnesty so 
that the co-operation of all sections, including the Con­
gress, could be secured for drawing up the new constitu­
tion (182). MacDonald of course rejected these proposals 
as impractical (183). Despite the overt support of the 
Liberals, the Prime Minister in his own statement to the 
Conference did not go beyond declaring that the Government 
recognized the principle of an Executive responsible to a 
Legislature if it was constituted on a federal basis, and 
that the precise nature and structure of the proposed Fed e­
ration needed to be determined after further discussion 
with the Princes and the representatives of British India
(184).
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MacDonald and the Labour Government could hardly have 
moved further at that time, for the Conservatives were op­
posed to any definite programme of change, and the domestic
economic crisis, particularly as it affected Lancashire, 
had its impact on Indian policy. The Labour Government
could not have further alienated the workers in Lanca­
shire by appearing to give India more freedom to restrict 
trade with Britain, and that was presumed to be one of 
the results of any political concessions to India. Be­
sides, at that time, the furthest that most sections in 
Britain would have gone was to accept the federal princi­
ple, although there were individuals and groups on the 
political periphery who were suggesting that there should 
be an immediate announcement of Dominion status for India. 
Significantly, MacDonald avoided the use of this controver­
sial term in his speech, and thus did not commit the 
Government to anything more than a further exploration of 
the ways in which a Federal Government could be created 
in India. The Round Table Conference did achieve certain 
tangible results. Most notably, it prepared the path for 
constitutional change in India, by preparing the British 
public to accept change. It also brought to the surface 
the divisions in the different Parties, and in particular 
in the Conservative Party, over the Indian question. At 
the same time, it left many major problems unsolved, espe­
cially the apparently knotty problem of communalism. As 
Ramsay MacDonald explained to M.R. Jayakar, even sincere 
attempts to construct a 'really good Constitution' for 
India foundered on the problem of community differences
(185). In the eyes of the British, the religious question
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loomed very large indeed, and perhaps prevented them from 
using other categories of perception. Thus, Sir Graham 
Bower, for example, felt that Indians thought in terms of 
religion where the English thought in terms of electorates 
and constituencies, and that Indians would continue to 
think in terms of religion till the end of time (186).
The British might not have deliberately fostered 
the differences between communities in order to divide and 
rule, but the tendency to see Indian politics primarily 
in terms of religious groups only helped to underline the 
differences. The refusal to see the Indian National Con­
gress as anything but a Hindu Party is an example of this 
sectarian perception. If attempts by the Government of 
India to prevent Muslims as a community from joining the 
civil disobedience movement (as, for instance, by exempt­
ing them from the operation of the Sarda Act on the marri­
age of young children) can be seen as mere tactical moves 
to counter the nationalist movement, and if the real reli­
gious differences that existed in India explain the way 
the British saw Indian political groups, it still leaves 
inexplicable the tendency to see them only in religious 
terms.
In order to consolidate the work done by the Round 
Table Conference, and to ensure future co-operation by 
the Congress, the Government decided to release the 
leaders from prison to facilitate discussion of the 
Conference proposals. The leaders were surprised by this 
step, as only a few days earlier the Working Committee 
of the Congress had decided that the Prime Minister's 
statement at the Conference was too vague to justify 
any change in the Congress policy (187). On the very
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day that the Congress leaders were released, which quite 
coincidentally but appropriately happened to be 26 January 
1931, a day decided by the Congress to be 'Independence 
D a y ' , Baldwin made a statement in the House of Commons, 
in which he pledged the Conservative Party's support for 
the policy of the Government in the development of India's 
constitution. This may have helped the moderates in the 
Congress to strengthen their position, and the subsequent 
'split' in the Conservative Party did not alter the imme­
diate political situation*
It was in response to this particular statement by 
Baldwin that Winston Churchill made his dramatic exit 
from the Business Committee or 'Shadow Cabinet' of the 
Party (188). Edward Cadogan, who had been a member of 
the Simon Commission, also wrote to Baldwin, pointing out 
that the Conservative Party ought to stand by the recom­
mendations of the Statutory Commission, and that, if Bald­
win chose to go beyond them in future, he, Cadogan, would 
be compelled to 'stand aside' and not seek re-election 
(189). H.A. G w y n n e , the editor of the Morning P £ S t , 
also informed Baldwin that, in his opinion, Baldwin's
speech in the Commons contradicted the non-commital poli­
cy of the Conservative Party as expounded by Peel and 
Hoare at the Round Table Conference, and that Baldwin was 
enunciating a policy to which 85% of the rank and file 
were opposed (190). The policy of the Conservative Party 
should be, wrote Gwynne, to conserve something, to hold 
on to what had been shown to be good, and, above all, to 
hand down to future generations the Empire inherited 
from past generations (191).
As the battle lines were being drawn in the Conser­
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vative Party over India, events moved forward in India, 
albeit slowly. Irwin hoped to strengthen the moderates 
in the Congress, and even hoped that there might be a 
split in the Congress (192). Gandhi began with a demand 
for an amnesty for political prisoners, and for an in­
quiry into excesses committed by the police (193). Irwin 
was willing to concede neither demand, although he did pri­
vately suggest to the Governor of Bombay that certain spe­
cific allegations made by Gandhi should be investigated
(194). Gradually the pressure on Gandhi to seek a settle­
ment began to increase, with commercial interests, repre­
sented by Purushottamdas Thakurdas and G.D. Birla,trying 
to persuade him, and the balance finally swung in the 
direction of the moderates when Sapru, Jayakar and Sastri 
met the Congress leaders, and probably convinced them of 
the value of the results of the Round Table Conference.
The result was that Gandhi wrote to Irwin, seeking an 
interview.
Irwin was not very optimistic about any useful re­
sults flowing from such a meeting, but he decided to meet 
Gandhi, since a refusal to see him when he himself had 
sought the meeting might have alienated public opinion
(195). Obviously Irwin was determined to make it possible 
for the Congress to make peace, and to make a constructive 
contribution to the process of constitution-making. This 
was a bold decision indeed, since the representative of 
the King-Emperor was agreeing to meet, on apparently equal 
terms, with a representative of the Party that had repudi­
ated the right of the King-Emperor to rule India.
There was a natural reaction in the Conservative 
Party, and Baldwin was led to write to the Prime Minister,
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pointing out that practically the whole of his Party was 
anxious about the protracted conversations with Gandhi, 
and especially about the rumour that there would be an 
enquiry into the conduct of the police (196). Baldwin 
was in fact being attacked for his apparent acquiescence 
in the Government's policy (197). But Baldwin had appa­
rently decided that the Indian situation required this 
meeting between Gandhi and the Viceroy, and he did not 
protest too much.
‘The negotiations between Gandhi and Irwin were made 
possible by a combination of circumstances - a Labour 
Government in Britain, the triumph, if only momentary, of 
the moderate wing in the Congress, and the personal charac­
ter of Irwin. Perhaps more than any other Viceroy of the 
twentieth century, Irwin was willing to see both sides of 
the question, and this enabled him to agree to the histo­
ric meeting with Gandhi.
When, after several days of prolonged negotiations, 
Irwin and Gandhi arranged a settlement (Benn had tried, 
unsuccessfully, to get the Viceroy to avoid the use of 
terms like 'settlement' or 'it has been arranged that', 
as he was concerned about the effect they would have on 
the British public), British response reflected the clea­
vage that had already emerged on India.
Reading immediately sent a congratulatory telegram 
to Irwin (198). The New_Statesman and the Daily Herald 
hailed the agreement as a victory for common sense (199).
The London Stock Exchange also reacted with optimism.
Shares in the cotton industries moved upwards as also 
the prices of Indian loans (200). Businessmen evidently
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saw the settlement as a harbinger of better times for 
trade with India.
Newspapers of the extreme right and left, however, 
viewed the settlement as a surrender. The Daily_Worker 
declared that the agreement between Gandhi and Irwin 
completed the betrayal of the Indian people and exposed 
Gandhi's role as a servant of imperialism (201). The 
Daily Mail, on the other hand, used a full page 7 column 
headline to declare, 'The Viceroy Surrenders to Gandhi'
(202 ) .
The Conservatives were, as usual, bitterly divided, 
but Baldwin, perhaps sensing the political strength of 
his opponents, threw down a challenge to them in the 
House of Commons. Declaring that the settlement was not 
a surrender but a victory for common sense which enlarged 
the area of goodwill and co-operation, Baldwin added that , 
if those who gave concessions to India in a grudging spi­
rit were in a majority, they should elect a new leader 
(203).
Churchill, representing the die-hards, declared that 
it was a Pyrrhic victory which illustrated the ceaseless 
landslide in British Parliamentary opinion (204). It 
would seem that the die-hards, while probably not strong 
enough to displace Baldwin from the leadership, were capa­
ble of exerting sufficient pressure on him to' make some 
gesture of reasserting the imperial predilections of the 
Party. This can be the only reason why Baldwin issued a 
statement that the Party would not be represented at the 
Round Table Conference to be held in India as proposed. 
This would have been taken to imply Conservative criticism
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of the Gandhi-Irwin settlement, without altogether seced­
ing from the Conference principle itself. The reference 
to the Conference being held in India appears to have been 
ignored, however, by contemporary observers. For instance, 
Lionel Curtis thought that this was the gravest thing that 
had happened in years, and saw parallels in it with Bald­
win's yielding in 1924 to the die-hards over the Irish 
Boundary Commission Question, (205).
If British opinion was not unanimous in support of 
the Gandhi-Irwin settlement, nor was support in India 
whole-hearted, Jawaharlal Nehru, for example, publicly 
declaring his personal disappointment with it. But Irwin 
had achieved across the Conference table his immediate 
target, that of getting the Congress to cease civil diso­
bedience, and, in principle, to accept the results of the 
first Round Table Conference. To the Indian National Con­
gress, it was not a victory in so far as the settlement 
merely secured certain short-term results, but at the same 
time the settlement was a demonstration that the Congress 
was a political force that could not be ignored.
The Congress probably had to seek a settlement, for 
not only was it under pressure from Indian business inte­
rests, but it had to consider also the very real possibi­
lity of the movement taking forms which could not be con­
trolled by the Congress. The intensification of the no­
rent movements in the United Provinces and in the Andhra 
area of the Madras Presidency were signs of such an even­
tuality, and it was, as Sumit Sarkar has argued, in the 
interests of the Congress to terminate the civil disobe­
dience movement (206). Similarly, it was in British
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interests to agree to the compromise, because the settle­
ment and the consequent peace would help the restoration 
of trade, and also preclude the emergence of more extreme 
forms of struggle. The pact was not in British interests 
in so far as it elevated the Congress to the status of 
an equal adversary. After this, the Congress could not 
be ignored. This effect of the pact was outweighed, how­
ever, by the desire and need for peace.
While the Gandhi-Irwin settlement was seen by some 
at least as a harbinger of peace, neither side considered 
it a permanent settlement. It was perceived more as a 
truce rather than a peace treaty. At any rate, Irwin, 
who did think that it was a step in the right direction, 
thought that it might not be permanent (207). Irwin re­
cognized that the very act of negotiating with the Congress 
gave it an importance that could be damaging to British 
interests, but at the same time he was certain that there 
was no other course available to him when Gandhi himself 
sought an interview (208). Negotiations with the Cong- 
gress were not seen by Irwin as indicating a loss of 
nerve or moral fibre, but on the contrary showed an attempt 
to come to terms with a rapidly changing reality (209).
In Irwin's view, if peace was to be re-established 
in India without the use of excessive coercive force, 
there was no real alternative to negotiated settlement.
He recognized the dangers inherent in such an attempt, 
not only for his own personal prestige, but also for the 
political balance in India. Yet he took the remarkable 
step of meeting Gandhi on equal terms because of his per­
sonal conviction that it was the only possible path to
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peace. He was aided in this, no doubt, by the support 
given to him by the Labour Government, which was, if 
only to a minimal extent, inclined to view Indian natio­
nalism with a less narrow vision. The conjuncture of a 
British Government willing to conceive of negotiating 
with the opponents of Empire and a Viceroy whose personal 
temperament enabled him to come down from the Olympian 
heights of the viceregal throne to talk on equal terms 
with such opponents was probably fortuitous. Neverthe­
less, it was this conjuncture which made the Gandhi-Irwin 
settlement possible. It was not, however, solely a pro­
duct of this conjuncture, for Gandhi and the Congress 
made the overtures without which such a settlement could 
not even have been conceived. On the other hand, it was 
the emergence, in Britain, of intellectual cleavages over 
India that perhaps enabled Irwin to attempt what in a 
previous period would have been unimaginable.
These cleavages appeared partly as a result of the 
dramatic concatenation of events beginning with the La­
hore Congress and culminating with the Gandhi-Irwin pact. 
Intellectual perceptions of Indian nationalism were neces­
sarily altered by these events. It was still possible 
even for a person like Edward Thompson to subscribe to 
such a traditional idea as that 'when an Indian takes 
over from a British official there is a loss of efficiency' 
(210). Yet it was clear that several members of the Bri­
tish intelligentsia were beginning to view India and In­
dian nationalism from new perspectives. The Simon Report 
had reinforced traditional ideas about India, ideas, more­
over, which remained dominant. Nevertheless, politics
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compelled the relegation of the Report to the sidelines. 
This 'helped the strengthening of new ideas. These new 
ideas were not yet fully formulated, but their emergence 
indicated undercurrents of change. India could no longer 
remain a non-partisan issue. Although there had been dis­
senters in previous periods too, a facade of unanimity had 
been maintained. The shock of the civil disobedience 
movement and the Gandhi-Irwin pact seemed to have shat­
tered that faqade, enabling different schools of thought 
to c ontend.
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5. The Widening Rift: Towards the White Paper, 1931-3
The Gandhi-Irwin Settlement delivered the coup de grace, as 
it were, to an already crumbling British consensus on India. The 
British political elite, its facade of unanimity shattered, be­
gan to draw its battle lines over India, and not even the formation 
of a 'National' Government could wholly resuscitate the traditional 
non-partisan Indian policy. In Britain, then, the effects of the 
Settlement appeared to be deep and virtually permanent.
In India, however, the political results of the Settlement 
turned out to be ephemeral. If Irwin had remained in India as the 
Viceroy, he might have helped to prop up the Settlement, and thus 
reaped from it a full political harvest. At the least, the goodwill 
generated by the Settlement - it undoubtedly gave a boost to Indian 
nationalist morale - would have lingered to influence subsequent de­
cisions by the Indian leaders. As it was, Irwin left India to be 
succeeded by Willingdon.
In the long and meandering story of Indian nationalism, the 
individual proclivities of a Viceroy, or the personal predilections 
of an Indian nationalist, might have introduced, on occasion, only 
minor variations of style or tempo, without significantly altering 
the main currents of history. Nevertheless, at any specific histori-
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rical moment, such factors loomed large and events were affected by 
them. The way in which a problem was perceived by an individual 
tended to condition the way in which the problem was solved.
In this sense, the appointment of Irwin's successor was cru­
cial at this juncture. In 1930, when the time came to decide about 
the new Viceroy, the Labour Party was in power, and could have ap­
pointed a 'Labour' Viceroy. Such a Viceroy might have helped to 
maintain the atmosphere of cordiality that Irwin had left behind 
and might even have, it may be conjectured, smoothed the path to 
the negotiating tables of the Round Table Conference in London. In­
deed, the Labour Government did attempt to appoint a 'Labour' Vice­
roy. It has been suggested that this attempt failed because of the 
unsuitability of the Labour nominee, Lord Gorell, a little known 
Labour Peer who had taken the Party Whip only in 1924 (1). Apart 
from the fact that Gorell was undoubtedly an unwise choice, it was 
unlikely that any truly 'Labour' nominee would have been accepted. 
Given the fears of many in Britain that the Labour Party would, if 
allowed, appoint a Viceroy who would act against British interests, 
it was extremely unlikely that the appointment of a Labour Party mem­
ber would have been tolerated (2).
In the event, it was Willingdon who succeeded Irwin. How did 
this affect Indian politics? From the outset, it was apparent that 
Willingdon was not inclined to maintaining the delicate webs of co­
operation that Irwin had spun in the last few months of his Viceroyal­
ty. Willingdon was convinced, for instance, that it had been an 
error on Irwin's part to have treated Gandhi as a plenipotentiary 
(3). He rejected the idea that Gandhi could be an intermediary be­
tween the people and the Government on matters relating to the Set­
tlement, and even began to contemplate the possibility of taking
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action before long against the Congress (4).
There was a reason for Willingdon's conclusion that Irwin had 
been in error. Some high officials of the Indian Government felt 
that the Congress was using the Settlement to develop its rural orga­
nization, taking advantage of the depressed economic conditions (5). 
In Britain, there were die-hards who thought that the Settlement had 
increased the truculence of the Congress (6). The Daily Mail gave 
expression to such thoughts by publishing, at this juncture, a 'Blue 
Book' on the Indian situation. Essentially a collection of articles 
on India which had been published in the Daily Mail, the one penny 
Blue Book presented a lurid and sensationalist picture of an India 
on the verge of ruin and anarchy. This was a view shared also by 
Rothermere, the proprietor of the Daily Mail, who felt that a conti­
nuation of what he termed the Irwin policy would mean the end of Bri­
tish India, and who therefore pledged his support to the die-hard 
campaign against the Gandhi-Irwin Pact (7). Sydenham, another nota­
ble die-hard,contended that the proper policy in India was to an­
nounce that order would be maintained sternly, that Dominion status 
was not open for discussion, and to ensure that in any political set­
tlement all essential safeguards would be strictly enforced (8).
There was, therefore, a reaction to the seeming appeasement 
of the Gandhi-Irwin Settlement. This reaction was not confined to 
the die-hards alone. Willingdon himself had expressed his opinion 
against it. His perception of the Indian problem was, as noted, ve­
ry different from that of Irwin. Where Irwin saw only one possible 
path to peace, Willingdon saw another - albeit one that would have 
necessitated the use of force. Whereas Irwin saw in Gandhi a saint­
ly politician, Willingdon thought Gandhi was a 'wily, vain old bird', 
constantly manoeuvring for an advantage, one in whom the bania
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predominated over the saint (9). Willingdon may have also been in­
fluenced by the opinion of Reading. Reading was very sceptical of 
the value of Gandhi's participation in the Round Table Conference, 
as he thought that Gandhi would be obstructive rather than helpful 
(10).
Willingdon's policy was no doubt influenced by his perception 
of Gandhi as a clever politician, by his opinion that the Settlement 
was an error, by the reaction in Britain to the Settlement and to 
views such as those of Reading that Gandhi's .participation in the 
Round Table Conference was not entirely desirable. Interestingly, 
Willingdon did think that Gandhi sincerely desired peace and that he 
might be reasonable at the Round Table Conference (11).
As the question of Gandhi's participation in the Round Table 
Conference was resolving itself into a 'will he, won't he' question, 
one problem that cast its dark shadow on the entire situation was 
that of the worsening condition of the workers in Lancashire. The 
boycott of foreign textiles which was being continued in India was, 
if not the cause of the economic distress in Lancashire, at least 
seen as being so, for it was a visible factor, unlike the mysterious, 
unseen forces of international economics. Thus C.F Andrews, divided 
by his love for India and Gandhi on the one hand and his sympathy 
for the workers in their misery on the other, could not help thinking 
that it was necessary for someone to go to India and explain to 
Gandhi that it would make a big difference if he were to be magnani­
mous to Lancashire (12).
Andrews tried to convey to Gandhi through a stream of letters 
the distress he had seen in Lancashire, hoping that Gandhi would be 
persuaded to find a solution, because, as he thought, the Lancashire 
problem, along with that of the relations between Hindus and Muslims,
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needed to be solved if a constitutional settlement was to be reached 
(13). Ramsay MacDonald expressed resentment about what he considered 
cruelty being practised upon the innocent operatives of Lancashire, 
and thought that it showed a lack of human sense (14).
While Andrews was primarily motivated by Christian concern for 
the workers in their suffering, there were those who saw in the econo­
mic distress of Lancashire the opportunity to make political capital. 
Sydenham thought that it would be helpful to have meetings in Lanca­
shire, as it seemed 'at last alive to danger' (15). The Indian Em­
pire Society sent C.J. Smith to report on the possibilities of hold­
ing a series of meetings to be addressed by Sir Louis Stuart. Smith 
held discussions with the Secretary of the Cotton Spinners' Associa­
tion, and concluded that the idea of holding meetings should be aban­
doned for the time being, as the chairmen of the local committees of 
the Association appeared to be reluctant (16). Although the chair­
men told the Secretary of the Association that their reluctance was 
due to the fact that most of the towns would be empty because of the 
'wakes', Smith thought the real reason was that C.F. Andrews had vi­
sited most of the chairmen and urged them not to do anything that 
would mean attacking Gandhi personally, on the grounds that the re­
sult might be an intensification of the boycott (17).
John F. Leach, a cotton magnate of Darwen, also complained to 
Louis Stuart that traders in Lancashire had been warned (by whom, 
he did not say) to remain silent, and that the weak and pallid hand­
ling of the political problem was ruining local industry (18).
It would appear that many people across the political spectrum 
saw a direct link between the boycott campaign in India and the distress 
in Lancashire. The actual source of Lancashire's economic troubles was 
of course the international economic crisis. But the Indian boycott
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certainly decreased the quantity of exports of Lancashire products 
to India, and thus added to the textile industry's problems. Besides, 
it was easier to believe that a causal connection existed between the 
boycott and the decline in the textile trade, whereas the effects and 
consequences of the international economic crisis could not be dis­
cerned so easily, and certainly not by the worker in the Lancashire 
textile mills. It is for this reason, probably, that Smith, the agent 
for the Indian Empire Society, suggested that they should get at the 
working classes instead of the cotton kings, whom he considered timid 
(19).
C.F. Andrews himself detected some local opposition to Gandhi, 
and tried to argue that a boycott of Lancashire was tantamount to the 
use of violence (20). Andrews was concerned not only by the misery 
of the workers, but also by the possible adverse effects the situ­
ation in Lancashire might have on the Round Table Conference. Gan­
dhi had agreed to the suggestion made by Andrews that Gandhi should 
visit Lancashire when he arrived in Britain for the Round Table Con­
ference .
Gandhi had not, however, definitely announced that he would 
go to London. When he met Willingdon on 18 July, Gandhi told him 
that, before he proceeded to London, he should have the assurance that 
Government would not, during his absence, precipitate a crisis, and 
that an inquiry would be instituted into the administration of Malcolm 
Hailey in the United Provinces (21). Willingdon could not, naturally, 
agree to this, but felt that this was bluffing on the part of Gandhi, 
and that he would go to London when the Conference began (22).
Interestingly, Malcolm Hailey thought that at the Conference 
the Congress would attempt to drive the Princes away from the idea of 
federation and demand responsibility at the centre based on a unitary 
legislature, and therefore felt that the best solution would be to
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press ahead with a scheme for provincial autonomy (23). There was 
thus a great deal of apprehension about the participation of the Con­
gress in the Round Table Conference. The die-hards too were as pre­
judiced as the others. Sydenham was happy that the date of the Con­
ference was postponed, as it gave them time to prepare a definite lead, 
for he felt that it was necessary to lay down clear limitations to 
the discussions, since Lord Sankey, the chairman of the Federal Struc­
ture Committee, was in his opinion as hopeless as Irwin (24). He 
hoped that the Conference would prove a total fiasco, since that would 
be best for the Empire (25).
Meanwhile, the Labour Government had been replaced by a 'Nati­
onal' Government, and Samuel Hoare became the new Secretary of State 
for India.
The India Office thus passed into the hands of one who was in­
clined to view Indian demands with a less sympathetic eye than Wedg­
wood Benn's. While not a die-hard Conservative, Samuel Hoare was 
nevertheless unwilling to force the pace of transition in India. It 
may be that Hoare and his Conservative colleagues were working within 
a Stubbsian framework of gradual constitutional evolution through slow, 
measured steps (26). At the same time, Hoare was in effect responding 
to the subtle pressures of public opinion. He felt that British pub­
lic opinion was against anything in the nature of a surrender on the 
lines of the Irish treaty and that it would be easier to make conces­
sions from a position of strength than from one of weakness (27).
Hoare's definite standpoint contrasted strongly with the much 
more nebulous viewpoint of the Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald. Iro­
nically, it was the Conservative Hoare who impressed Gandhi and the 
Labour leader, MacDonald, who rubbed him up the wrong way. Gandhi had 
at last decided to take part in the Round Table Conference, and his
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return to London was a significant signpost in British perceptions of 
India. Although the King considered him an enemy of the Empire, 
and therefore initially refused to meet him, Gandhi excited a great 
deal of popular enthusiasm. It might have been partly a sense of curi­
osity about the strange little man from India that drew crowds wher­
ever he went, but there was also a genuine element of admiration and 
sympathy for Gandhi among the people of the East End of London, where 
Gandhi stayed (28). Even more significantly, Gandhi evoked similar 
feelings among the workers of Lancashire, who could well have consi­
dered him an enemy more diabolical than their own capitalist masters, 
for, after all, a link had been established in their minds between 
the Indian boycott and the decline of their industry. But the prepa­
ratory work done by C.F. Andrews obviously helped to attenuate their 
hostility, and Gandhi's personal charm turned any remaining vestiges 
of hatred into a tacit acceptance of the Indian position, if not an 
overt expression of sympathy.
Gandhi failed, however, to exercise his charm on the political 
elite in the same way, or so at any rate thought Hoare, who reported 
to the Viceroy that Gandhi had made a bad impression on MPs of all 
Parties whom he had met (29). This apparent failure did not prevent 
Hoare from trying hard to diminish the publicity that Gandhi might 
get through the Press (30).
Nevertheless, when Hoare met Gandhi, Gandhi went away quite 
happily, while MacDonald, in contrast, left a very bad impression 
on him (31). It appeared to Gandhi's interlocutors that he was adopt­
ing an extreme and intransigent position. The Working Committee of 
the Congress had, in fact, taken a fairly extreme position, reiterat­
ing the Lahore and Karachi resolutions indicating, among other things, 
that the British could have no special commercial privileges, and that
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defence forces should be completely under the control of the Swaraj 
Government, the British troops being withdrawn immediately and so on
(32). The letter in which Jawaharlal Nehru had communicated these 
decisions of the Congress to Gandhi had been seen through secret intel­
ligence by the Government of India, which informed the India Office
(33). Thus Gandhi's attitude may not have come entirely as a surprise 
to the India Office, or to other British officials, who, as noted ear­
lier, were in any case inclined to presuppose that Gandhi would seek 
to wreck the Conference rather than assist in the discovery of a solu­
tion. Even Lord Sankey, who felt that Gandhi was likely to seek a 
settlement, still saw in him a fanatic, for Gandhi had told him that, 
if the Conference failed, the struggle would have to be renewed, and, 
bitter as the cup might be, it would be like nectar to him (34). 
Malaviya, on the other hand, impressed Sankey by his very taciturnity, 
and Sankey thought that, if Malaviya could be persuaded to accept the 
British view, success was almost assured (35).
Not everyone saw a fanatic in Gandhi. Robert Stopford, the 
Secretary to the Conservative Party delegation, felt that Gandhi was 
nearer a saint than a statesman (36). This, however, was not the domi­
nant idea. To other observers of the Round Table Conference, Gandhi 
seemed to be manoeuvring for political advantage, and not sincerely 
trying for a solution. In fact, even before Gandhi had arrived in 
London, Reading and others had assumed that Gandhi would only seek to 
wreck all chances of a settlement. Such assumptions might have reduced 
the chances of Gandhi being able to forge a compromise in London.
As it was, the increasing strength of the more militant ele­
ments in the Congress had already made Gandhi's task very difficult.
The assumptions of the British delegates to the Conference that Gandhi 
would only 'wreck' it placed him in an even more awkward position.
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The prospects of a compromise were perhaps rendered bleak also 
because of the shadow cast on the Round Table Conference proceedings 
by the British decision of 21 September 1931 to go off the gold standard 
and to link the Indian rupee to sterling at a ratio of Re 1 = Is 6d. 
This decision went against the long-standing Indian demand for devalu­
ation and appeared to demonstrate the dependent status of the Indian 
economy. The impression that Indian economic interests were being 
subordinated to those of Britain was probably heightened by the large 
and rapid flow of gold from India to Britain in the wake of the deci­
sion (37).
B.R. Tomlinson has argued that,although the gold flow benefi­
ted Britain, it was an unintended consequence of the currency decision 
and that there was no evidence to suggest that British policy was de­
signed to secure such a result (38). Indeed, the Secretary of State 
for India, Samuel Hoare, even declared that 'the exports of privately 
owned gold, and the maintenance of the link between sterling and the 
rupee, have been of the highest advantage to India' (39).
To Indian nationalists, however, reality appeared differently. 
The British decision and its economic results seemed to indicate that 
promises of fiscal and political autonomy were worthless. India's eco­
nomy was being used, it seemed to them, to prop up a British economy 
in crisis. In fact, Carl Bridge has suggested that there was evidence 
to indicate that the link between the rupee and sterling was designed 
to boost confidence in the pound, and that devaluation was rejected 
because it would strike at the heart of British interests in India 
(40).
It can be argued, therefore, that the apparent ease and indif­
ference with which Britain seemed to be controlling India's economy 
underlined India's subordinate status, and made compromises more dif­
ficult to achieve. The currency crisis perhaps indicated also the
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British need to retain political control of India.
The darkest shadow was cast, however, by the apparently intrac­
table communal problem. In his final statement, the Prime Minister 
pointed out that the 'communal deadlock' remained as the major obstacle 
in the way of constitutional progress, and warned the Indian delegates 
that, unless they agreed upon an acceptable settlement, the Government 
would be compelled to devise a scheme for protecting the electoral 
rights of the minorities in India (41).
The second session of the Round Table Conference ended then 
with no clear solution of the Indian problem, and Gandhi had to em­
bark for India with no definite proposals that he could put before 
the Congress. In the view of some British observers, however, it had 
not been an entirely infructuous session. Francis Younghusband 
thought that the Conference helped to ease the situation in India and 
contributed to a change of opinion in Britain (42). Winterton felt 
that the Conferences dispelled the myth that Indian politicians were 
merely a handful of 'verbose Bengali Babus' (43). The Parliamentary 
debates on the Prime Minister's statement indicated the emergence of 
cleavages in British attitudes to Indian politics, and also enunciated 
the determination of the Government to ensure that nothing deflected 
them from their set course (44).
This determination extended to the treatment of Gandhi and the 
Congress. The Viceroy was already of the opinion that the method of 
negotiating with Gandhi had been a mistake. He was matched by the 
new Secretary of State, Samuel Hoare, who also thought that the Gan­
dhi-Irwin negotiations had been objectionable, and that the associ­
ated policies had been erroneous, although he conceded the possibili­
ty that Gandhi might be prevented from falling into the hands of the 
extremists by granting him an interview (45). The Willingdon-Hoare
197
axis, then, appeared to be made of sterner stuff than the Irwin-Benn 
axis. The hardening of public opinion in Britain probably contribu­
ted also to the determination of the Government not to respond favou­
rably to the Congress's overtures.
Willingdon not only refused Gandhi an interview, but launched 
a carefully orchestrated attack against the Congress within days of 
Gandhi's arrival in India. To Willingdon, Gandhi appeared to be an 
'arrant little humbug', and there was not much to be gained politi­
cally by conferring with him (46). Samuel Hoare gave encouragement 
to Willingdon's policy of the big stick, by pointing out how the 
British public were strongly behind Willingdon, and indicated the 
sources of his own views, by referring to the many mistakes that the 
British had made in the context of Ireland (47). The shattering of 
the colonial shackles over Ireland apparently remained as a painful 
memory, and the British elite could not help seeing the Indian situ­
ation through the mists of Irish history.
There was, therefore, a visible change in the policy adopted 
towards the Indian nationalists. There were to be no more protrac­
ted negotiations, nor even the hint of an inclination to talk across 
a table. This new attitude puzzled even the Indian moderates, and 
it was felt that the attitudes of the Government would hamper the 
work of the Consultative Committee which was attempting to carry on 
the work of the Round Table Conference in India (48). It was as if 
the Government of India had stripped off the veneer of genteel wil­
lingness to negotiate and revealed underneath the ruthless determi­
nation to reassert the dominance of the Government. Eleanor Rath- 
bone noticed in the attitude of the Home Member of Bombay a harsh­
ness and contempt for Indians that she had never heard from anyone 
but the most die-hard Churchillian, and felt too that Indian stories 
of repression were true (49).
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This new attitude of an iron fist reached down from the 
very fount of imperial power, the King. He told the Secretary of 
State for India, Samuel Hoare, that Gandhi should have no interviews 
in prison, that terrorists should be deported to the Andamans
and that Government grants to educational institutions that produced 
terrorists should be withdrawn (50). There was, it would appear, 
a disenchantment with the old methods of peace talks, interviews and 
manoeuvres for saving face. The British Government saw the Round 
Table Conference and the slow road to devolution that it was building 
as the only path that could be taken in India: there could be no to­
leration of agitators and terrorists. Rule by Ordinance was thus 
seen as a necessity, and the heavy hand of the Government lay upon 
the Indian body politic, seeking to quell the quickening pulse of 
nationalism.
The main target of Government repression was terrorism. But 
inevitably its chief result was to increase nationalist resistance. 
The New Statesman pointed out that it was futile to hope that a re­
pressive policy would check the nationalist movement for any length 
of time (51). Interestingly, even Lothian, the Under-Secretary of 
State for India, recognized this (52). The Prime Minister himself 
wrote to the Viceroy, asking if it would be possible to withdraw admini­
stration by Ordinance, in some provinces at least (53).
Apparently elements of the British public were beginning to 
be plagued by doubts about the rule by Ordinance in India. One in­
cident which probably catalysed public opinion was the police beat­
ing inflicted in Madras on a Scottish missionary, Dr Forrester Paton. 
Dr Paton became a victim of the excessive zeal of the Madras police 
he was even charged with having violated one of the Ordinances - part 
ly because he was dressed in Indian homespun clothes, and was mista­
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ken for a Congress agitator. But this incident brought home to the 
British public the nature of the repressive regime in India more dra­
matically than any newspapers could (54). Samuel Hoare had to admit 
that in this case a mistake had been made (55).
The arousal of British public opinion against repression in 
India was facilitated also by the activities of some newly emerged 
pressure groups. One such group was the India Conciliation Group, 
which was formed under the aegis of the Society of Friends to promote 
a better understanding in Britain of the Indian problem (56). With 
the enthusiastic and dynamic support of Carl Heath and Agatha Harri­
son, the India Conciliation Group set to work to present the Indian 
case in Britain.
But even before the India Conciliation Group was formed the 
Society of Friends had begun to take special interest in India, 
a Committee on Indian Affairs having been set up in May-June 1930, 
following a talk by Rabindranath Tagore, and a deputation sent to the 
Secretary of State for Indie, Wedgwood Benn (57). Interestingly, 
some Friends felt that the Indian Affairs Committee was being too 
pro-Indian and not sufficiently cognizant of the good done in India 
by the British (58). It is probably because of such criticism that 
the India Conciliation Group was set up as a separate and distinct, 
if informal, body. Although it derived its moral provenance and 
leading members from the Society of Friends, the Group was not formal­
ly linked to it.
It was nevertheless the Society of Friends which financed the 
visit to India of three Friends in early 1932, and they reported that 
a state of deep embitterment had been reached, and that there was a 
growing alienation of moderate men. Pointing this out to the Prime 
Minister, Carl Heath suggested that he should issue a reassuring
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declaration, while selectively modifying the Ordinances and releasing 
some of the non-violent prisoners (59). MacDonald showed this letter 
to Hoare, who concluded that there must be propaganda aimed at show­
ing that he and MacDonald had different policies on India, and asked 
MacDonald to dispel this myth if he were replying to Heath (60). In­
terestingly, MacDonald, who had earlier, with Willingdon, adopted a 
critical stance about the Ordinances in India, generally discounted 
the information secured by the Friends in India, and attempted to jus­
tify the need for a repressive administration in India (61). Mac­
Donald, as the head of a National Government, had to accept and even 
justify the new harsher attitude towards India. At the same time, 
however, he had in the past advocated a softer approach towards India, 
and could not entirely slough off the old attitudes, which prompted 
him to attempt to persuade the Viceroy to wield his sceptre with 
greater sympathy.
Samuel Hoare thought that MacDonald was unnecessarily succumb­
ing to pressure from the Left, which had been carrying on active pro­
paganda in collusion with the Congress. Hoare himself thought that 
such propaganda had no impact on the 'big currents of opinion' (62).
He advised Willingdon that, despite what MacDonald might state, the 
great body of public opinion in Britain would support Willingdon to 
the full in maintaining any Ordinances that might be necessary for the 
period of the emergency.
Government policy was being justified not only by MacDonald 
in private letters, but by people like Lord Sankey in public. San- 
key wrote a brief article in the National Labour Fortnightly, the 
Newsletter, in which he criticized Gandhi for his 'uncompromising 
refusal of give and take in negotiation, the rigidly non possumus 
attitude he adopted and the extravagant claims he advanced....'(63).
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The Newsletter was, naturally enough, an organ of the Labour rump 
within the Government, and could therefore be expected to publish de­
fences of Government policy, and Sankey's was an extremely influen­
tial voice. Even so, his article provoked some critical responses. 
Horace Alexander questioned Sankey's statement that the Congress was 
almost exclusively Hindu (64). Arthur St John rejected Sankey's 
defence of the Ordinances, and enclosed reports which indicated that 
the Government was not confining its attacks to violent agitators and 
was not exercising moderation and caution (65).
While the 'Labour* members of the Government necessarily had 
to defend the new policy of 'resolute government', the Labour oppo­
sition was unrestrained in its criticism. George Lansbury compared 
the Indian situation to that in Poland when a Czarist official stated 
that order reigned in Warsaw after a terrible suppression of free­
dom. The Labour movement in Britain would not, Lansbury declared, 
support the coercive policy of the Government (66).
Others too were attempting at this time to moderate what they 
considered to be an excessively repressive administration in India.
In Birmingham, a Council for Indian Freedom came into being, with 
the object of supporting the Indian struggle for self-determination. 
This Council, which affiliated itself to the Friends of India, the 
India League, and the No More War Movement, was presided over by 
Horace Alexander and had, among its other office-bearers, the pro- 
Indian former Labour MP, Wilfred Wellock. The Council adopted a 
resolution expressing the hope that the Government would remove the 
Ordinances and release all the political prisoners (67).
Joan Fry, a Quaker, G.P. Gooch, the historian, Carl Heath, 
the Quaker chairman of the India Conciliation Group, J.A. Hobson, 
the writer and polemicist, A.D. Lindsay, the radical Master of Balliol,
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William Paton, Secretary of the International Missionary Council, H.S. 
L. Polak, Gandhi's co-worker in South Africa and member of the Labour 
Party Colonies Committee, and Maude Royden, supporter of women's suf­
frage and a former missionary in India, penned a letter of protest to 
the Manchester Guardian, asking that steps should be taken to prevent 
the further alienation of the Indian people and to restore mutual con­
fidence (68). Another letter, probably inspired by Carl Heath, was 
addressed to Cosmo Lang, the Archbishop of Canterbury, expressing con­
cern about the situation and pointing out that it was for the stronger par­
ty, the Government, to demonstrate a conciliatory attitude by lifting 
the Ordinances and releasing prisoners (69). Among its signatories 
were A.D. Lindsay and William Temple, the Archbishop of York, and 
George Bell, the Bishop of Chichester.
In a pamphlet published by the SCM Press, R.M. Gray also put 
forward the argument that the British Government as the superior 
force must make the opening move, and that administration with Ordi­
nances had led to disbelief in the sincerity of the British Govern­
ment (70) .
There was thus a segment of the British public which was attem­
pting to influence the Government. As yet it was a small segment, 
and its voice was muted. Nevertheless, it was slowly gathering 
strength, and securing support in Parliament. Samuel Hoare was, howe­
ver, determined not to let the anti-Ordinance propaganda deflect him 
or the Viceroy from the policy that they had deliberately chosen, and 
he assured Willingdon that he would not give way to pressure in the 
House of Commons (71).
Hoare was not merely determined to avoid any deviation from the 
path that had been mapped out. He in fact perceived the mood of the 
Commons to be one of irritation with Indian intransigence, and felt 
that any Government of India Bill could be got through the Houses of
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Parliament if only no further meetings of the Round Table Conference 
or of the Federal Structure Committee were held (72). There was appa­
rently a feeling among some MPs that the Indian refusal to co-operate 
had released the British from their commitments. Churchill, at any
rate, thought so (73). Hoare was inclined, too, to conclude that
events in India were hardening opinion in Britain against the propo­
sed constitutional changes, and in favour of advance by two stages 
(74). Hoare was perhaps inclined to think that public opinion was 
shifting in this direction because he himself tended to favour this 
view. Early in October 1931, he had come to the conclusion that the 
Indian delegates would be forced to accept provincial autonomy as a 
first step, although he saw that the suggestion could not come from 
the British Government in the first place (75). Hoare's perceptions 
of public and Parliamentary opinion led him also to reject Willingdon's 
idea of a British-India Federation with responsibility at the centre 
(i.e., without the Princes).(76).
Not everyone perceived the tenor of public opinion in the same
way. Lord Allen of Hurtwood felt that Hoare's opinions were untenable,
as the younger Conservative MPs whom he (Allen) had seen wanted the 
Government to lead and not to be frightened by the 50 to 100 old- 
fashioned Tories (77). Yet it was evident that the growing fissures 
within the Conservative Party could not be repaired, and India was 
acting as an increasingly powerful lever to widen the gulf between 
those who were keen to make a compromise with the Indian nationalists 
and re-establish peace in India, and those who harked back to the im­
perial high noon, and refused to countenance any measure which would 
diminish the glory of the imperial sun. Hoare had a very difficult 
task indeed, and at that stage could not have accurately gauged the 
power of the opposition to the National Government's India policy.
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While Gandhi and his colleagues languished in Indian prisons, 
unable to alter the situation, there were several individuals who 
hoped to save the situation. One such was G.D. Birla, the Indian in­
dustrialist and ally of Gandhi. In a letter to Hoare, he offered his 
co-operation, pointing out (rather dubiously) that, despite his admi­
ration for Gandhi, he neither took part in nor financed the civil diso­
bedience movement, and suggesting that it would be possible to frame 
a constitution that would be acceptable to Gandhi and other progres­
sive Indians, if not all Indians, and arguing that, as Gandhi alone 
could keep the left wing in India under check, to strengthen his 
hands was to strengthen the bond of friendship between Britain and 
India (78).
Hoare was not inclined to trust Birla, but sensed that Birla 
was seeking a rapprochement, and thought that such businessmen 
might be wooed away from the Congress (79). Birla was certainly 
anxious, as any Indian businessman must have been at that time, that 
the Indian crisis should be overcome as quickly as possible. He 
wrote to Lothian also, arguing that, without the co-operation of 
Gandhi and his school, no constitution could succeed, and that this 
co-operation could be secured by the release of Gandhi and other pri­
soners, and by non-renewal of the Ordinances (80).
There was a unity of purpose in the approaches of Hoare and 
Birla, a unity woven from reactions to the two basic strands of left- 
wing political attitudes in India, one against British imperialism and 
the other against Indian capitalism. If Hoare sought to quell the 
former, Birla and his kind had a natural interest in suppressing the 
latter. Although there was a fundamental contradiction of interests between 
Indian businessmen and those in Britain, there was also a delicate 
bond of an unstated unity. It was as much in the interests of the
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British capitalist to secure peaceful conditions in India for the 
continuation of profitable trade as it was in the interests of the 
Indian capitalist. If it was clear that peaceful conditions could be 
restored in India only through compromise and by political concessions, 
these steps were, nevertheless, anathema to the high Tories. In their 
imagination, the slightest yielding of power in India could only lead 
to the rapid and disastrous dismantling of the British Empire. And 
these die-hards, refusing to relinquish even an inch of the raj , were 
seen to be politically potent enough by Hoare and the Cabinet to 
decide them against reconvening the Round Table Conference or the 
Federal Structure Committee.
This was a decision that angered the Indian moderates. Lothian 
had anticipated such a reaction, and argued that any decision to alter 
the programme of constitutional deliberations was likely to alienate 
the Indian moderates, and lead to a revival of the civil disobedience 
movement, thus making it difficult for the new constitution to be ac­
cepted (81). The Government either did not anticipate such a reaction 
or assumed that the moderates did not matter any longer. Indeed, Wil­
lingdon explained the decision of moderates like Sastri, Sapru and 
Jayakar not to co-operate by attributing motives such as vanity and 
distrust, and thought that their non-co-operation was of no account, 
as they had no influence (82). Yet, in the end, the Government had to 
recognize the force of Indian resentment, and agree to the reconvening 
of the Round Table Conference.
The crucial question of balancing the apparently conflicting 
claims of the various Indian communities had not yet been resolved, 
however, and the Government took the decision to attempt a solution 
by diktat rather than the hitherto infructuous negotiations. There 
were several other reasons for this decision besides the failure of 
the method of negotiation. Primarily, there was the old and enduring
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notion that Muslims were a different political species and that they 
ought to be treated with circumspection. In the attempt to weaken 
political extremism in India, the Government had not been occupied 
merely in retaining the support of the moderates, but also that of 
the Muslim community. Thus Willingdon summed up the British view of 
Indian politics when he wrote to the Prime Minister that the Hindus, 
as a community, had been leaders of every subversive movement, were 
very unreliable, and always acted for themselves, while the Muslims 
had on the whole been law-abiding. If the Muslims did not get what 
they wanted, they would not co-operate, and the result would then be 
either autocratic rule or capitulation to the Congress (83).
This tendency to see India as an arena of conflicting political 
entities was another curious paradox of the Raj. While British ideo­
logues were constantly reiterating the role of the Raj in welding a 
multitude of nations into a unity, they were also prone to see clear 
divisions and dissensions between different groups if not between dif­
ferent nationalities. There were differences, no doubt, and the ma­
kers of constitutions for India had to take note of them. Hindus and 
Muslims, upper castes and depressed communities, landlords and pea­
sants, the antinomies were certainly there. But they were recognized 
primarily in terms of religion and caste. The term 'class' rarely 
made an appearance and there were few who differentiated the Indian 
countryside into landlords and peasants in other than caste or reli­
gious terms. The tendency to identify the Congress, and therefore 
Indian nationalism, with Hinduism was all-pervasive and persistent. 
Thus, when the New Statesman reported in February 1932 that 30,000 
'Hindus' were then in gaol, Humayun Kabir, an Indian student at Oxford, 
(he was later to become the Education Minister), had to point out the 
error (84). The editorial staff of the New Statesman were probably
207
using, as many people did, the word 'Hindus' as a synonym for 'Indians'.
But this carried with it an implied assumption, which was all too com­
mon, that Indian nationalists were Hindus, and Hindus alone.
The cleavages that existed in Indian society were reinforced by 
the way in which they were perceived, and even more by the political 
decisions rooted in those perceptions. Undoubtedly, in 1932, any Bri­
tish programme of constitutional change in India had to take into ac­
count the inter-group tensions and rivalries there. As it appeared 
that the Indian leaders were unable to reach an agreement on this is­
sue, the Prime Minister decided, as foreshadowed in his speech to the
Round Table Conference, to formulate a plan revolving around the con­
cept of separate electorates. It would seem that MacDonald was reluc­
tant to do this, for he confessed to Samuel Hoare that communal repre­
sentation was a 'terrible system' and that he was frightened at the 
prospect of self-government in India resting on that principle; more­
over, he was afraid too that no community would be pleased and it would 
seem that the British Government had no friends left in India (85). In 
the end, MacDonald had no choice perhaps, and had to make what came to 
be known as the 'Communal Award'.
The Prime Minister's decision, announced on 17 August 1932, 
reaffirmed the principle of separate electorates for Muslims, Sikhs, 
Indian Christians in some areas, Anglo-Indians and Europeans. The 
depressed classes were given special constituencies for 71 reserved 
seats. All the others were to vote in general constituencies. The 
arrangement could be revised after ten years by mutual agreement (86).
As might be expected, The Times thought that it was a 'defi­
nite and necessary step in the progress of self-government' (87).
Even the New Statesman welcomed the Award as an 'honest attempt' to 
solve the 'insoluble', for, although the system of separate electo-
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rates offended orthodox democratic doctrine, it could not be helped in 
India (88). The Daily Worker, on the other hand, clung tenaciously to 
the divide et impera argument, declaring that, if British imperialism 
did not deliberately act as a divisive force, the communal problem 
could soon be solved (89)
Whether or not it was a deliberate policy is not clear. What 
is apparent, however, is that the decision was rooted in a belief sys­
tem which saw the divisions in India to be ineradicable. Modern poli­
tical institutions and processes introduced into India by the British 
recognized and incorporated these differences, and in doing so tended 
to reinforce them. Thus, paradoxically, beneath a veneer of unity, 
the British Raj created a virtually self-perpetuating system of ten­
sions and conflicts.
If the Communal Award was intended to be the final word on the 
problem, the intentions were belied almost immediately. Gandhi, who 
regarded the provision of separate electorates for the depressed castes 
as a negation of his work for the eradication of untouchability, embar­
ked on a fast to death, to be given up only if the proposals were 
modified.
Was Gandhi attempting, as some suggested, to retrieve through 
the fast his political influence? J.R. Glorney Bolton rejected the 
notion that it was a political 'stunt', and argued that it was natural 
that Gandhi should fast on this issue, since he detested both untoucha­
bility and separate electorates (90). Whatever Gandhi's motives, the 
fast caused concern to his friends. C.F. Andrews felt that Gandhi 
was wrong to undertake the fast, but he considered it more important 
to secure the ending of the fast and the-saving of Gandhi's life, for 
the sake of both Britain and India (91). Andrews, desperate to save 
Gandhi's life, cast about for an alternate settlement acceptable to
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the depressed classes as well as to Gandhi, and suggested that consti­
tuencies could be restructured to secure the representation of the de­
pressed classes, or even that there could be judicial selection to se­
cure such representation (92). Andrews had indeed asked Gandhi to de­
lay the fast till he arrived in India, possibly with an alternative 
plan, but Gandhi replied that he could give up the idea of the fast 
only if the scheme of separate electorates was given up (93).
The more practical suggestion, that Gandhi should be released 
from prison so that he could confer with the representatives of the 
depressed classes, came from G.D. Birla, and under his inspiration, 
from Walter Layton, now at The Economist (94). Emmeline Pethick Law­
rence also urged the release of Gandhi, so that he could have discus­
sions with his friends, as a prison environment made it difficult to 
respond to objective realities (95). For different reasons, Profes­
sor John Coatman too argued that Gandhi should be allowed to con­
fer with the depressed classes. He anticipated Gandhi's failure to 
reach agreement, and, as he would then be covered in ridicule, thought 
that he would break off the fast (96). The New Statesman strongly ar­
gued in an editorial article that, since the consequences of the fast 
would be terrible, MacDonald should personally intervene, promising a 
general amnesty and further negotiations, without actually repudiating 
the Communal Award (97).
Samuel Hoare felt that Gandhi was attempting to shift the odium 
of his own actions onto the Government, and that the Government should 
not put itself in the position of releasing him and then having to re­
arrest him, and also that the Government should not get involved in 
the controversy between Gandhi and the depressed classes (98).
The Poona Pact of 25 September 1932, which rejected the idea of 
separate constituencies for the depressed classes, but increased the
!
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numbers of seats reserved for them to 148, relieved the pressure on 
the Government and Gandhi's friends alike. The New Statesman felt 
that Gandhi had scored a victory over 'his own people', and that the 
Pact was important as 'a sign of change in India and a prelude, as we 
hope it is, to a steady, or perhaps a rapid reform of a social system 
which, if it ever was defensible, is surely indefensible in a civilised 
community today' (99). Bernard Houghton, formerly of the ICS (he had 
served in Madras and Burma) and a radical critic of imperialism, also 
agreed that Gandhi had initiated a great social reform through the 
Pact. But, since Gandhi achieved this on religious rather than on pub­
lic grounds, the result was to accentuate the religious factor in In­
dia and was thus, according to Houghton, a retrograde step, and, even 
more, implied an acceptance of 'the imperialist plan' (100).
Reverend William Paton of the International Missionary Council, 
who had been in India during the Twenties, felt that the Pact present­
ed an opportunity to make a fresh start with the Congress, and urged 
the Prime Minister to at least attempt some kind of private consulta­
tion with Gandhi and his colleagues (101).
Apparently the Government too had come to such a conclusion.
At any rate, Samuel Hoare began to contemplate methods of facilitating 
the cessation of the civil disobedience movement by Gandhi. To this 
end, he was anxious that no statement should be made that would force 
Gandhi into an anti-Government stance, and he did not think that the 
Government should push itself into the position of having to keep 
Gandhi in prison for ever (102). Hoare thought that Gandhi should be 
allowed to see selected persons who might persuade him to call off the 
civil disobedience movement (103).
Willingdon himself, puzzled by the Poona Pact, was reluctant to 
consider either releasing Gandhi or even allowing him interviews, as
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he saw him as the chief instigator of all the Government's troubles in 
India (104). Willingdon, unlike Irwin before him, had convinced him­
self that Gandhi was an arrant politician whose agitational antics could 
not be tolerated by an imperial Government, and his attitude to Gandhi 
and the Congress was coloured by this conviction. Willingdon was not 
entirely alone in adopting a stance that was inherently hostile to 
Gandhi and the Indian nationalist strategy in general.
Even a Liberal intellectual like Sir Michael Sadler was inclined 
to consider Gandhi's methods as not being completely acceptable. Not 
only was Sadler convinced that certain forms of non-violent non-co- 
operation were in effect acts of physical resistance to the Govern­
ment and were therefore only nominally non-violent, and thus deserved 
condemnation, but he felt that India could not yet become a self- 
governing Dominion as there would be civil war caused by communal dis­
sensions (105). Sadler was probably rationalizing his decision not to 
support actively the newly set up Provisional International Committee 
on India which was to work for securing international sympathy and 
co-operation for the struggle for Indian independence. Nevertheless, 
his attitude did reflect the new ambivalence in Britain towards India, 
a sense of exasperation with the tactics of Indian nationalism, com­
bined with a desire to deal fairly with Indian aspirations.
This ambivalence meant that various groups could attempt to 
sway public opinion. A muted but real propaganda war over India be­
gan, and the Government necessarily got involved to protect its own 
position. Samuel Hoare, realizing the persuasive power of the cine­
matic image, not only did a five minute 'talkie' on the Government's 
programme for India, but suggested to the Viceroy the use of 
film as a means of propagating the Government viewpoint (106). He 
even toyed with the idea of a private company being formed for making
212
and screening propaganda films, with a third of the capital coming 
from Britain, a third from the Indian Princes and another third from 
British India (107). Indeed, as early as 1926, the United Empire re­
ported that some Indian Princes, including Alwar, Patiala, Bikaner, 
Jaipur, Kashmir and the Aga Khan, were offering to finance the produc­
tion and screening of 'Empire' films (108).
While these ideas of reinforcing the imperial lattice with 
the cinematic image did not materialize, the India Office carried on 
a propaganda war against opponents of Government policy from both 
ends of the political spectrum. One group that emerged in the con­
flicts and confabulations of the period was the India League (109).
The League had sent a delegation to India to examine and report upon 
the conditions in India. Even before the delegation had published any­
thing that might influence the British public, the Government of In­
dia sought to counteract the India League's activities. The Govern­
ment of India suggested to the India Office, therefore, that they 
should attempt to do this by showing how from the very beginning the 
delegation had been 'run' and influenced by the Congress (110). Hugh 
MacGregor, the Information Officer at the India Office, thought that 
an edited version of the Government of India's report on the India 
League delegation (prepared on the basis of Intelligence Bureau re­
ports and intercepted letters) should be sent to the Conservative 
Central Office and the Anti-Socialist Union, so that they could use it 
for propaganda, and H.A.F. Rumbold suggested that if possible a wedge 
should be driven between Ellen Wilkinson (one of the delegates) and 
the official Labour Party on the one hand and the rest of the delega­
tion on the other (111). What the Government of India report showed 
was that the delegation received Congress funds through Malaviya, 
that Congress arranged the delegation's itinerary, and, rather farci­
cally, even that the delegation stayed in hotels, and therefore could
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not claim acquaintance with the people. The Government of India obvi­
ously rated the possible influence of the India League as very high, 
to take such measures of counter-propaganda. The India League did 
have the possibly influential support of Bertrand Russell, who was 
its chairman, and several Labour MPs, including Eleanor Rathbone and 
Morgan Jones. Russell wrote a brief note introducing the League, in 
which he declared that, if the British public knew the facts about 
India, and of the Government's shameful and incredibly foolish beha­
viour, the public would shrink from the cruelties being perpetrated 
there (112). Intellectuals like Harold Laski and journalists like 
Simon Ratcliff of the New Statesman gave their tacit support for the 
League. Hence, although the League did not have an extensive member­
ship, it was seen as being sufficiently threatening for the India 
Office not only to keep track of its activities, but to attempt to per­
suade the Press to ignore it. An India Office note indicated, for 
example, that the Manchester Guardian Correspondent had been approached 
about a prospective India League meeting, but he felt that all refe­
rences to the meeting could not be suppressed (113).
There may not have been a real need to manipulate the Press, 
for, in general, the line taken by the India League was too radical 
even for the Manchester Guardian, which was sympathetic to the idea of 
Indian independence. The fact that the India Office still felt the 
need to detract from the importance of the League was an index of of­
ficial nervousness and of the precarious character of the Government's 
India policy. As one of the 'agents' of the India Office reported, 
the meetings of the League attracted working class and lower middle 
class audiences, and these were 'important as a voting power' (114).
If the India League was stirring up the officers of the India 
Office, the activities of the India Conciliation Group, although in
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a lower key, were no less significant. Originating as it did in the 
Christian ambience of the Society of Friends, the India Conciliation 
Group reached out to a slightly different public. While maintaining 
links with the India League, the Friends of India and other such or­
ganizations sympathetic to the Indian cause, the India Conciliation 
Group kept a distinct identity, and attempted to promote a sympathe­
tic attitude to Indian nationalism, especially among those who were 
not usually reached by such organizations. For instance, it formed 
a very useful link with the disarmament movement, which was attract­
ing a great deal of attention at that time. Thus, Gerald Bailey, the 
Secretary of the National Peace Council, was asked to join the India 
Conciliation Group. He not only joined the Group, but arranged for 
the publication of three or four special Bulletins on India which 
argued that the situation in India was a challenge to those working 
for peace. Similarly, the India Conciliation Group and the East End 
branch of the Peace Army organized a procession one day, in which 
people carried posters asking questions like, 'What would Christ do 
in India today?' and 'Gandhi was a Guest here. Now he is in prison. 
Why?', and stating, 'While we are talking of Disarmament, a state of 
war exists in India' (115).
One of the major campaigns launched by the India Conciliation 
Group in the winter of 1932-33 revealed the wide divergence of opini­
on about India among church leaders. The India Conciliation Group pro­
posed that some action should be taken to secure the release of Gandhi 
and other Indian leaders to create the right atmosphere in which the 
future constitution could be inaugurated (116). It was suggested that 
either a deputation could meet the Secretary of State for India, or a 
private letter could be sent to him. A letter to the Press was the 
other alternative considered. The responses to these suggestions were
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extremely varied, and with a few notable exceptions indicated that the 
different church leaders in Britain were very cautious about adopting 
radical stances on India, that they were, on the contrary, inclined to 
pursue a line that was not too different from that adopted by the 
Government, and that there was among them a scarcely concealed hosti­
lity to the Indian nationalist and his ideas. Thus, while Hewlett 
Johnson, the 'Red' Dean of Canterbury, and F.L. Donaldson, Christian 
Socialist and Canon of Westminster, were agreeable to any of the 
methods suggested, most of the others approached expressed their ina­
bility to adopt any of them for various reasons.
Oliver Quick, Canon of St. Paul's, argued, for example, that the 
release of Congress leaders would inevitably mean the resumption of 
propaganda against the proposed constitution, and this would destroy 
all chances of it working. M.E. Aubrey, General Secretary of the Bap­
tist Union of Great Britain and Ireland, felt that the Congress agi­
tation was in the interests of a small section of the Indian society, 
and that the Government should continue its policy. He did not ap­
prove of Gandhi's methods of moral coercion by threats of suicide, and 
felt that the release of Gandhi and the others would result in harm.
Refusal to support the India Conciliation Group proposal came 
also from William Temple, the Archbishop of York, George Bell, the 
Bishop of Chichester, Frank Williams, the Dean of Manchester, Henry 
Wilson, the Bishop of Chelmsford, Henry Vodden of the Church Missiona­
ry Society, Paul Kirk, Director of the Industrial Christian Fellowship, 
and Charles Curzon, Bishop of Stepney.
Percival Stacy Waddy, Secretary of the Society for the Propaga­
tion of the Gospel in Foreign Parts, regretted that he could not ap­
pend his signature without approval from his Committee, and thought it 
unlikely that they would agree. J. Scott Lidgett of the London
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Bermondsey Settlement also expressed his regrets as he had been con­
vinced in a private conversation with Samuel Hoare of his goodwill 
and felt that the Secretary of State must be the final judge.
W.J. Noble, Secretary of the Methodist Society, asked, rather 
strangely, if the appeal should not be made to Gandhi, since he put 
himself in prison, prompting Carl Heath to reply that Gandhi was in 
prison and therefore could not act.
Why was there such apparently universal reluctance to sign a 
simple letter urging the release of prisoners? That even radical cler­
gymen like William Temple and George Bell, who had earlier shown sup­
port for a conciliatory policy, should have demonstrated a new reluc­
tance might seem inexplicable. Perhaps they were being cautious.
Some others, like G.E. Phillips of the London Missionary Society, 
felt that any public expression of support for release of the Indian 
prisoners might unleash an avalanche of 'die-hard' protests.
The Anglican Church might have been expected to support the 
Empire, but the Non-Conformist Churches were usually more radical 
(117). But on India they were subject perhaps to contradictory pres­
sures which resulted in an ambivalent attitude. Their anti-imperia­
lism was balanced by a dislike of the Indian nationalist. This dis­
like stemmed partly from an aversion to the ideology of Indian nati­
onalism which was seen as being Hindu and even as being anti-Christian. 
It was also due to the tendency to equate the nationalist leadership 
with an oppressive minority which would exploit the Indian masses.
Thus, with a few exceptions, the majority of Christian missionaries 
in India were not sympathetic to the nationalist movement (118). Be­
sides, there might have been the influence of a notion such as that 
expounded in 1919 by Arthur Hirtzel of the India Office, that the Em­
pire was a means of enabling Christian redemption of mankind (119).
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The various churches in Britain seemed therefore reluctant to 
overtly support Indian nationalists. This reluctance extended even to 
the discouragement of attempts to set aside a day of prayer for India 
(120). Yet there were a few individuals like Hewlett Johnson who were 
willing to adopt a more explicitly sympathetic stance on Indian ques­
tions. Clergymen like C.F. Andrews and Verrier Elwin reacted to their 
Indian experience very differently, and more and more of their fellow 
clergy were beginning to realize that the promotion of Christianity in 
India did not have to take place only under the aegis of a rebarbative 
Raj .
As the time for convening the third Round Table Conference drew 
near, a wide variety of ideas were floated about the steps to be taken. 
The die-hards, sensing a growing inclination among the political elite 
to make definite concessions, gathered their forces for reshaping atti­
tudes to India, and Winston Churchill articulated their hope and con­
viction that the devolution of power in India would be a protracted 
process (121). Their views could not be entirely ignored, and it was 
probably to take some wind out of their sails that a group began to 
seriously consider the idea of prolonging the transition in India by 
a two-stage devolution. Initiated by Charles Mallet, who had been 
Secretary for Indian Students at the India Office from 1912 to 1916 
(and before that a Liberal MP for Plymouth from 1906 to 1910) and The­
odore Morison, former Principal of the Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental Col­
lege, Aligarh, and a member of the Council of India from 1906 to 1916, 
and agreed to by Harcourt Butler, Meston, and William Marris, who had 
all been Governors of Indian provinces, the idea was to seek a recon­
sideration by Government of the proposed constitutional programme (122).
Lord Crewe arranged a meeting at his house to discuss the idea 
and Salisbury, among others,was invited to attend. Interestingly
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enough, Salisbury wished to take Winterton and George Lloyd along with 
him, but Crewe thought that it would be odd to include anybody who de­
finitely belonged to the Winston group, as their standpoint was very 
different (123). Zetland, who could not attend the meeting, thought 
that he would be in sympathy with the views of those who would be 
present (124). Hardinge, who was happy to note such strong moderate 
opinion outside the die-hards, expressed his apprehension about the 
proposal to simultaneously give autonomy at the centre and in the 
provinces, while Reading felt that the Bill should be framed in 
such a way that central autonomy would be considerably postponed, but 
with an assurance that it would be a definite sequel (125).
At the meeting, held on 29 November 1932, the predominant opi­
nion, however, was against asking Government to defer responsibility 
at the centre for a subsequent Bill or to include it in the present 
Bill merely in a skeleton form to be clothed and developed as experi­
ence grew. The various administrators present thought that it would 
be best to concentrate on the safeguards issue, and.they agreed.to 
prepare a note on that subject (126).
The memorandum prepared by Harcourt Butler, Meston, William 
Marris and S.P. O'Donnell (who had been a Commissioner in Bengal until 
1900, and later, from 1906-10, a Liberal MP), suggested the need for 
extreme caution, and that safeguards should be precisely defined and 
included in the Act itself, the Governor being given not merely nega­
tive powers of veto, but positive power of intervention in the legis­
lative and executive spheres (127). Crewe discussed the memorandum 
with Salisbury, who thereupon arranged with the Secretary of State to 
receive a deputation on 12 December (128).
This memorandum became the opening salvo in a wide ranging 
battle for strict safeguards in any new Indian constitutionf an
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issue that was to be the central element in the protracted negotiations
over the proposed constitution. The concept of safeguards contradicted
the idea of responsible government, and was thus unacceptable to the 
Indians, while many British politicians were reluctant to place power 
in the hands of Indians without the fullest kind of protection for 
British interests. There was a feeling that .in any new election the 
Congress would come to power, and that, unless reined in by restric­
tive legislation, Congress Governments would act inevitably against 
British interests in India.
Although there was a feeling that only the constitution being 
considered by the Round Table Conference offered a way out of the 
Indian impasse, and that if the Indians voted against it chaos would 
come again, there was also the recognition that Indian nationalism 
was a force that had to be reckoned with and not ignored. Lothian, 
for example, thought that it was the refusal to recognize the strength 
of nationalism in Ireland that had led to problems there, and felt 
that the Congress leaders should be released to facilitate discus­
sion of the White Paper scheme (129). But Willingdon in India still
preferred his mailed fist, arguing that any amnesty at that juncture 
would be construed as weakness, which would be fatal for the future 
(130). If it seemed to some that the participation of the Congress 
was necessary for the successful working of the new constitution, 
others then saw the Congress as insufferable excrescence which, if 
possible, should be excluded altogether from the new Governments.
As already noted, one recurrent fear was that a Congress Govern­
ment would destroy British interests in a trice. This was the keynote 
of a letter that Lord Greenway, who had been in India as a businessman 
and still had business interests there, wrote to Samuel Hoare, indi­
cating his apprehension about the appointment of a Governor-General
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by India as a Dominion. What was to prevent the appointment of Gandhi 
or any other anti-British Indian as the next Governor-General, he asked 
and his main fear was that such an Indian would use his powers against 
British commercial interests(131). It was the fear of a Congress 
Government indeed that made the devolution of power at the centre such 
an apparently dangerous step, and particularly to one like Greenway, 
who was a senior partner of Shaw, Wallace and Company, one of the lead­
ing Managing Agencies in India with varied and valuable commercial in­
terests .
The Duchess of Atholl articulated this fear, expressing her 
anxiety about the safeguards that would form part of the constitu­
tion, an anxiety that was strengthened by the realization of the ex­
tent of opposition to transfer of responsibility at the centre (132). 
The Duchess may have been influenced in part by letters such as those 
she received from 'The Royalists', a right-wing European group, main­
ly composed of businessmen, in India. Eliott Lockhart of Gladstone 
Lyall & Co., and the young chairman of the Royalists, indicated in one 
letter that the non-official British organizations in India had opposed 
the idea of central responsibility for British India alone, and that 
responsibility at the centre should be given only in a Federation (133) 
He too was apprehensive about Congress coming to power, especially in 
Bengal, which should, he argued, be treated as a special case, because 
of terrorism and the sympathetic attitude of the local 'Hindus' towards 
terrorists, and where there should be no transfer of power until condi­
tions were suitable (134)
The Duchess of Atholl in fact began to orchestrate the oppositi­
on to the idea of simultaneous transfer of responsibility at the centre 
and in the provinces, along with Edward Cadogan, who had been a member 
of the Simon Commission, Reginald Mitchell Banks, Conservative MP for
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Swindon, and a few others (135). Meetings and luncheons were organized 
to co-ordinate the activities of those who hoped to modify the ideas 
that the Government might incorporate into the White Paper that would 
form the basis of the new constitution, and soon these preliminary 
meetings were turned into regular affairs (136). The thinking of this 
group, politically indistinct from the die-hards, could be determined 
from a memorandum drafted by the Duchess. In this, the Duchess of 
Atholl argued, among other things, that an All-India Federation should 
not be set up unless a substantial majority of Indian Princes signi­
fied their adherence: she also criticized the transfer of financial 
responsibility, and the idea of the Army Budget being discussed in 
the legislature, and deprecated the wide extension of the franchise 
recommended by the Lothian Committee (137).
Edward Cadogan, who had 'grave misgivings' about the Govern­
ment's scheme, was hopeful that their activities would show the Govern­
ment that there was a body of moderate opinion which was not inclined 
to let the Government have it all its own way (138). There were, in­
deed, signs that even at the constituency level within the Conserva­
tive Party, a muted opposition to the Government's India policy was 
taking root. The constituents of J.C.C. Davidson, MP for the Hemel 
Hempstead Division of Hertfordshire, for example sent him a resolu­
tion which declared that the demand for central self-government came 
only from a minority of townfolk, and that what the great majority of 
the Indians desired was not self-government but firm and stable rule 
(139).
This was an enduring tenet of Conservative ideology, that what 
India needed was rule with a firm hand, and nationalism was equated 
not only with Hinduism, but with urban elites. It was inconceivable 
that Indians could without British assistance administer India, and
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India could not be compared with any other Dominion (140). Did the die- 
hards sincerely sympathize with the oppressed masses of India and there­
fore seek to oppose the rise to power of the urban elites? There might 
have been an element of a feudal noblesse oblige in shaping their poli­
cy. But their alliance with the Princes to stave off the dominance of 
the nationalists in any new legislatures indicated a desire not so 
much to relieve oppression as to maintain feudal structures in India. 
Die-hard notions tied in also with the idea advanced by some that In­
dians were used to, and therefore thrived under, autocratic rather 
than democratic rule (141).
Did the machinations of the Atholl group or the die-hards have 
much effect on the India Office? At this stage, not much apparently. 
Hoare wrote to Baldwin that his course for the future was set and 
neither Winston Churchill nor George Lloyd would deflect it, and, 
as he had the full support of Baldwin, he was not even apprehensive 
about the die-hards sinking the ship altogether (142).
Baldwin's fight against the die-hards convinced the more mode­
rate leaders of the Congress, so the Correspondent of The Sunday Times 
reported, that the policy of breaking the law had failed, and they 
were now looking for an excuse to change their hitherto hostile atti­
tude (143). On the other hand, Tej Bahadur Sapru indicated that 
there was uneasiness in the public mind caused by the delay in publi­
cation of the White Paper, and irritation about the continued deten­
tion of Gandhi and other political prisoners (144). Willingdon was, 
of course, unwilling to release Gandhi, because he felt that Gandhi 
would resume civil disobedience, although Sapru was convinced that 
Gandhi was more likely to be involved in the anti-untouchability cam­
paign (145).
Sapru's plea for the creation of a better atmosphere in India
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was supported also by Lady Frances Stewart, member of the India Conci­
liation Group who had lived in India for twelve years with her hus­
band, Major-General Sir Keith Stewart. She suggested to the Prime
Minister that the Home Government ought to take the initiative rather 
than leave it to the Government of India (146). Similar suggestions 
for the release of political prisoners not accused of violence came 
from the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, a non­
partisan women's group which had among its members Agatha Harrison, 
which kept up a stream of resolutions on the subject which were for­
warded to the Secretary of State (147).
Several British women's organizations became very interested 
in the question of extending women's franchise in India. Although 
Indian women's groups were demanding full franchise for women, neither 
the Simon Commission nor the more liberal Lothian Committee recommen­
ded full franchise. The Franchise Committee under Lothian had sug­
gested a ratio of about one female elector to every five male elec­
tors. But even this was sought to be whittled down further, the pro­
posal being to change the ratio to 1:7 at least. This provoked vari­
ous women's groups to express their collective consternation, and to 
ask for the extension rather than decrease of the voting rights for 
women, and they also set up a British Committee for Indian Women's 
Franchise (148). Lothian himself was unhappy about the reduction in 
the proposed franchise, but the India Office was unable, at that junc­
ture, to modify the position (149).
One of the things the India Office and the Government had to 
contend with soon after the publication of the White Paper in March 
1933 was the growing opposition to it, especially from the right wing 
of the Conservative Party, the enemy within the gates as it were, 
which made the task even more difficult. A pamphlet published by the
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Indian Empire Society at this time termed the Government's plan 'the 
maddest example of doctrinaire constitution-mongering that the world 
has yet seen', and attributed it to the moral cowardice of British 
politicians 'bowing to the false gods of democracy', and to the sedi­
tion and terrorism of the nationalists in India (150). The pamphlet 
suggested that in India votes would be bought and envisaged a bleak 
future when the Indianization of the Civil Services would spell the 
end of Empire, and reforms would result in the cessation of Lanca­
shire trade with India.
The die-hards were extremely unhappy about the size and compo­
sition of the Joint Select Committee and rejected Baldwin's invita­
tion to participate in the Committee, on these grounds (151). They 
felt that Baldwin had deliberately stacked the cards against the die- 
hards by carefully selecting the members of the Committee, but by refu­
sing to accept membership they lost a chance to be more closely in­
volved in the framing of the reforms. Nevertheless, Churchill was hope­
ful of saving much from the wreck, even if it was not possible to save 
the ship (152). The die-hards were of course opposed to the partici­
pation of Indians in the Joint Select Committee, a view which led 
Lothian to expostulate that it was 'a disgusting manifestation of what 
is one of the main roots of Indian opposition to British rule - the 
assumption that 600 ignorant Englishmen are better judges of Indian 
conditions than any Indian' (153). To Lothian, schooled in the libe­
ral traditions of the Round Table, this was anathema indeed, but to 
the die-hards, who were convinced that Indians were incapable of self- 
government and that they had no right to participate in the framing 
of constitutions, which was the business of Parliament alone, this was 
the only possible creed.
But if the die-hards were hostile to the Joint Select Commit­
tee and regarded it as a tool of the National Government, the India
Office was no less apprehensive about the Committee and its attitudes 
Firstly, the Committee did not confine itself to the White Paper, but 
was determined to examine the whole question de novo, albeit in the 
light of all that went before. Secondly, there were in the Commit­
tee those who, like Salisbury, were suspicious of any great changes in 
the centre and even looked upon the transfer of law and order in the 
provinces with disfavour. Hoare's main fear was that the Committee 
might recommend that Federation was not practicable and advocate only 
a restricted provincial autonomy (154).
Although the Joint Select Committee was thus reconsidering the 
Indian question afresh, the die-hard campaign against the White Paper 
did not slacken. In a letter to the Daily Telegraph, Sir Michael 
O'Dwyer argued that the White Paper proposals required the existence 
of an intelligent electorate, which could not come into existence in 
India for some generations, and that the essentials of good govern­
ment, namely security, efficient and progressive administration, and 
light taxation, would all be imperilled if the changes contemplated 
were introduced (155). This was merely a restatement of the die-hard 
creed that India was not yet fit for self-government, a creed based 
on the assumption that Indians were corrupt, inefficient and incapabl 
But it was a creed that struck a responsive chord in many a British 
mind. The die-hards capitalized on the widely prevalent notion that 
India was a very backward place (reinforced by lingering memories of 
Victorian images of India recently refurbished by writers like Kathe­
rine Mayo, A1. Carthill, and R.J. Minney), and by widening their cam­
paign from the Press to grassroots work in the constituencies were 
able to stir up a very real and substantial opposition to the White 
Paper. This naturally caused a great deal of unease in the Govern­
ment, especially since on occasion even constituents of leading Con-
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servatives like Earl Winterton expressed their opposition to the 
Government line, and it seemed as though the ideas contained in the 
White Paper received support from only a small minority (156).
The attempts of the die-hards to secure rejection of the White 
Paper were viewed with consternation by officials of the Indian branch 
of Imperial Chemical Industries Limited. They feared that rejection 
of the White Paper would drive the Indian moderates into the Congress 
camp, resulting in a renewal of political agitation and violence, 
and thought that the die-hards should concentrate on securing safe­
guards for finance, trade, and law and order (157). Imperial Chemi­
cal Industries was one of the 'new' industrial giants in Britain: 
its close monitoring of Indian politics and its recognition of the 
need for supporting the general principles of the White Paper signi­
fied its desire to adjust to changing conditions while protecting its 
commercial interests. Indeed,the founders of the company had declared 
that it had deliberately been given the name Imperial Chemical Indus­
tries because the British Empire was 'the greatest single economic 
unit in the world', and since the promotion of imperial trading inte­
rests would be given special consideration by the Company (158).
This example of the Imperial Chemical Industries taking a prag­
matic view of political change in India suggests that probably the 
new industries, which feared little Indian competition and were also 
able to cope with protective tariffs by establishing local manufac­
ture, were able to accept the notion of greater devolution of power. 
Perhaps, as D.K. Fieldhouse has recorded in the case of Unilever 
(which also set up Indian subsidiaries), the equanimity of the mul­
tinationals viewing the prospect of transfer of power might have been 
due in part to misreading of the political scene: Unilever, for exam­
ple, assumed that it would be a long time before India became comple­
tely independent (159).
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Political strategies of giant companies were not determined, 
particularly in the short term, by such considerations alone. Other 
factors, especially metropolitan factors, also operated on them.
This perhaps explains why Alfred Mond, one of the founders of ICI, 
might have, as J.C.C. Davidson believed, intrigued with the Tories, 
who hoped to use the Irwin Declaration affair to attack Baldwin (160).
But it was not only the die-hards who nurtured the idea that 
Indians were unfit for self-government. Willingdon felt that, even 
if responsibility were given to Indians, they would still want the 
British to run the country for them almost in the same manner in 
which they had been doing before (161). This was an idea shared by 
Sir John Anderson, the Governor of Bengal, who also thought that a 
large British element would have to be retained in India for many 
years to come, as even the most capable Indian officers were often 
corrupt, and legislators sold their votes for a few rupees (162). If 
the British officials in India held such views, it was even more natu­
ral that those who observed the Indian scene from the distant shores 
of Britain should adopt an even more hostile attitude. It was to coun­
ter this hostility and to win public support for the White Paper that 
the Government began to seriously consider the formation of an organi­
zation to undertake propaganda work on its behalf.
The idea of such an organization had been considered as early 
as July 1932, and Irwin was expected to head it. That expectation 
could not be realized, however, as Irwin joined the Cabinet, but the 
idea was not altogether given up, Lord Derby being considered a pos­
sible replacement for Irwin (163). At a meeting held at the Oxford 
and Cambridge Club (Pall Mall, London) on 28 October 1932, Irwin, 
Lothian, Stanley Reed (Editor of The Times of India, 1906-23),
Lionel Curtis and Hubert Carr, who had been President of the European 
Association from 1922-5, drew up a plan of action for formally setting
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up an organization for carrying on propaganda on behalf of the Govern­
ment (164). But the concept did not take concrete shape because the 
City did not come up with the expected support, and several of those 
consulted, like Hardinge, Walter Lawrence, and Laurie Hammond, were 
not inclined to be encouraging in their response (165).
As the opposition campaign increased in its intensity, however, 
the Government had to revive the idea of a body that would promote 
views that were more in line with those espoused by the Government.
The Government needed all the support it could get, and it was essen­
tial at that juncture to secure support from those who would be recog­
nized as those who had close associations with India.
The need of the Government for a supportive organization grew 
all the more when the campaign against the Government's policies 
being waged by different groups within the Conservative Party inten­
sified. For instance, the Bath Conservative Association, admittedly 
the retreat of retired Colonels from India, refused offers of speakers 
from the Central Office of the Party, as they had had Lord Lloyd 
down and were presumably unwilling to listen to any contrary opinions 
which the speakers sponsored by the Central Office might advance.
The Women's Executive Committee of the Conservative Association voted 
against changes in the central government of India and against the 
transfer of law and order in the provinces. The 'Camberley Committee 
on India' published a pamphlet in which it was argued that liberali­
zation of rule in India would be antagonistic to the interests of the 
Indian people, and that the 'failure' of the Chinese Republic had 
shown the inappropriateness of democracy in the East (166).
The hostility of the local Conservative Associations to the 
Government policy on India stemmed partly from misconceptions about 
it, one widely held notion being that the White Paper required all
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provincial Governors to be Indians (167). Partly, it was also due to 
the successful propaganda being carried out by Churchill, Lloyd, the 
Duchess of Atholl and others, to the effect that the Government was 
surrendering India out of cowardice and the lack of a will to hold 
India for the Empire. There was also the possibility that India was 
being used as a lever by an anti-Baldwin faction in the Conservative 
Party, to displace him from the leadership. Interestingly enough, 
this faction represented an older generation of Tories, those who had 
aristocratic origins with close ties to land, and this was reflected 
not only in their dislike of the new Tories, who were predominantly 
linked to the industrial bourgeoisie, but also in their espousals of 
the Indian aristocracy and their opposition to the Indian capitalists.
The combined attack of Winston Churchill, the Daily Mail, and 
the Morning Post on the Government's India policy made, in the opini­
on of Samuel Hoare also, a very significant impression on the people 
in the constituencies (168). The Daily Express also threw its weight 
behind the campaign against the White Paper. Only The Times, under 
the editorship of Geoffrey Dawson, remained a staunch, if sometimes 
critical, supporter of the Government, a support that some die-hards 
attributed to Dawson's friendship with Irwin, and to his connections 
with the Round Table movement.
If the Government wished to promote its own scheme against the 
hostility of such formidable opponents who could, moreover, take ad­
vantage of the fairly widespread ignorance of true conditions in In­
dia, it needed, it became clear, a separate organization which would 
support the White Paper without actually being a department of the 
Government. The first formal step towards setting up this body was 
taken when R.A. Butler, the Under-Secretary of State for India, cir­
culated a draft letter which would form the basis for getting together
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like-minded people for working in favour of the Government's India 
policy (169). The draft letter indicated that a meeting would be 
held on 9 May at the house of J.J. Astor, the proprietor of the 
Observer, to discuss how best to combat the activities of those cri­
tical of the Government's proposals, and the best way to present the 
Indian situation in the proper perspective. It was expected that the 
letter would be signed by Lord Goschen, former Governor of Madras 
(1924-9) and with close connections with the City, Basil Blackett, 
who had been the Finance Member of the Government of India (1922-8) 
and was a director of the Bank of England and several other companies, 
Leopold Amery, Conservative MP for Birmingham and former Dominions 
Secretary, Alfred Watson, former Editor of the Calcutta Statesman, 
Charles Innes, former Governor of Burma, and J.P. Thompson, who had 
retired as Chief Commissioner of Delhi. After a brief hiatus, 
caused partly by the reluctance of Lord Goschen to head the new orga­
nization, it came into being as the Union of Britain and India. If 
the India Office was not the 'onlie begetter' of this Union, it was 
at least the prime mover, and acted as the catalyst to create the 
new organization, and, as Butler saw it, it was created at the right 
psychological moment (170). It was also the right political moment, 
for the die-hards appeared to be wielding a magic wand that was trans­
forming the Government's policies into shreds of abject surrender to 
the Indian nationalist, and thus winning wide support for their bat­
tle against the White Paper (171).
The Union of Britain and India began with J.P. Thompson as 
Chairman, Alfred Watson and Edward Villiers, who had been the Presi­
dent of the European Association in India in 1931-2, as Vice-Chairmen, 
Brabourne as the Treasurer, and Owen Tweedy as the Secretary. It did 
not formally constitute itself into an association, but remained 
loosely structured, and asked its supporters to send donations of
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5 shillings or more. Obviously the donations of sympathizers could 
not and did not constitute the only source of financial support for 
the UBI. Although these other sources of financial support for 
the UBI have been very carefully obscured, it is evident that Lord 
Goschen, who had close links with the banking circles of the City, 
either acted as a conduit for City funds, or was himself a munificent 
supporter of the Union (172).
Why did these people support the idea of the UBI and, by im­
plication, the White Paper? J.P. Thompson had been the Chief Secre­
tary of the Punjab during the O'Dwyer administration, and was pro­
bably attempting to rid himself of the lingering taint of Amritsar. 
Even as early as 1930, Thompson had come to the conclusion that fur­
ther constitutional progress was necessary, and this conviction may 
have led him to support the Government's policy (173). Villiers, 
the fortunate victim of an unsuccessful assassination attempt, had 
been the President of the European Association, which, although divi­
ded in its attitudes, some of its members opting to oppose the White
Paper, was committed to the support of the policies of compromise ra­
ther than those of the heavy hand.
Quite rapidly, the Union of Britain and India attracted several 
individuals who responded to the Press notices which appeared on 20 
May 1933, and to a general circular distributed to those who might be 
inclined to join the Union. The circular suggested that sympathizers 
could help by agreeing to speak in different constituencies, by as­
sisting in the preparation of leaflets, by contradicting mis-state­
ments, or, at the least, by merely expressing sympathy for the objec­
tives of the UBI (174). Among the early respondents was G.R. Lane- 
Fox MP, who had been a member of the Statutory Commission (175). He 
was naturally co-opted into the Council.of the Union. The Council,
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the main co-ordinating body for the activities of the Union, consisted 
of personswho had served in India in various capacities, and thus could 
speak authoritatively on Indian affairs without being dismissed as 
mere theoreticians. The members of the Council had returned from 
India recently, and could therefore claim to much more contemporary 
knowledge about Indian affairs, a fact that was made much use of in 
the propaganda of the UBI.
The motives of those who joined the UBI and of those who de­
clined to do so reveal the range of attitudes towards the White Pa­
per and what it signified to different individuals. M.J. Ottley, a 
retired Colonel of the Indian Army, offered his support because he 
was an absolute believer in the White Paper, and significantly indi­
cated that he was a shareholder in several Indian companies and was 
acquiring more shares, and also operated coalmines in the Central 
Provinces with 5000 employees (176). Another retired Indian Army 
officer, Brigadier P. Sturrock, felt that political development was 
essential and thought that the White Paper was a sound basis to work 
upon (177). Reverend E.N. Spear of the St. Agnes Vicarage, Leeds, 
wanted to join the UBI because he had spent three years in Travancore 
and had learnt how strong and legitimate was the desire for self- 
government by Indians who still valued the British connection (178). 
Lord Meston, while expressing his sympathy for the Union, declared 
his inability to become a regular member of it because he was among 
the first members of the Indian Empire Society, and, although he dis­
liked the drift of the IES towards the die-hard camp, he had not cut 
himself off totally, and besides, he could not hurt his old friends 
like Reginald Craddock (179).
The Indian Empire Society, dominated as it was by die-hards, 
had to respond to the newly created Union of Britain and India, and 
this it did by creating an alter-ego; the India Defence League. The
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India Defence League, in contrast to the Union of Britain and India,
had a Council consisting of those who had served in India very much
earlier, mostly before the War and the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms.
They were apt, therefore, to view Indian affairs from a perspective 
that was still Victorian and more overtly imperialist. Collective­
ly, they were more likely to reject ideas of reform in India, as such
ideas directly conflicted with their view of India as a trust for the
British, one that had to be zealously guarded. The formation of the 
India Defence League marked the beginning of a prolonged battle be­
tween it and the Union of Britain and India, a battle that, while ap­
pearing to be a conflict merely between two factions in the Conserva­
tive Party, reflected also the deep divisions in the way the British 
public reacted to the developing events in India (180).
Not only was the India Office compelled to secure support for 
its policies from within the Conservative Party, it had to counter 
criticism from outside as well. The India League continued to be a 
target of the Information Officer's propaganda. When a book.by Ellen 
Wilkinson was about to be published, H. MacGregor, the Information 
Officer, proposed to secure adverse reviews for it, and contacted 
Captain McClay of the Central Office of the Conservative Party, who 
promised to do all he could to ensure that the book got the kind of 
review it deserved (181). But more insidious tactics were reserved 
for the Report of the India League delegation which had visited In­
dia. Jonathan Cape had accepted the manuscript for publication, and 
their imprint would no doubt have given the Report a cachet of respec­
tability and a wide readership. But the printer took a proof copy to 
the Information Officer for advice, who thought that the book would 
do much harm abroad if not at home (182). It was conjectured that, 
if the printer could be persuaded to refuse to print the book, Cape
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would also decline to proceed further, or at any rate refer the book 
to an expert, who was likely to be John Coatman, who was expected de­
finitely to give an unfavourable report. A letter was accordingly 
sent to the General Secretary of the Newspaper Society, Edward Davies, 
who was representing the printer, S.J. King, suggesting that the Re­
port was a publication with which no responsible Englishman should be 
associated, and this was followed up by a telephone conversation with 
Davies (183). The ruse succeeded, for the printer did refuse to print 
the book, and Jonathan Cape refused to publish it. It was ultimately 
published by Essential News, a small publisher who obviously could 
not furnish the book with the kind of distribution that Cape would 
have given it.
The India Office managed, thus, to obscure a view of India 
that was presented by those who had seen Indian affairs from close 
quarters, but a view that necessarily conflicted with that the In­
dia Office sought to present. Since the India Office did not go to 
the same lengths with other books and pamphlets that were appearing 
at this time, it can only be surmised that they perceived the India 
League report as potentially a very influential book, one that could 
further increase opposition to the policies of the Government*
If the India Office was able to blunt the barbs of one set of 
critics, it was virtually helpless in the face of criticism from the 
right wing, who had the undiluted support of mass circulation news­
papers such as the Daily Mail and the Daily Express, and others such 
as the Daily Telegraph and the Morning Post, which were unanimous in 
their rejection of the White Paper. There were also pamphlets and 
articles in journals through which the opponents sought to present a 
bleak picture of an India that could only decline without the presence 
of the British. For example, in a pamphlet entitled 'The Main Facts
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of the Indian Problem', the Duchess of Atholl tried to argue that In­
dian illiteracy, the caste system, barbarous customs, corruption, the 
close connection between the Congress and the terrorists, and the de­
terioration in the efficiency of the transferred departments all re­
quired the continued British control of several spheres, and added 
that transfer of power would affect British trade (184). In a fore­
word to this pamphlet, Lord Islington declared that it was a mistaken 
sense of political expediency that was driving India and the British 
Empire into great peril.
An anonymous article in Blackwood's Magazine made a similar 
point, remarking that the Government proposals were to abolish Bri­
tish rule, and hand over power to the Congress 'De Valeras' and to 
'put the dumb and helpless millions of India under the heel of their 
hereditary oppressors', and went on to declare that autonomy for In­
dia would also be ruinous to Britain, as Congress would confiscate 
the thousands of millions of British capital invested in India (185). 
Such a view was not confined to die-hards alone. J.C.C. Davidson 
thought that 'the British Government, the Viceroy and to a certain 
extent the States have been bounced by Gandhi into believing that a 
few half-baked semi-educated urban agitators represent the views of 
365 millions hard working and comparatively contented cultivators'
(186).
How closely did such views represent the reality of the Indian 
political scene? Did the Congress still remain an 'elite minority wait­
ing to capture power so that it could exploit the Indian masses? In 
the late 19th century, the Congress might have been, in Dufferin's 
dismissive phrase, a 'microscopic minority'. But the complexities of 
20th century politics and the national campaigns it had organized had 
transformed the Congress into a new creature. Its membership, its
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ideology and its policies reflected the emergence of complex link­
ages between the Congress on the one hand, and the urban bourgeoisie 
as well as the rural rich peasantry on the other (187). At the same 
time, the Congress had to recognize and act upon rural and urban dis­
content and the resultant popular unrest. As Gyanendra Pandey pointed 
out, it was perhaps the 'popular masses who brought an increased mi­
litancy and "radicalism" to the Congress, rather than a militant and 
radical Congress which took politics to the people' (188). Neverthe­
less, the Congress also acted as 'a major source of inspiration for 
popular revolt' (189).
But the significant question perhaps is not why Congress became 
militant, but the fact that it did acquire a sharper, more radical 
stance. The Congress had become in fact a protean creature, attempt­
ing to satisfy in a multitude of ideological guises a wide range of 
political and economic wants. But it was certainly no longer confined 
merely to an urban elite.
However, the charge that giving power to the Congress was to 
place power in the hands of the 'hereditary oppressors' of the Indian 
masses had an apparent ring of truth. Despite its rhetoric, the Con­
gress was little inclined to support those at the bottom of the social 
pyramid, the share-croppers and agricultural labourers, for instance 
(190). Nor was it sympathetic to the urban proletariat. Gandhian 
notions of 'trusteeship' visualized a well-tempered society, but not 
an egalitarian one.
Nevertheless, the charge rested on the false premiss that under 
British rule things were different. British imperialism also sup­
ported an exploitative, hierarchical structure, especially in the coun­
tryside. Indeed, given its dependence upon the support of Zamindars, 
big landlords and Princes, the Raj had a vested interest in perpetuating
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the existing social structure. Although enlightened attempts were 
occasionally made to regulate, through tenancy legislation, the way 
in which the structure operated, the paternalistic concern for the 
peasant did not extend to any ideas of radically restructuring rural 
India.
Admittedly, the Congress also derived, in certain regions, 
support from the rich rural peasant, and was therefore unlikely to 
desire any radical change. But it also had links to the urban bour­
geoisie and contained within itself small but increasingly signifi­
cant groups of enlightened radicals. The Congress was thus subjected 
to several forces which perhaps gave it a changing ideology, but one 
which increasingly acquired a radical tinge.
The die-hard campaign in Britain thus rested on an inability 
to shed old and outworn images of India and of the British role there. 
Although the campaign got entangled in the internecine conflicts with­
in the Conservative Party, thus suggesting that the Indian question 
was merely being used as a convenient excuse for attacking a section 
of the Party elite, in reality the campaign was serious. The die-hards 
considered the Empire inviolate, even sacred , hence the stridency
of their campaign for its defence. This made it seem as though the 
British public were polarized into those for Indian self-government 
and those against. The reality was much more complex. Left-wing cri­
tics of Empire, for example, were also hostile to the nationalists, 
as were some of those clergymen who were sympathetic in principle to 
the cause of Indian political advance. Business interests were sub­
jected to contradictory pressures as well: their desire to preserve 
the Indian Empire with their vast investments in it was balanced by 
the need to come to terms with nationalist agitation. Their sense 
of urgency was perhaps increased by the growth of terrorism and the
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apparently increasing militancy of the Congress itself, and thus promp­
ted attempts - such as that of the Indian branch of the Imperial Che­
mical Industries - to intervene in the political debate. Then again, 
not all the businessmen were inclined to see the need for compromise. 
The younger ones, who formed themselves into a right-wing 'ginger 
group' in Calcutta, not having experienced, perhaps, the full force 
of militant nationalism, were apt to believe in the possibility of 
completely extinguishing the fires of Indian nationalism.
The White Paper debate did not precipitate a radical shift in 
British perceptions, but it set in motion an intellectual flux. De­
bates, discussions, questions raised and answered, all compelled a 
renewed examination of Britain's role in India, and while the consti­
tutional juggernaut moved slowly on the British public found itself 
in the middle of a propaganda war.
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6. The Final Compromise: the Making of the Government of India
Act, 1935
The breakdown of the long-standing British consensus over 
India and the consequent emergence of deep and real divisions tended 
to accelerate the programme of reform. The imperial facade had till 
then concealed such divisions, and the mystique of a non-partisan 
policy on India had helped to obscure dissentient opinions. But, 
it appeared, the facade had been shattered, and, if a new India
policy was to be forged, it had to be done quickly, before opposi­
tion grew too strong.
British policy-makers were perhaps spurred also by the signs 
of growing militancy in India, reflected in the creation of the 
Congress Socialist Party or in the rejection by the Indian nationa­
lists of the White Paper proposals. One of the unstated aims of the 
new constitutional proposals was the strengthening of structures of 
collaboration in India which had been weakened by repeated waves of 
mass agitation. If potential collaborators were to be rescued be­
fore they too were engulfed by the menacing tide of militancy, the
new constitution had to be hammered out quickly.
There was another, probably more important reason for speed: 
the world economic crisis showed no signs of disappearing, and it
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perhaps became more necessary than ever before to solve the Indian 
problem rapidly and with the greatest advantage to British interests. 
India had not yet ceased to be an economic asset. Even if trade with 
India constituted only a tiny segment of the British economy, in a pe­
riod of economic stress it became a vital segment. Any market assumes 
importance in a crisis, and, despite the apparently increasing fis­
cal autonomy of India, there were benefits that could be reaped by 
the retention of India in the Empire. Dietmar Rothermund has shown 
for instance how the Indian foreign trade became an important source 
of revenue for the Government of India, and a means for the transfer 
of funds to Britain (1).
But it was no longer possible to control India's economy through 
imperial fiat. Indeed, it was a recognition of this which increased 
the reluctance of some British groups to yield more political power 
to India. At the same time, it was becoming increasingly evident 
that only through mediation and compromise could a solution be for­
mulated that would be acceptable to British and Indian economic inte­
rests alike. The informal arrangement between Indian and British 
cotton textile interests was an example of such mediation and compro­
mise (2) .
Some British businessmen recognized that Indian industry was 
entitled to a reasonable level of protection against import of goods 
from the UK, especially cotton goods, but at the same time they wanted 
an acknowledgement from the Indians that there was no damaging competi­
tion from Lancashire, and also a higher level of protection against 
other foreign producers, like the Japanese. British industrialists, 
in effect, were seeking to form an alliance with the Indians against 
the Japanese, the main contenders for the lucrative Indian market (3). 
The Indian market was no longer a captive market, and agreements such
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as these had to be negotiated to protect an industry already damaged 
by the world depression. Yet there was no doubt that the longer In­
dia remained within the Empire, the longer it would be possible to 
exert influences in favour of British trade at the negotiating tables. 
Ostensibly, for instance, the agreement reached between Indian and 
Japanese textile manufacturers restricting imports from Japan was one 
designed to benefit the Indian cotton grower and manufacturer. But it 
also served to help Lancashire, by diminishing the fiercely competi­
tive imports from Japan, although the Cotton Trade League of Manchest­
er, for one, was inclined to doubt the benefits accruing to them as a 
result of the Indo-Japanese agreement (4).
The urgency of, and the need for, Indian reform was, as pointed 
out, especially evident to some industrialists in Britain, and they 
were the keenest supporters of the Government's White Paper scheme, 
which was essentially a design to provide India with a measure of 
self-government while hedging it around with safeguards that would pro­
tect British commercial interests among others. Lord Derby, closely 
connected with the Lancashire textile industry, was one such, com­
mitted to the White Paper proposals, and he was even able to persuade 
the King to see the need for considerable advances in Indian consti­
tutional reform, to the extent that Samuel Hoare noted a change in 
the monarch's attitudes (5). If the King represented a conservative 
focal point, one which acted as the focus for tendencies to preserve 
the Empire as it was, a change in his attitudes, however small and 
however private, implied nevertheless that there was a growing incli­
nation among British elites to concede the necessity for change.
Yet, even among those who might have been expected to support 
the White Paper as a scheme that promised much, there was a strange 
reluctance to support it, partly caused by the consideration that it
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could be used as a political pawn, and partly by a conviction that 
the White Paper went too far. Lloyd George, for example, was against 
the White Paper, and thought that Britain ought to keep a strong hand 
in India, and even advised Reading and Churchill not to serve on the 
Joint Select Committee, so that they could have a free hand after the 
Committee's Report was published (6).
It would appear that there was a great deal of concern in the 
Conservative Party group led by Baldwin that the Indian White Paper 
might turn out to be its Waterloo, as the opposition to it and the 
ideas it contained came not only from the die-hards who felt it went 
too far, but from some, like Josiah Wedgwood, who felt it did not go 
far enough, and from Indians who rejected the contradiction inherent 
in it, namely self-government with safeguards. At the same time, 
Baldwin and his followers saw the White Paper scheme as the golden
mean, as it were, between the two extremes of self-government on the
one hand and the continuation of coercive British rule with an in­
creasing use of force on the other. The deliberations of the Joint 
Select Committee attenuated the intensity of the opposition, but 
could not totally extinguish it, and the die-hards strove to undermine 
support for the White Paper. Very significantly, the die-hards, while 
whipping up anti-White-Paper feelings in Britain, attempted to secure 
the support of the Indian Princes for their campaign.
Since the notion of a federal structure for British India alone 
was rejected as being impractical and undesirable, the Princes became 
a crucial factor in determining the course of events. If they
rejected the proposals in the White Paper, it would have to be
replaced, and thus a struggle for their enthusiastic allegiance was 
launched. The Morning Post, the most ardent exponent of the die-hard 
creed, acted as the chief instrument for securing the support of the
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Princes for the die-hard cause. H.A. Gwynne, its editor, and Madhava 
Rao, the Indian Correspondent of the newspaper, made strenuous efforts 
to secure and retain the support of the Princes. Their efforts were 
complemented by a series of delegations the Morning Post sent to In­
dia. The first of these consisted of Major John Courtald, MP for 
Chichester, and Vice-Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Morning 
Post, and Viscount Lymington, MP for Basingstoke, and it was intend­
ed that they would explain to the Indian Princes why they should op­
pose the White Paper (7). The second mission to the Princes, which 
followed hard upon the first, consisted of Captain Spencer-Churchill, 
and E.W. Russell, the deputy editor of the Morning Post (8). These 
missions were not only to gather support for the die-hard cause, but 
were also to counter the pressure that the die-hards believed was being 
exerted on the Princes by Willingdon, to bend them in favour of the 
Government policy on India.
The die-hards sought the support of the Princes because they were 
seen as a conservative force which would act as a counterweight to the 
process of democratization (9). But this was also one of the unstated 
reasons for the idea of an All India Federation that embraced the 
Princes, and this convergence of opinion on an important aspect of the 
Indian policy could have been used to minimize the conflict and polari­
zation in Britain, but was not utilized to that effect.
What is interesting about the active involvement of the Morning 
Post in the Indian question is that, unlike the various other British 
newspapers which were confining themselves to attempted moulding of 
public opinion, it tried to strike a blow at the White Paper at a 
more basic level, by securing the opposition of the Princes. There 
was also the possibility that the Princes could be induced to part 
with some of their enormous wealth to support the die-hard campaign
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in Britain (10).
The Morning Post delegations did not, according to the Government 
of India, confine themselves to intriguing with the Princes, but 
sought to conspire with the Hindu Mahasabha as well to stir up the 
anti-White-Paper agitation (11). The main object of the Morning 
Post and the India Defence League was to undermine the support for 
the White Paper proposals, and they were determined to use any pos­
sible ally to achieve this object. ' Their most powerful allies were 
in the Joint Select Committee, where not only- Salisbury, Rankeillour 
and Reginald Craddock were putting the die-hard case effectively, 
but others, like Austen Chamberlain, were beginning to argue for 
fairly radical recasting of the White Paper scheme, especially with 
regard to the question of indirect elections to the federal legisla­
ture. Outside, Hoare got the impression that the agitation against 
the White Paper, was diminishing, except for London, the Home Counties 
and Lancashire (12).
Inside the Joint Select Committee, however, the die-hards seemed 
to be winning their battle. In fact, as early as January,R.A. Butler 
wrote to Brabourne that the main problem was whether to yield on cer­
tain points in the White Paper so that the support of the independent 
Conservatives led by Austen Chamberlain could be secured. It was a 
case of throwing over parts of one's equipment to save the ship, he 
added, and,while he appreciated the value of standing pat on the White 
Paper, and the importance of Indian opinion, politically they could 
not do without the support of the majority in the Select Committee (13). 
Butler felt that the Chamberlain group wanted to justify their pre­
sence in the Committee by making some alterations in the White Paper 
scheme, which would also enable them to persuade the progressive sec­
tions of the Conservative Party that the scheme was essentially
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sound, requiring only such minor changes (14). Chamberlain did 
think that the basic idea of the White Paper was correct, but felt 
that the Report of the Committee would not have much authority if 
it merely approved the White Paper in toto, and was inclined, there­
fore, to making some changes at the centre (15). It became clear to 
Hoare, Baldwin, Halifax and other members of the Cabinet, with some 
of whom Austen Chamberlain conferred, that, unless concessions were 
made on the issue of indirect elections, there was little hope of 
securing Parliamentary support for the subsequent Bill on Indian 
reform (16).
The Government clearly were compelled to surrender to pressure 
from the die-hards, and were willing to weather the storm of pro­
test that they anticipated from India. Indeed, even before the 
Committee reported, Indian moderates like Sapru were getting alarmed 
by newspaper rumours about the possible contents of the Report.
Sapru thought that it would be disastrous if the White Paper scheme 
was further whittled down, as it had few supporters in any case (17). 
Hoare hoped that criticism of the final Report could be defused 
by extensive propaganda, especially by the use of news films, in 
India as well as in England (18). From the correspondence of this 
period, it is evident that the Government were prepared to resile 
from their White Paper position, and ultimately did so, for tactical 
reasons.
Carl Bridge has argued that it was inaccurate to suggest that 
the die-hards acted as a restraining influence, and that in fact 
Hoare himself was inclined to favour indirect elections, and was 
therefore moving in a direction in which he and Baldwin would have 
liked to move in any case (19). This is true to a certain extent, 
but, just as no concessions of any kind would have been made without
256
the pressure exerted by the Indian nationalist movement, the regression 
from the White Paper position was necessitated by the much more imme­
diate pressure from the die-hard campaign.
Constitution-making in London was always an intricate and deli­
cate task, with pressures and influences from several different posi­
tions acting and reacting to produce an end product. This was more 
so when there was a strange coalition in power in Britain, faced by 
an acute domestic economic crisis and divisions within the Parties 
constituting the coalition. While it was true that the Conservative 
Party was committed to the maintenance of the Raj, there were real 
differences among Conservatives in their responses to the winds of 
change summoned up by Indian nationalism.
At one extreme there was the notion that nationalism must be 
suppressed by full use of the imperial might, and by seeking allies 
among the conservative elements in India, the Princes. At the other 
was the idea that the Raj could be made more enduring by striking 
a bargain with Indian nationalism, the Princes being brought in as a 
countervailing force. These notions reflected differing perceptions 
about the strength of the nationalist movement. If it was evident 
to some that it could no longer be totally extinguished and that ex­
cessive force could only further stoke the fire, to others it was 
still the insignificant activity of a few urban elites, and hence one 
which could be ground down with no fearsome consequences. It was this 
difference in perceptions that was at the root of the conflict in Bri­
tain between the different shades of Conservative opinion. If indeed 
the Baldwin group intended to move in the same direction as the die- 
hards, they would not have needed to create an organization such as 
the Union of Britain and India to fight the India Defence League in 
the public arena. There was a struggle for the mind of the British
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public, and the struggle was real.
At the same time, this struggle tended to obscure, by its own 
intensity, the fact that there were others in Britain who fell into 
neither the group that supported the White Paper nor into the one 
that opposed it altogether (20). Indian voices and those of their 
allies in Britain were drowned by the clamour in Britain caused by 
the conflict between the Government and its die-hard opponents. It 
was in the nature of the circumstances of the time that this should 
be so, and, although there was a wide range of opinions, these 
tended to be subsumed by the fiercely polarized struggle between 
the Government and the die-hards.
It was a struggle, at once for the preservation of the British 
Raj and for dominance in the Conservative Party, and India became 
an important element, unusually so, even in British electoral poli­
tics. At various by-elections held at this time, India and the 
Government's policies towards India were examined and pronounced 
upon (21).
One European political phenomenon which struck a responsive 
chord in Britain, albeit a minor one, was the rise of Fascism. The 
reincarnation of the erstwhile socialist, Oswald Mosley, as a leader 
of the British fascists, and the rise of the Blackshirts, necessarily 
impinged on imperial and Indian politics, and added a new dimension 
to an already complex problem. To the fascists, Empire was all, and, 
as they considered it absurd to contemplate self-government for India, 
they opposed the White Paper policy totally (22). This ranged the 
fascists on the same side as the die-hards, who could not have been too 
pleased by this unsolicited alliance. More significantly, however, 
this development probably gave an added impetus to the Government to 
push on with Indian reform. Similarly, the emergence in India of 
the Congress Socialist Party with a programme of radical economic
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change, must have quickened the desire to reach a settlement with more 
moderate elements. The decision of the Congress leaders to formally 
cease civil disobedience (which had, in fact, been all but suppressed 
long before) created the political atmosphere in which such a settle­
ment could be reached more easily.
Yet the continuing conflict between the die-hards and the Bald­
win wing prevented an easy transition in India. An examination of 
this conflict is useful, for it reveals the breakdown of the consen­
sus politics which had hitherto been the norm for determining India 
policy, and at the same time indicates the manner in which the two 
groups sought to manipulate public opinion. India intruded upon 
the British public as it never had since the Mutiny. Even the BBC, 
which had, as a rule, abjured discussion of Indian politics, decided 
to allow a series of broadcasts on India, and the presses of Britain 
poured forth a large number of tracts, pamphlets, books and leaflets 
on India, as the major contenders in the arena sought to project an 
image of India that would support their ideas on Indian reform. The 
most assiduous of these were the members of the India Defence League, 
and they were also visibly the most ostentatious. In the first place, 
the League had the advantage of total access to the journal of the 
Indian Empire Society, the Indian Empire Review. This monthly jour­
nal, edited by Sir Louis Stuart, had been started in 1931 (with Sir 
Mark Hunter as the editor), and carried articles and reviews expound­
ing the die-hard view of India and Indian politics, besides carrying 
regular reports about the activities of the India Defence League, and 
of the Indian Empire Society, which, strangely, retained its separate 
identity, at least nominally, despite the greater fame of its doppel- 
ganger sibling. Unlike other groups (the India League, for example) 
of the period, the Indian Empire Society was financially well
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supported, evidently so, for the journal appeared regularly, and 
was very well designed, running to about 80-100 quarto pages. The 
Indian Empire Society was ostensibly supported by subscriptions, but 
the India Defence League had an apparently wider range of sources of 
support. It was not merely the 'bottomless purse' of Lady Houston 
which sustained the activities of the India Defence League, as R.A. 
Butler imagined (23). The League presumably secured funds from the 
Princes in India, and quite appropriately the suggestion that the 
'die-hard' fund, collected by the Morning Post to save Ireland, 
should now be converted into one that would be used to save India 
was seriously considered (24). Baldwin thought that Rothermere also 
provided large sums for the 'anti-Government' campaign on India (25).
The result of this affluence was a journal that looked very 
impressive, and an organization that could maintain an intensive 
campaign. The die-hards were also aided by the fact that they were 
propagating an idea that merely reinforced existing conceptions about 
India. The notion that Indians were a benighted people incapable of 
ruling themselves without the help of the British died hard, and, in 
terms of opinion-moulding, the India Defence League had a relatively 
easy task. All it had to do was to persuade people that nothing had 
changed in India, and the paradigm of the 'unchanging East' was one 
that could be taken advantage of. The Government, on the other hand, 
had the much more difficult task of convincing people that Indians 
had advanced sufficiently to be given a measure of self-government, 
but not enough to be allowed a totally free rein.
The Press also seemed to be enthusiastically supporting the die­
hard cause. While the Morning Post was at the forefront, waging its 
great battle for India, the more widely circulated Daily Mail and 
the Daily Express joined the well orchestrated chorus of opposition 
to the Government's India policy. The Daily Mail even published a
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'Blue Book' on India, priced only one penny, with a slogan that encap­
sulated its philosophy: 'Save India for the Empire' (26). In a fore­
word to this pamphlet, Lord Carson of Duncairn declared:
The proposal to abdicate British rule in India - 
for disguise it as you will, that is the reality - 
is the most vital for us and for India that has arisen 
within the lifetime of the present generation.
Sir Michael O'Dwyer delineated the results of such an abdication in 
his essay for the 'Blue Book' entitled 'The Betrayal of our Trust'.
The loss of India, O'Dwyer argued, would mean the loss of the hundreds 
of millions of British capital, bring misery to hundreds of millions 
of Indian 'fellow subjects', and poverty to millions of British work­
ers who depended for their livelihood on the annual trade of 200 mil­
lion pounds between India and Britain. It was immaterial if the 
figures that O'Dwyer was using were accurate or not. It was the im­
plicit argument that was significant. In striking and stark phrases, 
it reached out to British capitalist and worker alike, and also managed 
to reiterate concern for the Indian 'masses'.
The Daily Mail 'Blue Book' also reprinted a series of articles 
by Rothermere which had earlier been published in the newspaper, and 
in these the well worn arguments about the artificial character of 
Indian nationalism, the corruption and inefficiency of Indians, the 
problem of communalism, and the inability of India to defend herself 
were brought out again. The purpose of the 'Blue Book' was of course 
to present a negative image of India, and this was done not only 
through these articles, but also through selected statistics and 
the choice of pictures which showed riot scenes, victims of terrorist 
attacks, animal sacrifices and such other images of India as would 
serve to reinforce traditional notions of India.
With a circulation of nearly 2 million, and a readership drawn 
from the lower middle—class, the Daily Mail was a potent propagandist
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for the die-hard cause, for what it was saying about India struck a 
responsive echo in its readers, for many of whom India was a distant, 
exotic land peopled by unlettered and superstitious peasants and held 
together only by the British Raj.
What is of interest in such image-reinforcing propaganda is the 
fact that it blurred the ability to perceive the reality of the In­
dian situation. Whatever was happening in India was seen through a 
distorting prism, as it were, and this meant, in turn, that people 
could not slough off the traditional ideas about India which clung 
to them with greater intensity. The gulf between the objective reality 
and the subjective perception of it was significant because it was 
the nature of the perception that determined the attitudes of the pub­
lic. For instance, it was a basic tenet of the die-hards that they 
could not allow Indian nationalists to acquire any real power because 
they would only use it to further oppress the masses. Their propagan­
da reinforced this idea and a self-sustaining circle of ideas was thus 
set up.
There were many others too who held such ideas about the Indian 
nationalists. What distinguished the die-hards was their unwilling­
ness to change their attitudes. Baldwin had recognized that it was 
necessary to adapt to the changed circumstances. He had told Thomas 
Jones in February 1932 that: 'Rightly or wrongly we have done with
the old India; there's a new one afoot and we must make the best of 
it' (27). The divergence of die-hard attitudes towards Indian re­
form had several reasons. As predominantly deriving from the Bri­
tish landowning classes, they probably felt a greater kinship with 
the Indian landlords and entertained a natural antipathy towards 
the Indian capitalists and their partners, the nationalists. True, 
the Congress received support from rural rich peasants in many areas,
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and their alliance with the Indian capitalists was tenuous and shift­
ing (28).. But the traditional image of the Indian nationalist as an 
urban Hindu persisted, and the die-hards refused to explore beneath 
the surface to discover the roots of Congress. Perhaps this image was 
reinforced also by the loyalty to the Empire displayed by the big land­
lords of Punjab and their peasant allies (29). The loyalty of these 
'feudal' elements contrasted strongly with the hostility of the appa­
rently urban nationalists, and thus strengthened die-hard sympathy for 
the Indian landlords.
There were some die-hards who were involved in commercial acti­
vity, of course. But this involvement was limited to certain speci­
fic areas. An analysis of the commercial connections of the India 
Defence League, for example, shows that, of the 47 MPs who were mem­
bers of the League Council, 27 held no directorships, and those who 
held directorships were connected primarily with foreign investment 
funds, railway companies, and tea plantations in India (30). These 
were areas in which there was little or no Indian competition and 
the investors had few grounds for apprehension. But the countervail­
ing factor was the fear that Congress would repudiate India's debts, 
and confiscate British assets in India, and this fear produced a reluc­
tance to countenance any plan that gave Indians a greater control of 
their economy.
These fears were sharpened perhaps by economic changes in 
India. Shares of many companies were passing into Indian hands, 
and blurring the distinction between British and Indian capital (31). 
Even more significantly, the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce 
and Industry launched an attack on the managing agency system, suggest­
ing that contracts should be limited to 25 years at the end of which 
the 'managed' company would have the option of revision. As most of
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the managing agencies were British and as the system was a highly pro­
fitable one, the move of the Indian Federation caused alarm, prompting 
Eric Hayward, the chairman of one major managing agency, Waldie and 
Co. of Calcutta, to write to the Duchess of Atholl, seeking her 
support (32).
It has been argued that the difference in age between the die- 
hards and the supporters of the White Paper was one factor which would 
explain the reluctance of the die-hards to accept the necessity of 
Indian reform (33). The Union of Britain and India had also argued 
that most of the important members of the India Defence League had 
served in India before the Montagu Chelmsford reforms, and hence were 
unable to accurately judge the potential for change. These factors 
no doubt serve to partly explain the attitudes of the die-hards, but 
the economic aspect would seem to be equally important as an expla­
natory factor. The difference in age was not truly significant, and, 
as the India Defence League continually pointed out, a large number 
of the members had returned from India quite recently, having experi­
enced the newly reformed administration. Besides, Members of Parlia­
ment attracted to the India Defence League had little actual experi­
ence in India, and their stance can be better understood in economic 
terms.
Carl Bridge has suggested that die-hards and the supporters of 
the Government's policy shared common perceptions of Indian politics, 
differing only in the attitudes towards method and procedure (34).
But this argument ignores certain fundamental differences. Although 
both groups wished to perpetuate British rule in India, the die-hards 
refused to recognize the existence of a strong nationalist movement 
which transcended provincial and communal boundaries, and they sought 
to preclude the rise of democratic movements by strengthening the
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hands of the Princes and other feudal foci of power and influence.
They vociferously opposed the extension of the franchise, rejecting
even the limited extension proposed by the Lothian Committee, and
made every effort to create an image in Britain of an India that
would sink into anarchy if the Government proposals were implemented
without alteration.
Thus, in a leaflet entitled 'Facts', the Indian Empire Society
declared that (35):
India has had some twelve years' experience of the 
Montagu 'Reforms' with grave results. It is now 
proposed to transfer power into the hands of thirty- 
five million voters, the majority of whom have not
only no conception as to what a vote means, but are
in addition illiterate...
In effect the die-hard concept of the Indian polity was one which en­
visaged no extension of democratic structures.
In a book published in 1934, Hamish Blair, who had written a
series of articles on India for the Saturday Review, suggested that 
the primary task of the British Government was to rescue the peasant, 
and not to enfranchise him,while in his prefatory remarks Ian Colvin, 
who had been with the Allahabad Pioneer between 1903 and 1907, and 
was in 1934 a Morning Post leader writer, observed that the Congress 
was the Party of Indian 'capitalism', which was trying to drive out 
British goods from India, expressed the hope that all Conservatives 
who opposed the Government's policies would form the nucleus of a 
new Conservative Party (36). In one of his despatches, Blair also 
sought to raise the bogey of Russian intrigues, especially with the 
newly emergent Congress Socialist Party, and concluded that what 
was needed was a little 'timely firmness' which would crush the 
'Congress and the neste of vipers, Communistic, Terroristic and the
rest, to which it has given rise' (37).
Another fearsome image conjured up by the die-hards to
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buttress their theories was the fate of Christian missionaries and 
Christians in India under a nationalist Government. In a letter to 
the Archbishop of Canterbury, Sir Henry Page Croft expressed the 
'very grave anxieties which are felt by large numbers of Churchmen 
with reference to the proposed reforms in India', as the fanatical 
religious feelings of the days of the Indian Mutiny were still la­
tent among Hindus and Muslims. And, he added, 'There are in India 
6,000,000 Christians surrounded by overwhelming masses of fanatical 
members of other religions, and to some of us it appears that their 
whole chance of employment or advancement and even their lives may 
be imperilled by the sudden ending of the partnership of Britain and 
India...' (38). The Archbishop replied that, from the evidence that 
he had, there was no basis for the apprehensions of Page Croft (39). 
The General Secretary of the Methodist Missionary Society, the Reve­
rend Edgar Thompson, repudiated the suggestions of Page Croft much 
more emphatically. Speaking at the annual meeting of the Society, 
Thompson declared that, 'No body of Indian.Christians,.and no repre­
sentative Christian or missionary leader, so far as I am aware, has 
ever given Sir Henry Page Croft any support in this view'. He added, 
'We do not deplore the reform scheme as an abdication by England of 
her responsibility for India's welfare and progress; rather we wel­
come it as a vindication and fulfilment of England's mission to In­
dia' (40). A number of Indian missionaries and missionary leaders 
also rejected Page Croft's ideas as baseless (41).
Sir Henry himself was unwilling, despite this chorus of disap­
proval, to jettison his ideas of the endangered Cross. The confi­
dence of the missionaries was over—optimistic, he stated, and cited 
the Moplah rebellion and other communal conflicts as evidence of the 
inflammable nature of religious feeling in India. 'Can anyone
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contemplate without the gravest concern the position of any religious 
minority when the police and the judiciary have passed from British 
to Indian hands, and how can we be sure that Christians would be im­
mune from such animosities?' Croft asked, and went on to criticize 
the Indian missionaries for seeking to dissociate themselves from 
the British Raj and European civilization. The day Christianity 
and the British flag were divorced, he added, the former would have 
lost the main medium through which it was established around the world, 
and the main inspiration of British civilization would have been 
destroyed (42). Croft's efforts to stir up fears of a Hindu Raj in 
India decimating Christians there bore no fruit because very few 
influential Christians supported him. Besides, it was evident to 
any perceptive observer of the Indian scene that the Christian in 
India had nothing to fear from the nationalist, even if the missiona­
ries from Europe anticipated some curbs on their freedom to propagate 
the Gospel.
The die-hards were successful, however, in creating in many con­
stituencies a feeling that the proposals of the Government on India 
were fraught with danger not only for Britain but for the Indian mas­
ses as well. It was acknowledged by the supporters of the Government 
that they could not, in many areas, counter the effective propaganda 
of the India Defence League, especially since members of the League 
appeared to be capable of exerting much greater influence locally (43). 
The India Defence League had, from the beginning, rapidly developed 
a network of local branches, each with its own organizational struc­
ture, and this provided it with a fairly effective platform for put­
ting across its views. The Union of Britain and India, on the con­
trary, began to consider the setting up of local committees only 
about August 1934 (44). The battle between the India Defence League
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and the Union of Britain and India intensified from this time, and, 
although the Joint Select Committee was the chief instrument of deter­
mining policy, the struggle for public support went on undiminished.
It was, on one level, an intra-party struggle. But, by waging it in 
public, the two bodies kept the debate on India at a high pitch and 
contributed in a substantial measure to increasing public awareness 
of the Indian problem. But, since the die-hards as well as the sup­
porters of the Union of Britain and India belonged to the Conserva­
tive tradition, the debate was conducted within a very limited frame­
work, and it did not do much to totally demolish existing stereotypes 
of Indian politics.
Public opinion is shaped primarily by two factors: preconcep­
tions, formed by conscious absorption and subconscious assimilation 
of information, which constitute the internal mental framework, and, 
secondly, the new information that seeks to alter or reinforce those 
notions already held. Altering an existing set of ideas is evident­
ly a much more difficult task, since there is inevitably an intellec­
tual resistance to change, especially if the internal framework is 
strong and well defined. This was another reason why the die- 
hards were successful in terms of support in the localities. Their 
propaganda was acting to shore up public opinions that had been 
formed over decades of British rule over India. The British public 
had inherited an intellectual image about India and Britain's role 
there which was lit more by the histories of James Mill and the fic­
tion of Kipling than by the writings of Edward Thompson or E.M. 
Forster. It was this image which acted as the internal paradigm 
even in the Thirties, and the implication of die-hard propaganda 
that nothing had changed fitted in very well. If change in public 
opinion was desired, it could be secured only by modifying the
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internal framework of perception. Although this process had begun, 
with a significant number of literary and scholarly works question­
ing assumptions about the British Empire and India, there had been
little change in the preconceptions of the vast majority of people, 
and what change there was was slow.
The slowness of the change was due also to the fact that those
who sought to counter the die-hards did not attempt to alter basic
assumptions about India. Hugh Tinker, analysing the activities of 
the India Conciliation Group, has suggested that mediatory groups are 
constrained to function within parameters set down by those who wield 
power (45). That is to say, they have to function within the dominant 
paradigm. The dominant paradigm is not therefore susceptible to 
change. If groups like the India Conciliation Group were constrained 
to function within closely defined boundaries, it was even less like­
ly that groups like the Union of Britain and India would attempt to 
alter the paradigm.
The Union of Britain and India, for example, merely hinted that 
the consequence of reforms in India would not be anarchy and that 
what was being attempted was reform in a minor key, as a result of 
pledges made in the past. In the various pamphlets published by the 
Union of Britain and India, there was no explicit indication that 
India had become fit for receiving any measure of self-government. 
They were primarily defensive statements, seeking to reassure those 
who were suspicious about the White Paper proposals, and contained 
few positive statements about Indian development. The first leaflet 
issued by the Union of Britain and India, entitled Facts about India: 
Plain Answers to Plain Questions, argued that the White Paper con­
tained adequate safeguards, and that British trade would not suffer. 
Another leaflet suggested that, if the pledges made to India were not
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honoured, ill-will would increase and consequently trade would be af­
fected. Others in the series argued that it was not possible to re­
sile to the Simon Commission recommendations, that the reforms of 
1921 had worked, and that terrorism in India need not lead to a rejec 
tion of the White Paper, as, on the contrary, such a rejection would 
further stimulate the terrorist movement (46).
It was in the nature of the political struggle between the two 
factions of the Conservative Party that there should be little said 
on the manner in which India was more ready for self-government than 
before. The consensus on India was breaking down, but it had not 
yet broken down so irrevocably that the very way in which Indian 
events were viewed was altered. At other points in the political 
spectrum, however, there were visible signs that attempts were being 
made to significantly change the ways in which people saw and thought 
about the Empire. An example of this was the decision of the London 
County Council to change 'Empire Day' celebrated in its schools to 
'Commonwealth Day'. The Education Committee of the London County 
Council approved the issue of a circular to schools indicating the 
change, and suggesting that the celebrations should not be used to 
encourage among children and students any unworthy feelings of racial 
superiority or antagonism for the rest of the world (47).
The Chairman of the Royal Empire Society, Sir Archibald Weigall 
inveighed against this 'grave mistake', as he termed it, arguing that 
it would mislead the child, and eliminate from the child's mind the 
idea that he shared in a great heritage of crown colonies, protecto­
rates and mandated territories. The Royal Empire Society would never 
change its name to the Royal Commonwealth Society, declared Sir 
Archibald to cheers from his audience (48). One correspondent to 
The Times, the Reverend G.S. Hewins, thought that the title, Empire
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Day, was full of significance for children, suggesting the greatness 
of the British Empire, while Commonwealth Day was a weak and meaning­
less title (49).
This minor tussle about a very obscure aspect of the great Em­
pire has, nevertheless, a significance of its own, since it indicates 
the subtle shifts that were taking place in attitudes to the Empire. 
These shifts were necessary if larger changes in the political struc­
ture of the Empire were desired. But as yet such shifts, even if 
evident, did not affect the decision-makers or even those whose opi­
nions influenced the decision-makers. The dominant paradigm was still 
that which saw India as being in virtually permanent tutelage to Bri­
tain. Thus Sir Walter Lawrence recorded in 1934 that, in his opinion, 
human nature had not changed in 2000 years, and that Oriental charac­
ter was not suited to democracy and Parliamentary institutions, and 
therefore the changes that might have occurred in India were meaning­
less. He regretted the fact that Morley, Montagu and Hoare had made 
it impossible to return to the Victorian era which culminated with 
Curzon (50).
Those who saw the viceroyalty of Curzon as the high noon of 
Empire could not accept the gradual eclipsing of the imperial sun by 
the despised nationalists, and to such people the very idea of giving 
away more power and responsibility was anathema. The most extreme of 
the die-hards wished a return to that glorious past. An example was 
Sir Lionel Haworth, formerly of the Indian Army and the Foreign and 
Political Department of the Government of India. For him, the Empire 
was a means by which British traditions, the salvation of the world, 
could be spread to undeveloped and 'savage' areas (51). Most of the 
die-hards were not so reactionary in their views and did not cling to 
such outworn concepts of the role of the Empire. On the other hand,
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they did not believe that the time had come for any substantial mea­
sure of reform in India. The furthest they were willing to go was 
to concede responsibility at the provincial level, and even that was 
to be hedged in by special safeguards to protect law and order. The 
die-hards were determined that, unless the experiment in reforms was 
shown to be successful in the provinces, there should be no talk of 
transfer of any power at the centre. Interestingly, however, des­
pite receiving a significant amount of support, the die-hards did 
not expect the Government to modify the White Paper proposals to any 
large extent (52). Yet they carried on their fight relentlessly.
Why did they do so? Primarily it was a harking back to the Curzonian 
dictum that the loss of India would mean the end of the British 
Empire, and any reforms in India were, in the eyes of the die-hards, 
certain pathways to that bleak and dismal end. Secondly, the die- 
hards were seeking to dislodge Baldwin and the new Conservatism that 
he represented, using India as the crucial lever at that juncture.
But it was this second aspect that perhaps gave the Baldwin 
group an additional rallying point, for they could ask for, and 
get, support for Party unity against divisive forces, especially in 
the face of a serious potential threat from the left wing in British 
politics. True, a rump of the Labour Party was in the National 
Government, and thus was the political ally of the Conservatives*
But the Thirties were the time for militancy, both on the right and 
the left, and the fear of the 'socialists' acted as a useful cement­
ing force for the Conservatives.
It was this which led Rothermere to remark that the Conserva­
tive leaders seemed to think that it was less important to lose India 
than to lose an election (53). It must be noted, however, that 
Rothermere himself was willing to flirt with fascist forces as a
272
means of staving off the rising tide of communism, in Germany, and 
presumably in Britain as well (54). Rothermere's attitudes on In­
dia may have been tied up with his grander vision of a rearmed Bri­
tain ready to resist any invader, but there was at this time a complex 
meshing between sympathy for fascism and hostility to Indian re­
forms. Not all die-hards were inclined to support fascism, but there 
were a significant number of them who saw in the rise of fascism the 
mechanism by which the Empire might be preserved against erosion by 
socialist tendencies. Whereas socialism was anti-imperialist,fas­
cism appeared to be promising a return to the old Empire, ruled by 
imperial fiat, with no quarter for nationalist flimflammery, and it 
was not surprising that die-hards on India should also have shown a 
predilection for the British Union of Fascists, which was advocating 
an Empire reincarnated.
It has been argued that there was no correlation between the 
die-hards and those favouring 'appeasement' (55). But appeasement 
related to making a deal with a potential enemy, while on India and 
the Empire the aims of the fascists in Britain and those of the die- 
hards coincided too well for there to be any divergence of opinion. 
India became, therefore, another ingredient in a strange mixture of 
complex and conflicting ideas on national, imperial and international 
issues.
The vociferous opposition of the die-hards was not entirely 
without effect, for, when the Joint Select Committee published its 
Report, it was evident that the Government had, in order to secure 
the greatest possible measure of support, yielded on certain conten­
tious issues. Most notably, the Report recommended indirect elections, 
increased safeguards for protection of British trade, and more power 
of intervention to Governors. Although the die-hard members of the
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Committee, Salisbury, Middleton, Rankeillour, Craddock and Nall, 
signed a separate Report advocating only provincial autonomy with 
safeguards, it was clear that the Majority Report itself was the 
product of pressures exerted by the die-hards during its long gesta­
tion. The Labour members of the Committee submitted their own mino­
rity Report, recommending that the new constitution should provide 
for the attainment of Dominion status by India without further re­
course to the British Parliament, and with no special powers for the 
Governors and the Governor-General. Although this reflected the In­
dian nationalist view, the Government had reached a position from 
which they would not retreat to satisfy nationalist aspirations.
In fact, at this juncture, although the Government was keen 
not to do anything that might damage the chances of Indian accep­
tance of the Bill to be placed before Parliament, they appear to have 
decided that the Congress, at any rate, was not to be given too much 
importance. Thus, through the summer of 1934, mediators like C.F. 
Andrews and Agatha Harrison attempted to persuade the leaders that 
Gandhi was desirous of peace, and that the Government should make a 
conciliatory gesture, such as release of Congress prisoners, return 
of confiscated buildings and funds, and, if possible, meeting with 
Congress leaders (56). The Secretary of State for India, into whose 
India Office these doves of peace came proferring olive branches, re­
mained unconvinced, while Baldwin politely declined to see Mirabehn 
altogether (57). Indeed, Baldwin appears to have decided that there 
was no use in talking to Gandhi (a move which had been advocated by 
Lloyd George also) as, in his opinion, Gandhi was an 'impossible per­
son' to deal with and difficult to pin down (58).
If in one sense the Congress was the progenitor of the Indian 
reform proposals, it was obvious to the Government that in the
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final version they fell so far short of Congress expectations that 
they would be rejected, leading to further difficulties in getting 
the Bill through an already reluctant Parliament. Indeed, so ap­
prehensive was the Government that they had earlier decided to post­
pone elections in India lest Congress should come to power and wreck 
the reforms scheme by rejecting the Report.
The Congress did indeed reject the Report of the Joint Select 
Committee, and the consequent Bill that was introduced, and Gandhi 
declared that withdrawal of the Bill would be a blessing both for 
India and England (59). But the constitution-making process had 
acquired a momentum of its own, and the Government were determined 
not to let the opposition of either the Indians or of the die-hards 
halt the stately progress of this great constitutional beast which, 
its time come, was slowly moving towards the end. If in fact any 
opposition was noticed, it was that of the die-hards at home, and the 
distant muted voices of the Indians were lost in the plangent cla­
mour in Britain. The adoption of the Majority Report did not deter 
the die-hards, and they decided to fight every line and every comma 
of the Bill at every stage of the Parliamentary process (60).
Looking for sources of strength, the die-hards turned once 
again to the Indian Princes whom they had so assiduously cultivated 
in the past. On 14 December 1934, the Morning Post published an 
article which suggested that the Government would be relieved if 
the Princes decided against joining the Federation. In a letter to 
Patiala, Gwynne, the editor of the Morning Post, declared that, if 
the Princes refused to join the Federation, the Government proposal 
to give responsibility at the centre could be defeated, and that the 
Princes must see 'that the introduction of a drab, uniform, vakil 
raj is going, in the long run, to destroy all that is fine and
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beautiful in India' (62).
The Indian Princes were, naturally, very apprehensive about 
their fate under the proposed Federation, and probably their fears 
were increased by the gloomy forecasts of the die-hards. The result 
was that the Princes passed a resolution at a meeting in Bombay, 
stating that the Bill in the existing form was unacceptable to them. 
That there was collusion between the Princes and the die-hards is in­
dicated by the fact that Churchill was able to quote from the speech­
es made at the Bombay meeting when he was addressing the House of 
Commons a few days later. The Bombay resolution caused consterna­
tion in London, but the Government decided to go ahead with the Bill, 
on the assumption that the Princes would 'tumble in due course' (63).
As the Bill progressed through Parliament, the debate did not 
lose its intensity, and in fact the India question came, briefly, to 
the forefront of British politics. The BBC arranged a series of 
broadcasts by persons representing various shades of opinion (64).
In the Lords, peers who had never voted before, and even those who 
had not even been sworn in, came to vote, and to take the oath and 
participate (65).
Because of the tenacity with which the die-hards continued 
their fight, the Union of Britain and India, which had contemplated 
winding up its affairs soon after the publication of the Select Com­
mittee Report, had perforce to maintain its activities at a high 
pitch (66). It continued to publish its Bulletin, to hold meetings, 
and to keep its local Committees going (67). Functioning within 
the Conservative Party ideology, the Union of Britain and India per­
formed the useful task of blunting the edge of die-hard criticism and 
in the process securing greater support for the Government's policies, 
not only among the Conservatives, but among people with no specific
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Party allegiance.
Since the National Government was predominantly a Conservative 
one, the debate on India could only be conducted within the broad 
ideology of the Conservatives. What the debate revealed, however, 
was the existence of a sharp division between two groups in the Con­
servative Party, one which had a belief in, and was committed to, an 
evolutionist view of Indian constitutional reform, while the other 
saw every step towards Indian self-government as a step towards the 
ruin of the Empire. But it was this internecine conflict that shaped 
the India Bill, not the voices of Indiamationalists. Indian leaders 
might not have seen it as the most reactionary constitution that had 
yet been devised for perpetuating imperialist rule in India, as Rajani 
Palme Dutt described it (68). They might not have, as Birla suggested 
to Lothian, preferred the Act of 1919 to the new Bill, but clearly 
there was resentment that Indians were excluded from the shaping of 
the Act (69). The Government of India Act of 1935 was a compromise 
between opposing factions of British politicians, and not a compromise 
with Indians. Even as late as June 1935, a few weeks before the Act 
received the Royal Assent, Willingdon was refusing to consider a meet­
ing with Gandhi, even though Zetland, the new Secretary of State, 
thought that such a meeting might improve the atmosphere (70).
Why did the focus of Indian politics shift from India to Lon­
don? Although the announcement of the Statutory Commission which ex­
cluded Indians and the assertion that the British Parliament alone 
would formulate the necessary constitutional changes appeared to 
transfer the Indian problem to London, the consequent agitation, 
and the civil disobedience movement of 1930-31, did indicate a 
return of the initiative to India. Yet, when the final act emerged, 
in 1935, it came, not primarily as a response to Indian nationalist
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demands, which it signally failed to meet, but as a product of con­
flicting forces in Britain. The initial impetus, it is true, came 
from the pressure exerted by the Indian nationalist movement. The 
need for reforms was conceded because of the increasing strength of 
the nationalist movement in India, which indicated that without fur­
ther reforms India could not be retained within the Empire. There 
were contemporary observers (as there are modern historians) who 
argued that the reforms were a result of the evolutionary tenden­
cies in British politics (71). Yet it can easily be argued that, 
had it not been for the nationalist movement, there was no need 
for any reforms. Imperial politics required collaborators, and 
collaborators can be secured only at a price. Although in the begin­
ning a minimal share of the spoils of the Raj might have been suffi­
cient to ensure the support of the new elites in India, the changes 
in Indian politics necessarily changed the price of collaboration.
This was further complicated by the rising competition between Bri­
tish and Indian capital, a competition which made collaboration more 
necessary and more expensive.
By this argument, then, the political initiative should have 
remained with the Indian nationalists. It passed, nevertheless, in­
to the hands of British rulers. The explanation for this lay in the 
fact that in the Nineteen Thirties Britain could not shake off the 
mantle of the imperial ruler to the extent that Indians were demand­
ing. The independence of India was an image that contrasted harsh­
ly with the palimpsests of the past which created a picture of a 
permanent Raj slowly toiling to raise India from the abyss of bar­
barity, in which nationalists were obstacles to progress. The politi­
cal stance of the Congress - complete independence - was the result 
of a rising tide of militancy, and it could retreat but little from 
that position. But this was an untenable proposition for the British.
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In the end, therefore, the British had to ignore the Indians, mode­
rates and extremists alike, and forge a new constitution that would 
go as far as possible to meet some Indian aspirations, without ali­
enating the British public, or sections of it, and without sacrific­
ing British economic interests.
But no constitution or commercial arrangement, however clever­
ly wrought, could benefit all British economic interests. While some 
sectors of the economy derived advantage from retaining India in the 
Empire, the price paid for securing that retention - fiscal autonomy 
for instance - adversely affected other sectors. The cotton textile 
industry was one of xhe 'victims' of new political and economic ar­
rangements, and tried to secure special safeguards. It failed to do 
so because the Government was determined to carry through the reforms 
programme without let or hindrance, and to this end even managed to 
persuade the Manchester Chamber of Commerce to alter the evidence it 
had submitted to the Joint Select Committee (72). Indeed, some of 
the cotton traders believed that the Government was suppressing all 
dissent on the White Paper (73).
As already suggested, the difference in attitudes to Indian 
constitutional changes could partly be traced to the different eco­
nomic interests of the various elite groups. The dominant groups, 
particularly the 'new' Tories, were able to overcome die-hard resis­
tance albeit by making concessions. In this sense, it was die-hard 
pressure which gave the final shape to the India Bill of 1935 rather 
than Indian expectations. The Act was not a compromise between In­
dian nationalists and imperial rulers. It was rather a compromise 
between different sections of the British elite.
One reason for this was the necessity of presenting a united 
front to newly emerging social and political forces in British soci­
ety. Already, as the India Act was being inscribed in the Statute
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Book, the die-hards who had fought so passionately against it were 
informing their erstwhile opponents that the time had come to heal 
old wounds and be friends again, though they continued the India 
Defence League into the 1940s. Similarly, it may be argued, there 
was a feeling that the Indian nationalists also faced the threat of 
militancy from the masses, and would need to compromise with the im­
perial rulers.
The making of the 1935 Act showed, then, that, while the 
strength of Indian nationalism was implicitly acknowledged, the 
weaknesses were also recognized and taken advantage of. It also 
showed the divisions that were beginning to appear in Britain. The 
crumbling of the consensus on Empire which led to the bitter strug­
gles between the die-hards and the Government and also to the exposi­
tion of a wider range of views on India, led also to compromise 
designed to resurrect the consensus. But later events were to show 
that the decay was irreversible, for the fundamental paradigm had 
begun to change.
There were several reasons for the change in the paradigm. The 
very intensity of the debate, and the activities of the various pres­
sure groups, focused attention on India and subjected Indian affairs 
to close scrutiny, compelling a re-examination of the Indian question. 
Old notions and ideas did not completely disappear. But they were 
confronted by a new set of ideas,based on new perceptions of Indian 
nationalism. These ideas were espoused by eminent persons in Bri­
tain and thus proved to be influential. They did so partly because 
of an intellectual revulsion against the use of coercion. As Regi­
nald Coupland put it (74):
The idea of forcing our will, even with the best 
of intentions, on subjects who resist and resent 
it has somehow become distasteful to us.
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The distaste arose perhaps not only from moral considerations 
but also from a realization that the use of coercive power abroad 
would ultimately lead to its use at home, as Harold Laski argued 
in India Today, the journal of the India League (75).
The result of such intellectual reorientation was a new struc­
ture of beliefs which made it possible to reduce the resistance to 
the idea of Indian constitutional reform. In the beginning, as the 
British Empire was being established in India, there was a great de­
bate and much pamphleteering (76). In the process, the dominant 
imperial paradigm was created. In the end, as the imperial struc­
tures were shored up by constitutional compromises, the imperial 
paradigm gave way, if only partially, to a new paradigm.
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7: Conclusion
This study of British attitudes to Indian nationalism between 
1922 and 1935 was an attempt to answer three basic questions. What were 
the attitudes of the British public to expressions of Indian nationa­
lism during this period? What was the economic, social, political 
and intellectual context of these attitudes? Finally, what was the 
relationship between these attitudes and imperial policy?
The British public was not a homogeneous entity which reacted 
monolithically to Indian events. On the contrary, the evidence sug­
gests that different groups in British society held different atti­
tudes towards India and Indian nationalism. Admittedly, no attempt 
was made in this study to correlate statistically the attitudes with 
the various social groups. Nevertheless, it is clear that there were 
marked variations in the way in which different sections of British 
society perceived, and reacted to, Indian nationalism.
Who were the people in Britain who took, individually or col­
lectively, an interest in India and expressed opinions on Indian 
events? And what prompted their interest? Some were ardent support­
ers of the British Empire, and they inevitably saw India as a natural 
focus of their imperialism. Former Indian civilians and retired mili­
tary officers with cherished memories of the Raj were, as might be
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expected, prominent among those who became actively involved with Indi­
an affairs. Businessmen with economic interests in India constituted 
another such group. Others, like missionaries and intellectuals, were 
driven by more complex reasons to take a close look at the British con­
nection with India. Significantly, however, the great majority of 
those who displayed an overt interest in India appear to have belonged 
to the middle and upper classes of Britain.
Possibly, this conclusion, that India was essentially a middle 
and upper class preoccupation, might be a result of the narrow focus 
of this study. The sources used, and the questions raised initially, 
might have set artificial limits, and thus led to an arguably false 
conclusion. If working class activities had been probed more deeply, 
it might be argued, a greater awareness about Indian politics among 
British workers might have been revealed. But there is little mani­
fest evidence of the existence of such awareness, except for an occa­
sional and transient interest in India sparked off by incidents like 
Gandhi's visit to Lancashire. Undoubtedly, the Labour Party and the 
Trades Union Congress closely monitored Indian politics, and often 
expressed carefully formulated opinions upon Indian affairs. There 
is no indication, however, that the interest shown by the higher eche­
lons of these organizations percolated down to the grassroots.
What were the reasons for the British worker's apparent indif­
ference to the Raj? There were pamphlets,and articles in newspapers 
like the Daily Herald and the Daily Worker, which attempted to present 
the British worker with alternative views of the Empire. But they do 
not appear to have stirred British workers to rage against imperialism. 
This did not mean, however, that the British working class had been 
successfully and totally incorporated into the imperialist system 
through a social imperialist mechanism (1). If they had been, they
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might have more explicitly supported the Empire. Indeed, traditional­
ly, British workers were ambivalent towards the Empire (2). Such am­
bivalence might have stemmed partly from the differing perceptions of 
the Empire as seen by different fractions of the working class. This 
ambivalence could perhaps have been erased by imperialist propaganda. 
There is little evidence to suggest that in the Twenties and Thirties 
any such attempt was made overtly and explicitly to enlist the active 
support of British workers to defend the Empire.
There were, no doubt, newspapers like the Daily Mail and the 
Daily Express which were suffused by an imperialist ideology, and con­
stantly tried to whip up a perfervid imperialism. But these were aimed 
more at the petit-bourgeoisie than at the workers, although they might 
have also attracted some of the more affluent workers.
The medium which perhaps helped most to inculcate an imperia­
list ethos among workers was cinema. It was in fact because of this 
that political censorship of films was resorted to so that anti-impe­
rialist Sentiments could hot be disseminated through them. But even 
films could only secure a passive acceptance of the Empire.
British workers and their organizations were probably too invol­
ved with domestic economic affairs to be concerned by the problems of 
distant colonies (3). And, it might be that the dialectical tensions 
generated by different perceptions of imperialism also contributed to 
the apparent apathy to questions of imperialism and nationalism.
But then, indifference to imperial affairs and to India was not 
characteristic only of the working class. Between the wars, British 
society as a whole evinced little interest in imperial questions, be­
ing more preoccupied with domestic issues. Although India had been 
usually considered the most vital element in the British Empire, it 
seldom caught the attention of the British public. Even Parliament,
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charged with the ultimate responsibility for India's administration, 
rarely displayed more than perfunctory interest. As India began to 
shuffle off the coils of Empire, however, British interest in Indian 
affairs quickened.
The period between the cessation of the non-co-operation move­
ment and the Government of India Act of 1935 was a period of rapid 
political change in India. The metamorphosis of the Indian nationa­
list movement, triggered by the First World War and its effects, 
gathered momentum and a new more aggressive nationalism was born.
This new militancy captured sections of Indian society which had hither­
to remained outside the political arena and British imperialism found 
itself challenged by a fiercer and more widespread nationalism. These 
developments did not mean that the older, more moderate forms of In­
dian nationalism were completely extinguished. They lingered on, al­
beit in an attenuated state. The predominant form of Indian nationa­
lism was, however, radical and extremist. British responses - consti­
tutional reforms and commercial concessions - were designed to ensnare . 
and tame this new and seemingly protean beast. But these very mea­
sures appeared, on the contrary, to be destroying the web of Empire 
in India.
At a time when Britain faced crises at home and abroad, the 
apparent crumbling of the Raj seemed to be even more threatening.
Very naturally, Indian politics stimulated British interest in India 
to a degree not reached perhaps since the 'mutiny' of 1857.
Books, pamphlets, and articles on Indian subjects appeared in 
prolix profusion. Intense and passionate debates were conducted on 
Indian questions. Pressure groups emerged and attempted to mould of­
ficial policy. Thus, despite the general preoccupation with domestic 
issues, the spectre of a vanishing Empire spurred, it would seem, a
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new interest in India.
This study of expressions of British opinion on India shows that, 
though there was a wide range of attitudes towards Indian nationalism 
and India (the two were necessarily related), essentially three main 
ideas dominated the currents of thought in Britain.
At one extreme was the idea, held by a tiny minority, that impe­
rialism was inherently exploitative, and hence that British domination 
of India should be terminated immediately. The Marxist overtones of 
this idea meant that its proponents viewed Indian nationalists also 
with hostility, since, in their eyes, the nationalists were part­
ners in the imperialist exploitation of India, and therefore as guilty 
as the imperial rulers.
At the other extreme there was the notion that the British 
Empire in India was immutable, and that the British presence in In­
dia was necessarily permanent, since Indians were deemed incapable 
of ever being able to govern themselves efficiently. This too was a 
minority view, also complemented by.an intense hostility towards In-, 
dian nationalists.
The radical Left, with its intense anti-imperialism ,and the ex­
treme Right, with its veneration of the Empire, thus shared an appa­
rently common dislike of the Indian nationalist. Both considered the 
nationalists to be a minority which, if given power, would exploit the 
Indian masses. But the similarity of attitudes was superficial. Be­
neath the surface, there was a fundamental divergence.
The radical Left looked forward to a revolutionary transforma­
tion of Indian society in which the imperialist rulers and their bour­
geois collaborators would both be overthrown. The extreme Right, on 
the other hand, envisaged a permanent Raj in which the British would 
hold the balance between Princes and peasants, having extinguished the
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nationalist.
But the image of the nationalist as a member of an exploitative 
urban elite was one of the most potent weapons in the armoury of the 
imperialist ideologue. The fact that some elements of the radical 
Left agreed with such a formulation tended to reinforce the image.
The anti-imperialism of the Left lost some of its force because of 
this. It introduced an inevitable ambivalence into the struggle of 
the Left against British imperialism. They could not, for ideologi­
cal reasons, espouse the cause of the Indian nationalists, although 
by doing so they would have hastened the dismantling of the British 
Empire. But not all the anti-imperialists were hostile to the nationa­
list leaders. In fact, the majority of them were inclined to see the 
nationalists as a progressive group which ought to be supported, and 
thus came close to what might be called the median view.
The predominant idea, which with minor variations coloured 
most British thought on India, conceded the necessity of political 
reforms and economic concessions, and envisaged the evolution of In^ - 
dia into a self-governing Dominion. In any society, extreme view­
points are usually held by small minorities, while the majority tend 
to congregate towards the middle of the spectrum of attitudes and be­
liefs. This was true also of British attitudes towards Indian natio­
nalism. Nevertheless, the predominance of one set of ideas did not 
mean that the views of the majority were harmonized. Despite general 
agreement on tendencies and principles, there was fierce controversy 
over the mechanics and the degree of devolution in India. In part, 
this controversy was stimulated by pressure from the peripheries of 
the ideological spectrum, and also by the very range of ideas on In­
dia that were thrown up during this period.
This controversy revolved around two crucial questions. First­
ly, was India ready for self-government? And, secondly, to which
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elements of Indian society should power be given? The answers to these 
questions were determined by British perceptions about the nature of 
Indian society and the character of the Indian nationalist movement. 
These perceptions were influenced by attitudes which constituted an 
internal paradigm or model. Images of India that reinforced this in­
ternal model were easily accepted, while those that tended to weaken 
the paradigm were rejected. The parallels with the African experience 
of European observers are striking and significant. Philip Curtin 
has pointed out how the British image of Africa differed from the 
African reality (4).
...reporters went to Africa knowing the reports of 
their predecessors and the theoretical conclusions 
already drawn from them. They were therefore sensi­
tive to data that seemed to confirm their European
preconceptions, and they were insensitive to contra­
dictory data. Their reports were thus passed through 
a double set of positive and negative filters, and 
filtered once more as they were assimilated in Britain.
Data that did not fit the existing image were most of­
ten simply ignored. As a result, British thought about 
Africa responded very weakly to new data of any kind.
Curtin did not link the European'Africaanschaung', as he called it, 
to imperialism. But, given the resonances between the Indian and
African cases, it can be argued that the preconceptions and the dis­
tortions that flowed from them were consequences of the imperialist 
need to 'incorporate' subject people and also to create an imperia­
list mystique for home.
As in Africa, so in India too, images were formed within a 
closed, self-sustaining intellectual system which repelled new images. 
Moreover, attitudes which are shaped by received images and in turn 
act as filters, are resistant to change. There could be slow shifts 
in the paradigm, but the accumulation of powerful alternative images 
that could secure a really significant shift was inhibited by control 
of the transmission of images and ideas inimical to Empire. The possi­
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bilities of changing the paradigm were therefore very slight.
The predominant paradigm about India was one which had been in­
herited from the past, from a time when imperialism sought to justify 
itself and therefore created an image of a backward India that needed 
the civilizing influence of the British. The implicit assumption of 
the racial and cultural superiority of the European, the notion that 
Indians were effete, corrupt and inefficient, the concept of martial 
races, and the idea that Indian society was degenerate because of an 
excessive sexuality, were all part of this structure of beliefs that 
became the paradigm which conditioned perceptions of India.
This paradigm was generated by the mythology of an expansionist 
imperialism. As imperialist structures began to be buffeted by the 
rising tide of nationalism, the paradigm was reinforced by reiteration 
of the old myths. The Twenties and Thirties saw the resurrection of 
old images of India. If their function in the past had been the justi­
fication of imperialism, they were now defensive statements, justify­
ing the permanence of Empire and legitimizing the continuation of Bri­
tish rule over India. But these were not 'new' ideas or images: they 
were merely old images refurbished and reproduced. This constant re­
iteration prevented change.
Besides, for those whose experience of the Empire and India was 
in an imperialist high noon, any change was anathema. Ruth Lee, who 
travelled through India with her husband, Lord Lee of Fareham who was 
the chairman of the Royal Commission on the Indian Civil Services, des­
cribed one encounter with Rudyard Kipling, who gave her the impression 
of being as prejudiced against any new developments in India as 'any 
old "Qui Hai"' (5). That was in 1931. There was a permanence of il­
lusion, as it were, which inhibited change. It was within such a 
reinforced paradigm, for instance, that the Simon Commission operated.
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11s members carried with them a set of notions about India which had 
been inherited from the past, and it was inevitable that they should 
have found little to alter their preconceptions to any significant 
extent.
The reinforcement of the predominant paradigm became all the 
more necessary as Indian nationalism became more militant and thus 
more threatening. Although it was often dismissed as an irrelevant 
irritant, Indian nationalism and its concrete manifestations in the 
form of agitation and political unrest could not but be perceived as 
a threat to the permanence of the Raj. It became necessary, there­
fore, to attack Indian nationalism, and this attack came from two 
directions.
Since India remained a sphere of darkness which even the efful­
gent imperial sun could not penetrate to any significant degree, the 
argument ran, the demands of the nationalists for self-government 
were untenable. India had to remain under British tutelage. Second­
ly, the nationalists were, it was argued, a small urban minority hun­
gry for political power which they would only abuse to exploit the 
rural masses. The minority and potentially oppressive character of 
the nationalists was further emphasized by stressing that they were 
'Hindu' and not Indian. The idea that India was not a nation and that 
it never could be proved enduring, but it was now given a religious 
colour as well. Not only was a distinction drawn between the 'Hindu' 
nationalist and the loyal Muslim, but the 'Hindu' nationalist was cast 
also as the oppressor of the low caste rural masses.
The attack on the nationalists meshed closely with the recurrent 
notion that India was and would remain primarily an agricultural coun­
try (6). The question of whether imperialism inhibits or advances 
colonial industrial development has in recent times generated an
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intense historiographic controversy (7). It is particularly interest­
ing therefore that the idea of India remaining an agricultural coun­
try producing raw materials for the metropolis and consuming its manu­
factured goods should have been enunciated so often. This is not being 
offered as proof of any theory of imperialism as the progenitor of 
underdevelopment; it is, nonetheless, suggestive, since it reflects an 
underlying attitude that India must serve the economic interests of 
Britain. There was also a resonance between this attitude and the no­
tion entertained by some elements in Britain who visualized a perma­
nent Empire in India consisting of Princes and peasants living amica­
bly under the imperial sun.
That such scenarios were sketched out by right-wing Conserva­
tive groups, and in particular by the Morning Post, is significant 
in this context. On the one hand, Indian Princes and landlords were 
seen as conservative elements who would neutralize the radicalism of 
the nationalists. On the other hand, there was also a natural affini­
ty at work here. Suggestively, the keenest British supporters of the 
Indian feudal elements were those who could be termed the 'old' Conser­
vatives. They were mostly members of the rural squirearchy, and the 
India Defence League, which was dominated by them, was one of the chief 
defenders of the interests of the Indian Princes. In addition, they 
also cast themselves as protectors of the Indian peasantry against 
the urban nationalist. They represented therefore one strand in 
British thought on India which visualized an India preserved as a 
feudal society.
Bill Warren has argued that the apparent 'preservation' of 
pre-capitalist modes of production was due to uneven development of 
capitalism, and that, in the long run, imperialism was a liberating 
force, as Marx had prognosticated (8). The focus of this study has
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been, however, on intentions and preconceptions rather than final deci­
sions and end results. It is therefore interesting that an influenti­
al group in Britain should have desired the preservation of a feudal 
order in India, and that this group reflected the assumptions and 
ethos of an older Conservatism. This also indicates that,just as the 
British 'public' was not monolithic in its attitudes towards India, 
so too were British economic interests differentiated into several 
distinct strands.
This was because of the complex contradictions of imperialism. 
Although Britain would have benefited in one sense from 'preserving' 
the Indian economy in a feudal or semi-feudal state, it was neces­
sary also to raise the productive capacities of India, even if it 
were only to raise consumption of the industrial produce of the met­
ropolis. This would have, in turn, created the conditions for fur­
ther economic development. The growing strength of the Indian capita­
lists meant that in some sectors at least they began to compete with 
foreign entrepreneurs. This contradiction was partly resolved through 
a wary alliance with Indian nationalists (9). The protectionist poli­
cies engendered by this union did not always defend the Indian entre­
preneur. Various multinationals merely set up local subsidiary opera­
tions and remained blithely oblivious of the hard edge of nationalist 
economic policies (10). Essentially, although the 'old' industries 
like textiles suffered because of tariff policies, the 'new' indus­
tries like chemicals could overcome the barriers by the fairly sim­
ple expedient of local manufacture. It must be noted, however, that 
they too required the pax britannica to prosper, for only a colonial 
Government would have given them sufficient guarantees against nati­
onalist expropriation or allowed them to repatriate profits without 
hindrance. Nevertheless, they were perhaps more willing to make
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compromises with the Indian nationalist movement than other sections 
of the British economy. It can be argued that decolonization might 
have been resisted with greater vigour if there had been the need to 
exercise a rigid control over India's economy. If business could be 
carried on as usual, what need colonies in the traditional sense?
The suggestion here is that the willingness of some British economic 
interests to accept the devolution of some power to Indians facilita­
ted political change, and allowed also the growth of alternative struc­
tures of beliefs about India.
Such structures were gradually created by individuals and groups 
which tended to question received notions about imperialism and Bri­
tain's role in India. A new paradigm of perceptions slowly came into 
existence, one in which Indian nationalism was perceived as a progres­
sive force, and the leadership was seen as being capable of ameliorat­
ing the condition of the masses. The creation of this alternative pa­
radigm made change more likely and less painful.
What were the roots of such anti-imperialist ideas? Britain 
had a tradition of anti-imperialism and in the Twenties this tradi­
tion appears to have surfaced again. The period after the First 
World War was in any case a time of intellectual flux. New ideas and 
new ways of looking at the world had begun to exert their influence on 
people everywhere, and not least in Britain. From Relativity to Marx­
ism, from psychoanalysis to philosophy, a new intellectual ferment led 
to reformulation of old ideas and to questioning of traditional assump­
tions. New attitudes towards India and Indian nationalism can be 
placed in this intellectual context.
It can also be argued that the rising militancy of Indians and 
the consequent use of increasing repressive force by the British forced 
a re-examination of old attitudes. Particularly for Christian groups,
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the use of the coercive power of the State must have seemed abhorrent, 
and a contradiction of the original concept of the Empire as a vehicle 
for the dissemination of Christianity. To some Christians the Indian 
nationalists might have seemed to be too 'Hindu' to be given power 
which they might use to oppress the various minorities and the 'sche­
duled castes'. But imperialism rampant could have appeared even less 
attractive.
The events in India also obviously had their repercussions on 
British attitudes. The civil disobedience movement, for example, 
demonstrated the falsity of the traditional notion of the nationalist 
spirit being confined to the towns and the cities. Similarly, the 
radicalization of the Congress, manifested in the formation of the 
Congress Socialist Party, might have introduced a sense of urgency 
into British political circles. The earlier a compromise could be 
forged in India, the more moderate the leadership that would have and 
hold power, according to one calculation.
The struggle in Britain over the Indian question, then, had 
several components, one of which was the conflict between alternative 
structures of belief. The distinction between the two sets of ideas 
was not clear and precise, and even within each paradigm there were 
constantly shifting perceptions. It can be said, however, that, just 
as imperialism in its expansionist phase produced an imperialist mytho­
logy, it was accompanied in a period of decline by the emergence of a 
new and antithetical set of beliefs.
It would be difficult to establish a causal relationship between 
ideas and the expansion of empires. But ideas favouring and encourag­
ing such expansion did arise and created attitudes supportive of impe­
rialism which made the riveting of imperial rule more acceptable to 
the subject people as well as to the people of the dominant country.
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Similarly, while it cannot be argued that critics of the Empire brought 
about decolonization, it would appear that they and their ideas facili­
tated the process of imperial retreat.
Some social psychologists have argued that there is no relation­
ship between attitudes and behaviour (11). But the problem is perhaps 
one of measurement, for the relationship cannot be determined with any 
degree of precision. It is possible to argue that, as attitudes con­
dition the way in which an object or a situation is perceived, they 
influence the responses of an individual or of a State. The relation­
ship is perhaps too complex to be analysed accurately but that it 
exists can be inferred, if not measured. In fact it was, in the case 
of India, a self-sustaining relationship. British attitudes which con­
stituted the traditional paradigm influenced the way in which the In­
dian problem was perceived, and these perceptions in turn conditioned 
imperial responses to Indian affairs.
Attitudes, then, set the mental boundaries within which imperi­
al decision-makers functioned. The parameters of their policies were 
determined, in the sense of exerting pressure and influence, by the 
predominant structure of beliefs. This would seem to suggest that 
public opinion as expressed through pressure groups would have exerted 
no significant influence. Indeed, some scholars have argued that there 
was little concrete empirical evidence to correlate public opinion and 
public policy (12).
But it was partly the expectation of influencing and altering 
official policy that led to the emergence of pressure groups which 
proliferated during the great debate on Indian policy. Pressure 
groups often serve to reinforce the beliefs and attitudes of their mem­
bers by providing a more intense focus and by creating an intellectual 
milieu in which such attitudes are inevitably sharpened. They could
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also facilitate attitude change by providing alternative foci, and 
by advancing new paradigms of perception. Fundamentally, however, 
pressure groups are formed in order to exert influence on the decision­
makers in power. The groups that emerged in the Thirties, during the 
discussions on India, were the products of such expectations. Some of 
these, like the India Defence League, were defenders of the Empire 
and hoped to stop the retreat of the Raj. Others, like the Union of 
Britain and India, represented within the predominant paradigm the 
elements who hoped quickly to forge a compromise in India and thus 
secure the continuance of British economic interests. Others, like 
the India Conciliation Group and the India League, tried to create 
alternative structures of belief. But, as Hugh Tinker has pointed out, 
apropos of the India Conciliation Group, the groups sympathetic to 
Indian nationalism were faced with a dilemma: on the one hand they 
were trying to espouse the cause of a subject people and had to adopt 
their values and modes of thought, while on the other hand, in order 
that their efforts might succeed, they had to 'accept the rules of the 
game as laid down by the powerholders, and by pressing for small con­
cessions, here and there,...achieve small ameliorations' (13).
In other words, pressure groups necessarily had to function 
within the predominant paradigm. But they could act as sources of 
new ideas about the colonial people, and thus help to alter the para­
digm. It was perhaps this aspect of the activities of pressure groups 
that caused concern to the Government, compelling them to monitor pres­
sure group activities, and even attempt to undermine their influence. 
The Government also attempted to mould public opinion. It supported, 
for instance, organizations like the Union of Britain and India, which 
would reinforce the propaganda of the State. Or, as in the case of 
the India League, the Government tried to prevent the dissemination of
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alternative images inimical to Empire.
There is also some evidence to suggest that on a few occasions 
the State reacted explicitly to public opinion, as for example over 
the Irwin Declaration of October 1929 which was in effect recanted, 
or as in the incorporation of 'safeguards' into the Government of 
India Act of 1935. Reflecting as it did the dominant ideology, the 
State had to mould policy and opinion to obtain the closest possible 
correspondence between them. The rise of contrapuntal themes and 
ideas made the task of the State more difficult perhaps, and thus made 
it necessary for the State to take them also into consideration.
Imperialism is a complex matrix of interacting elements such 
as domestic and international economies, political structures, and 
ideologies. Attitudes and opinions, which are a part of the ideologi­
cal element, might not have determined the precise nature of imperi­
al policy, but they did set the limits of action and drew the bounda­
ries of thought within which the chief actors could formulate their 
policies.
In this sense, British attitudes to Indian nationalism made 
certain policies more likely than others. Other, more material, fac­
tors were no doubt responsible for determining the fundamental charac­
ter of imperial policy, but the structure of beliefs that existed at the 
time shaped the contours of that policy in significant ways. Similarly, 
the alternative images of India that were projected by many sympathetic 
individuals and groups helped to create a new climate of opinion which, 
it may be said, prepared the path for a peaceful transition. Alterna­
tive ideas did not entirely extinguish the dominant ideology. In the 
nature of things, they could not have, since the predominant paradigm 
had an intrinsic inertia which resisted change. Nevertheless, they 
contributed to the process of dismantling, however slowly, the
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imperialist structure of beliefs which was nurtured by, and in turn re­
inforced for so long, the British Empire.
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